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I. Introduction
The general failure of city officials to embark on a sustained and
comprehensive program of housing code enforcement may be ex-
plained by a variety of factors: housing codes often contain obsolete
or impractical requirements;' successful code enforcement does not
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1. It would be pointless to attempt a detailed analysis of the anomalies contained in the
thousands of housing codes and supporting regulations enacted by American municipalities.
The most significant study of prevailing code requirements found little consistency between
code provisions on the same points and found further that little or no scientific research
has been attempted to support the standards selected. Its conclusion that "tradition,
rule-of-thumb and personal experience" play the preponderant role in the formulation of
standards corresponds to the intuition of any person hardy enough to read in full the
requirements imposed by any urban housing code, complemented by its regulations. See
Mood, The Development, Objective, and Adequacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in
HOUSING CODE STANDAws: THREE CRITICAL STUDIES 33 (NATIoNAL CoastmissmON ON UnIAN
PROBLEmiS, Research Report No. 19, 1969). See also NATIONAL CotussiON ON UrnAN
PROBLEMS, BUnIDiNG THE AixmcAN CrrY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 273-807
(1969).
For our purposes, it will suffice to characterize the nature of a housing code in highly
generalized terms. The analysis presented here will consider the economic and ethical
justification of any housing code which seeks to regulate the existing housing stock
to prevent deterioration below a level of quality mandated by the relevant policy makers'
sense of "decency." The critical limitation upon the scope of this essay lies in its exclusive
concern with public control of the quality of older housing which is deemed to provide
inferior amenity levels; no effort has been made to discuss the different problems po, by
governmental control over the construction of new housing through the use of "building
codes." With this caveat, the analysis presented here applies not only to quality param-
eters which have traditionally been a concern of housing codes, but to any plausible fet of
standards a decision maker might choose. Nevertheless, it will doubtless be of assistance
1093
HeinOnline -- 80 Yale L.J. 1093 1970-1971
The Yale Law Journal
yield great political dividends for the incumbent administration;
since code enforcement is such humdrum work, it does not often
attract personnel of high quality; present methods of enforcing com-
pliance with code requirements are woefully deficient; finally, the
poor often lack the political power to maintain a sustained regulatory
effort on their behalf.2 All of these considerations are quite real and I
do not mean to minimize them. Nevertheless, my casual conversations
with both city officials and representatives of tenant organizations have
suggested to me that these factors do not in themselves fully explain
to the reader to have a sense of the typical elements of the contemporary code, which is
adequately conveyed by a Douglas Commission Research Report:
The substantive content of most housing codes includes three broad subject arets,
namely 1) minimum facilities and installed equipment; 2) maintenance of the
dwelling unit and of facilities and equipment; and 3) use, maximum occupancy, and
conditions of occupancy. A comprehensive coverage of provisions related to minimum
facilities and installed equipment usually includes: water supply and waste water
disposal; garbage and rubbish disposal; kitchen and hand washing sinks; bathing
facilities; toilet facilities; means of egress; heating equipment for the dwelling unit
and hot water supply; lighting; ventilation; and electrical service.
Most housing codes will contain specific provisions pertaining to maintenance of the
dwelling and of the supplied facilities and equipment to include such items as: general
sanitary conditions; chimneys, flues and other potential fire hazards; electrical wiring;
insect and rodent infestation; internal structural repair; external structural repair; and
dampness.
The sections of most housing codes that regulate use, maximum occupancy, and
conditions of occupancy usually have provisions pertaining to: living space over.
crowding; sleeping space overcrowding; doubling of families; separation of sexes;
and mixed use of living space for business purposes.
Most, if not all, housing codes tend to rely on general words or phrascs without
defining them such as 'good repair', 'adequate', and 'safe condition.' These terms
are difficult to interpret and sometimes create confusion. Much is left to personal
judgment.
Mood, supra, at 15-16. See also U.S. DE'r. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, APHA-PHS
RECOMMENDED HOUSING MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPANCY ORDINANCE (Public Health Service
Pub. No. 1935, 1969); NEw YoRK CITY CHARTER AND ADMIN. CODE §§ D26-1.01 ct seq. (1970),
PHILADELPHIA CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 7-100 et seq. (1963).
2. The literature evidencing this depressing litany is large and growing constantly. The
most useful studies are: COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW Yolu, CODE ENFOnctNIENT
FOR MULTIPLE DWELLINGS IN NEW YORK CITY (PART II): ENFORCEMENT THROUGH CRIMINAL
COURT AcrION (1965); F. GRAD. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS (NATIONAL
COMIISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, Research Report No. 14, 1968); GRAD, WEISS & HACY,
LEGAL REMEDIES IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (Legislative Drafting
Research Fund, Columbia University 1965); B. LIEBERMAN, LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF HOUSING CODES (1969); PHILADELPHIA HOUSING ASSOCIATION, IMPEDIMENTS
TO HOUSING CODE COMPLIANCE (1963); J. S.AvETr & M. LEvIN, NEiv AP IROACIES TO HOUS-
ING CODE ADMINISTRATION (NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, Research Report
No. 17, 1969); Castrataro, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Failure in New
York City, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 60 (1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanc-
tions and Remedies, 66 CoLumI.L. RE v. 1254 (1966); Lehman, Building Codes, Housing
Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. Cm. L. RLv. 180 (1963);
Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 COLuVf. L. Rgv.
275 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 H-ARv. L. RFV. 801 (1965);
Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HAtv. L. Rav. 1115 (1956); Note, Enforcement "of th
New Orleans Housing Code-An Analysis of Present Problems and Suggestions for Ims.
provement, 42 TUL. L. REv. 604 (1968); Note, Administration and Enforcement of the
Philadelphia Housing Code, 106 U. OF PA. L. REv. 437 (1958).
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the general failure of code enforcement programs. In large measure,
the lethargy is itself a symptom of a more fundamental problem-most
policy makers involved in housing code enforcement are themselves
unsure whether code enforcement is a good thing. They are not con-
vinced that strict enforcement of even an ideal code will really benefit
the tenants whom the code is intended to "protect." They fear that
landlords who are required to improve their properties to code stan-
dards will simply pass on the added costs to their tenants by increasing
rents or that they will abandon the properties entirely, thereby depriv-
ing tenants of even sub-code accommodations. Thus, "effective" code
enforcement may simply require the poor to allocate an additional
share of their meagre budgets to the purchase of housing services when
the poor themselves would prefer to purchase more food or entertain-
ment or automobiles.
As a consequence, code enforcement tends to oscillate wildly between
passive and active phases. At times, city officials--temporarily confident
of their superior wisdom-impose their preference for better housing
upon the poor and embark upon a moralistic code enforcement "cam-
paign" which couples a "massive crash enforcement program" with
an even more massive dose of invective against greedy slumlords and
"intolerable" living conditions. Unfortunately, moral indignation is
difficult to maintain indefinitely for any cause, however noble. And
it may be expected to cool quite rapidly when landlord groups threaten
to pass on the costs of code enforcement to the hapless tenantry and,
even more devastatingly, when both landlord and tenant organizations
prophesy that the "campaign" will induce a significant number of
owners to withdraw their buildings from the rental housing market
and even abandon their properties entirely-thereby reducing the
available low rent housing stock and leaving the city free to become
the biggest slumlord of all if it dares to foreclose its tax lien on the
abandoned properties.
When faced with this rather dismal cycle of stem enforcement and
benign neglect,3 even an observer extremely sympathetic to the plight
3. No one has attempted to describe systematically the politics of code enforcement or
to ascertain the degree to which the cyclical pattern suggested here has any basis in reality
although the history of code enforcement in New York City, over the very long term, has
seemed to correspond with this hypothesis. See Gribetz & Grad, supra note 2, at 1259.67.
While it is possible to document the cyclical theory with citations to various fragmentary
newspaper reports, it would be more candid to rest the theory at this stage simply upon
casual empiricism, which-despite its unsystematic character-may nonetheless be correct.
As this essay will suggest, the existence of such a cycle would be readily predictable from
a theoretical analysis of the consequences of a code enforcement program which is not
supported by an appropriate subsidy effort. See p. 1112 infra.
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of the slum tenant will tend to give code enforcement an unimportant
place in any plausible strategy to ameliorate ghetto conditions. Perhaps
one should enforce the code strictly against those houses which are so
utterly indecent that a civilized society cannot tolerate the thought
of yet another generation maturing in such a festering environment.
Society may cry out that some houses are so abominable that they con-
stitute an absolute evil, without concerning itself with what is to hap-
pen to the families who are deprived even of these execrable accommo-
dations if the landlord responds to the commands of the code inspector
by simply abandoning his property completely. However, if this cry
of dismay can ever serve as a justification for social policy, it may only
do so in the most extreme cases.
If code enforcement is to be considered a tool of broad utility, its
use must be justified on quite different lines. This essay attempts such
a justification, although-as should be anticipated-the analysis pre-
sented here certainly does not suggest that comprehensive code en-
forcement should be attempted at all times in all places. While re-
finements must await subsequent analysis, it will assist the reader if
the main thrust of the argument is presented at the outset. Compre-
hensive code enforcement is considered here as a program which may,
under certain conditions, redistribute income from the landlord class
to the generally poorer tenant class. If a slum dweller has been paying
$80 a month for a rat-infested apartment and is still paying 580 a
month after the landlord is forced by code authorities to take effective
steps toward rat prevention, the tenant has received something for
nothing, while the landlord has paid out cash and received no addi-
tional returns. If the typical tenant would refuse to return to his former
life among the rats even if he were given a monthly cash grant of $5 in
compensation, code enforcement has in effect put an additional $5 a
month in his pocket. Thus, once our society has determined that the
poor tenant class has an unfair share of the national income,4 compre-
4. It should be stated explicitly at the outset that this essay does not attempt to argue
that the present distribution of income and wealth in contemporary America is seriously
flawed, but proceeds from the premise that substantial redistribution to the poor may be
justified in principle. Recent commentaries, emanating primarily from the Harvard Law
School, seem to suggest that John Rawls' philosophy of social justice may serve as an
appropriate theoretical basis for an active redistributionist effort. See Michelman, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAIw. L. REv.
7, 14-16 (1969); C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUEs 61-74 (1970). See also W. RUNCIIAN,
RE ATVE DEPRIVATION AND SocIAL JusricE 247-95 (1966); Reparations for Blacks? In 4
G. H GHEs, SocIAL JusTIcE 74-92 (unpublished course materials prepared for students In
the New York University Law School, 1968). For the basic philosophical arguments, see
Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, 13 NAT. L. Foutinr 51 1968); Rawls, Consli-
tutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice in Nomsos VI: JusricE 98 (C. FriedrIch F. J.
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hensive code enforcement is one of the programs which may signifi-
candy contribute to righting the balance.
Before comparing the merits and demerits of code enforcement with
proposals for a negative income tax and other income redistribution
schemes, however, it is first necessary to consider the conditions under
which economic theory suggests that landlords will not be able to pass
on their code costs to tenants.5 For it should be apparent that to the
extent landlords increase rent above $80 when they eliminate the rats,
the redistributive impact of code enforcement is diminished. And if
landlords can increase the rent to $85 the redistributive effect of
the program will be dissipated completely, since the typical tenant,
by hypothesis, values a rat-free house at no more than that sum. Con-
sequently, Section II of this essay develops a model of a city slum in
which code enforcement generates no rent increases, thereby causing
a significant income redistribution effect in favor of tenants. The most
significant lesson to be learned from Section I is this: under certain
conditions, a program in which the code is enforced comprehensively
throughout the city's slums has a superior redistributive potential
compared to a program under which enforcement is attempted in only
a portion of a city's slums. In developing this model, it will become
apparent that in many situations, code enforcement will fail as a re-
Chapman eds. 1963); Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PMiL. Rav. 164 (1958); Rawls, The Sense
of Justice, 72 PmI.. Rxv. 281 (1963). While this corpus undoubtedly represents the most
significant contemporary effort at s)stematic explication of a conception of justice re-
quiring some degree of redistribution, I find m)self unable to join the Rawlsian school
and am instead compelled to look elsewhere to justify a movement tomard a greater
degree of economic equality than now exists. The reasons for this position are best post-
poned to a later writing, however, since they involve factors far removed from housing
policy.
While the ultimate issue of distributive justice is deferred here, significant issues of
fairness arise in an assessment of housing policy even within the context of an overarching
commitment to significant redistributionism. These issues will be canvassed at pp. 1157-77
infra.
5. In contrast to the cornucopia of learning available to the student who wishes to
understand the institutional detail surrounding housing codes and their administration,
see sources dted at note 2 supra, there is virtually nothing of substance attempting even
the simplest analysis of this issue, despite its central role in the entire regulatory effort.
The only significant discussion may be found in A. Sctur, Eco.o!rzc Aspzcrs or UaN
REENwAL: THEORY, POLICY, AND AREA ANALYSIS 10-15 (Research Report No. 14, Real
Estate Research Program, Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of
California, Berkeley, 1960), whose five pages contain several basic insights into the issue
but which does not purport to be an effort at even moderately comprehensive analysis.
Comments in the important recent works written by serious students of urban economics
are so fragmentary as to be virtually useless. W. GrCrSUY, HOUSING M.4rrs AND Ptinuc
POLICY 306 (1963); R. Mtrr, Crmis AND HOUSING 134, 330-35 (1969); IV. SNm?, HousING:
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOic EtM ENs 390 (1970). The poverty of tdcolarship in this area
can probably best be explained by noting its position in the arid w-asteland still sep-
arating law and economics-while the issue is too "theoretical" for the typical professor
of property law, it is too "institutional" for the professor of economics. Consequently, it is
ignored despite its significance for the rational formulation of public policy.
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distribution program unless the government is willing to subsidize the
slum housing market. After the dimension of this housing subsidy is
discussed (Section III), the redistributive impact of code enforcement,
when supported by a housing subsidy scheme, is compared to the redis-
tribution potential of a negative income tax plan (Section IV). The
principal lesson to be learned here is this: expenditure of government
money upon a code enforcement-housing subsidy scheme will in many
situations benefit the poor tenant class substantially more than the
expenditure of the same sum of government money on a negative in-
come tax plan. Succeeding portions of the essay attempt to provide a
more complete assessment of the impact of code enforcement. Since
these sections build upon the analysis of the earlier discussions, I shall
not attempt to describe their argument in detail, but simply state what
is perhaps the most important conclusion: the more monopolistic the
organization of the slum housing market, the greater the tenant bene-
fits generated by an expenditure of a dollar of government money on
a code enforcement-subsidy program (Section VI).
After establishing the conditions under which the government's in-
vestment of a dollar in code enforcement will benefit the poor more
than will a dollar of public money invested in a negative income tax,
the essay compares these two programs along several additional di-
mensions by considering their relative fairness to the poor, fairness to
the rich, fairness to the much maligned "slumlord" (all in Section VII),
ability to correct market failures, and overall cost to society (both in
Section VIII). As this multi-faceted comparison is developed, it
becomes quite clear that code enforcement, even when backed by a
special housing subsidy, cannot be seriously proposed as the sole strat-
egy to be adopted by a government committed to a policy of sub-
stantial income redistribution; on the other hand, code enforcement
can play an important role within a larger war on poverty which in-
dudes a system of cash grants. Indeed, a strategy which contemplated
both housing code and cash grant programs would sometimes be su-
perior to, and often no less desirable than, one which relied exclusively
on the disbursement of cash grants. From this perspective, it will prove
possible to evaluate not only the current federal effort to encourage
local use of the code enforcement technique but also the now sub-
stantial movement joined by courts and legislators, as well as commen-
tators, which seeks to alter dramatically the traditional law of landlord
and tenant to provide the tenant with sufficient legal remedies to as-
sure a decent home for his family (Section IX).
As this brief summary suggests, the argument advanced here pro-
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ceeds in a manner which some of my readers will find overly abstract
for their taste. Instead of beginning with a description of the structure
of the slum rental market as it actually exists, I shall instead consider
the impact of code enforcement on a series of hypothetical slum mar-
kets, each of whose relationship to reality is controversial. I have taken
this course for three reasons. First, we do not yet know enough about
the slum market to justify confident descriptions of its structure. All
students of the slum market are, of course, greatly indebted to George
Sternlieb for his pathbreaking study of central Newark which cast
grave doubt upon the popular stereotype of the rapacious slumlord
earning monopolistic profits at the expense of an oppressed tenantry.
The ownership of Newark's slums in the mid-1960's was found to be
quite diffuse; 7 in addition, far more fragmentary data suggested that
the rate of return earned by the typical landlord on his original in-
6. G. STEaRna, THE TENEMt- LANoLORD (1966).
7. In Sternlieb's sample of 385 "parcels," 42.8 per cent were owned by persons owming
no other houses, 21.6 per cent by persons owning only one or two other properties, 10.9
per cent by those owning from three to six, 7.8 by those owning seven through twelve and
15.8 by those owning more than twelve. G. STmNrmT-, supra note 6, at 122-23. This distribu-
tion may, however, seriously understate the degree of concentration prevailing in Newark's
rental markets, since each of the "parcels" in Sternlieb's sample did not contain the same
number of apartments, id. at 46, and it is most likely that the "single parcel oner" -who
bulks so large in the data owned parcels which contain a far smaller number of apartments
on the average than the multi-parcel owners. This is suggested by the fact that seventy
per cent of the "single parcel owners" lived in the house they oined, id. at 131, 135,
conjuring up a picture of a large number of "Mrs. Murphys" living on the ground floor
and renting the second and third floors to two additional families.
Despite Sternlieb's unfortunate failure to take account of the imperfection of the "par-
cel" concept which serves as the basis of his study, the Newark figures do suggest a con-
siderable diffusion of apartment ownership. Sternlieb's subsequent study of New York
City's rental market reveals a somewhat smaller percentage of "single parcel" owners in
his sample (59.1 per cent), although the pattern of parcel ownership remains extremely
diffuse. See G. STRaxNam, Tnm URAN HousING Dmuom 13.1-1341, esp. Exhibit 1 at 13.2
(prelim. draft 1970). In this study, however, data are provided which explicitly indicate that
"single parcel owners" control houses which contain substantially fewer apartments on the
average than larger owners, see id. at Fxhibit 1, 13-2, therefore making their share of the
apartment market smaller than the study suggests. Moreover, the relevance of the New
York data to an understanding of slum markets is attenuated since Sternlieb's sample ias
taken from all rent controlled apartments in the city, and from not solely slum districts.
An ambitious examination of housing and poverty in the city of Baltimore which is
being presently undertaken by Professor William G. Grigsby of the University of Penmsyl.
vania and his associates has uncovered a similar degree of concentration of slum ownership:
According to our survey, over one-fourth of the private inner-city rental inventory
is owned or controlled by about 50 professionals, with the largest having in excess
of 1,500 units and the smallest, about 100. At the other end of the scale are what
might be termed casual investors, persons owning fewer than five units. In between,
are the small investors who have anywhere from five to 24 dwellings, and the
medium-size owners with holdings of from 25 to 100 units. It is our guess, based on
very small samples, that medium-sized investors hold somewhere around 15 per cent
of the inventory, with the small and casual investors accounting for te remaining
60 per cent.
%V. GRIGSBY, L. ROSENBURG, M. STEGMAN & J. TAYLOR, HousiNG AND POVray, cv . 6,
at 6 (prelim. ed. 1971). It is unclear whether these figures contain the same theoretical
imperfection noted in the Sternlieb studies.
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vestment was not extraordinarily high considering the risks entailed
in slum ownership. Sternlieb's Newark of the 1960's, however, is not
the world and it would be a great mistake to respond to a single study
by replacing the stereotype of popular fable with a stereotype derived
from the study. Indeed, it appears most likely that no single model
of the slum market describes even approximately the hundreds of cities
which are endowed with substantial quantities of inferior and decaying
housing.9 It thus would seem much more reasonable to conduct a
systematic canvass of the impact code enforcement may be expected
to have in a variety of market structures than to proceed from the
premise that a single model will adequately describe all cities at all
times within the foreseeable future.
Beyond the impropriety of assuming that all American slums have
a fundamentally similar economic structure, there is a second reason
for beginning the analysis by considering relatively simple (and there-
fore abstract) economic models. Given the present poverty of theoreti-
cal analysis in the field, an empirical study of the impact of code
enforcement could well obscure potentially critical relationships in a
mass of data collected without preexisting criteria defining the relevant
parameters of inquiry. Thus, a consideration of the hypotheses prof-
fered by economic analysis is an important precondition for fruitful
empirical inquiry. Finally, and at least equally important, decision
8. Sternlieb found that the average "actual return on investment in terms of the
overall parcel value is dearly in the neighborhood of 10 to 12 per cent." G. STEENLM, Supra
note 6, at 88. Unfortunately, this estimate of slum profitability seems to be based upon a
sample composed of only 32 parcels owned by a single substantial tenement management
company. Id. at 78. Arthur Sporn, in an earlier study based upon Wisconsin income tax
returns submitted by 52 owners of 47 properties, found the average rate of return on
owner's investment to be a substantially higher 20 per cent. Sporn, Empirical Studies in
the Economics of Slum Ownership, 36 LANn ECONOMICS 333, 336 (1960). Even earlier,
Chester Rapkin estimated rates of return prevailing in New York's West Side Urban
Renewal Area to be approximately 10 per cent; again, however, the estimate was not
based upon an extensive sample. C. RArKIN, THE REAL ESTATE MA'RrET IN AN URBAN
RENEWAL AYEA 81-82 (1959). See also L. Gr.aBLR, EXPERiENCE IN URBAN MAL ESTATE
INr'sTAMNT 183-86 (1955). It should be plain, however, from even this brief description
of these studies that their limited scope does not justify confident claims about the
profitability of slum ownership.
A substantially larger sample of units was obtained by Sternlieb when, after his Newark
experience, he moved on to supervise a study of the impact of rent control in New York
City. Of 665 structures in the sample, approximately one half were found to be yielding
less than 6 per cent of market value even before a correction for an appropriate manage.
ment fee. All of the parcels in the sample, however, were under the rent control
regime, and since New York stands virtually alone among American cities in its adherence
to price control, little can be inferred from these figures-even assuming that they
accurately reflect profitability in the New York ghetto, which of course was not the
exclusive source of buildings composing Sternlieb's sample. See G. STERNLirn, supra note
7, at 5-1-5-32, esp. Exhibit 20 at 5-30.
9. Indeed, the significant studies undertaken thus far suggest considerable hetero.
geneity. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
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makers cannot indulge themselves in the luxury of awaiting the report
of the ultimate (or penultimate) empiricist before deciding upon a
strategy for regulating slum markets on behalf of the poor. The white
knight, Empiricism, may well never appear on his charger, and mean-
while diverse groups have attacked upon winged chariots demanding
action (or inaction) now before the passage of time stills the hopes and
fears of this generation of landlords and tenants. In order to assist a
policy maker before the white knight arrives, the theorist can at least
define with some precision the economic worlds in which code en-
forcement and other efforts to control the housing market on behalf
of the poor make the most sense and those in which it makes the least.
If this is done successfully it will enable the decision maker who is
acquainted with the realities of his own particular city to assess in
rough terms the likelihood of success in improving the slumdweller's
life-situation through code enforcement and similar techniques. Doubt-
less, a particular decision maker's understanding of the world he con-
fronts may often, in the end, be bottomed on a species of empiricism so
casual as to verge on clich6. However, it is vain to demand that the
white knight appear instantaneously-thus decisions must be made
without adequate empirical study. And assuming one is not burdened
by an ideology which unalterably places the burden of embarking upon
an elaborate empirical study either upon advocates of laissez faire or
upon advocates of government regulation, the best one can hope for is
that the makers of policy at least will ask the right questions about the
"real world" they perceive, even though their perceptions of reality
may be often infected not only by misinformation but also by personal
prejudice and sheer pigheadedness.
Having discharged my obligation of providing the reader with no-
tice of the fare that awaits him,10 I shall now consider the conditions
under which there is good reason to believe that slum landlords will
be completely unable to pass on the costs of improving their properties
(hereafter "code costs") to their tenantry, thereby assuring that code
enforcement will have a substantial redistributive impact in favor of
the poor. In considering this question, I shall attempt to make all of
my important assumptions explicit. Unquestionably, it would be in-
appropriate for policy makers to indulge in some of these assumptions
in some urban contexts. Nevertheless, for our purposes, introductory
10. For those of my readers who are somewhat daunted by the length of this essay,
it may be useful to learn that Sections V and VI can be omitted without reducing the
main line of the argument to utter gibberish.
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exposition based on these axioms has the substantial advantage of pro-
viding a model of a city slum which can serve as both a normative and
analytical benchmark: a normative benchmark, because aggressive code
enforcement in the name of income redistribution makes more sense
in this hypothetical slum than in many others; an analytical bench-
mark, because once the economic analysis in this simple case is under-
stood, it will be easier to move on to more complex situations.
II. Slumville
Imagine a city called Athens whose slums are concentrated in one
geographic area that we shall call Slumville. While the residents of
Slumville are extremely mobile within the confines of the slum dis-
trict, Athenians living outside Slumville are extremely reluctant to
move into the area even if there is a significant improvement in hous-
ing quality. Of course, if there is an enormous change in the character
of the neighborhood, the city's residents may change their view of
Slumville. But a moderate change will not lead them to discard their
fears about the quality of life, as well as the quality of housing, en-
joyed by the area's inhabitants.
While the middle-class Athenian's substantial reluctance to live in
Slumville is fundamental to much of the argument that follows, several
additional assumptions will be altered at subsequent stages of this
essay. For purposes of the present discussion, then, assume (1) both
landlords and tenants act rationally in their self-interest;11 (2) no land-
lord or group of landlords has successfully established a monopoly
or oligopoly position in the rental market; (3) tenants are aware of
the range of prices and quality levels of accommodations offered for
rent in Slumville and experience no significant cost in moving from
one part of Slumville to another; (4) all of Slumville's accommoda-
tions are not only slums, but are equally slummy;12 (5) similarly, all
of Slumville's tenants inflict equal damage upon the physical structures
11. The model under discussion is also restricted to a Slumville composed entirely of
renters. While a subsequent portion of the essay considers certain difficulties which arise
when owners themselves live in a home rented partly to tenants, see pp. 1174-75 infra,
considerations of length have made it impossible to consider at this time the full range
of complexities raised by the fact that some slumdwellers live in houses which they own.
12. To be more precise, I am assuming here that if parcel A were situated in another
location within Slumville (site B) it would fetch the same rental as that which is currently
obtained by the house at site B. It is not, however, necessary to assume that A and D
are renting at the same price under this definition since rent is determined not only
by the physical characteristics of the houses but also by numerous other factors
including relative proximity to employment centers, recreational, educational and mass
transit facilities, etc. This fact will be discussed further at pp. 1134-89 infra.
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of the houses in which they reside; (6) a significant number of poor
provincials are not entering Athens from the outlands nor are Slum-
villites emigrating to the hinterlands; (7) each and every landlord in
Slumville earns a rate of return on his investment which substantially
exceeds the return available when the property is used for other pur-
poses; indeed (8) even if the landlords are forced to bring their resi-
dential properties up to code, their rate of return would still exceed
that available for any other use of the property; and (9) no landlord
will find it more profitable to abandon his building entirely when
faced with the necessity of investing substantial sums to bring his
tenement up to code.
The implications of these last three assumptions can be misunder-
stood quite easily. They do not imply that the landlords of Slumville
are making exceedingly high profits on their original investments.'
3
Even if they were only making a very low rate of return after absorb-
ing the costs of code enforcement, my description of Slumville's land-
lords would still be satisfied if they could only earn an even lower
rate of return by converting their land to an alternative commercial
use. Similarly, the ninth assumption enumerated above, which stip-
ulates that no buildings be abandoned, does not necessarily suggest
the existence of excessive returns. A landlord will seriously consider
abandonment only if the discounted present value of the costs code
enforcement imposes over time exceeds the capitalized value of the
future profits he expects from the building. In other words, even if
an investor originally purchased a building for $100,000 and is cur-
rently earning only one per cent or $1000 a year in profit before code
enforcement, the only financially relevant question for him is the value
the market places on the right to receive $1000. If a purchaser is willing
to buy this future income stream for $5000, abandonment is irrational
unless the anticipated stream of future code costs exceeds this amount
after an appropriate discount rate is applied. Thus, the Slumville we
have depicted is not one which invokes the legendary exploitative land-
lord; indeed, our model is compatible with a situation in which each
landlord is earning an exceedingly low return on his original invest-
ment.14 We have only excluded from consideration in this first simple
13. By "profit" here, I mean the rate of return on capital which remains after a sum
is deducted that represents the market value of an owner's time if he chooses to manage
the property himself rather than contract this task out to another.
14. Moreover, the relationship which the owner of the fee may have with a mortgage
lender is also irrelevant to this anal)sis. If, for example, code costs will nake it un-
profitable for the fee owner to meet his mortgage payment, he will simply default and
te new owner of the property (generally the mortgagee) will find himself in the same
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model those landlords who are in a truly desperate financial situation
in which the capitalized value of future profits is lower than the capi-
talized cost of code repairs.'5
A.
We are now in a position to trace the economic consequences of
a code enforcement program in Slumville. Given the model which has
been developed, it follows that when the costs of code improvements
are imposed upon Slumville's landlords none of them will have an
incentive to remove their properties from the rental housing market.
For we have stipulated that even after code costs are taken into ac-
count, the return on slum investment still exceeds the rate of return
available when the land is used for other purposes or not used at all.
Since the imposition of code costs upon the landlords does not induce
a fall in the supply of housing, rent levels will be determined by the
effect of code enforcement upon the demand for housing.
Two different demand responses can be anticipated, depending
upon the extent to which the housing code is enforced. First, assume
that the code is enforced strictly only in one part (Area X) of Slum-
ville and that the rest of Slumville (Area Y) is entirely ignored
by the housing code inspectorate. In this case, one would expect that
some of the residents of Y will find X a more attractive place than
formerly and will bid the rents up in Area X. Those residents of X
who find the new rent levels too steep for their taste will of course
move to Y, where apartments have been vacated by those moving into
the newly improved housing in X. Consequently, a program of selec-
tive housing code enforcement in Slumville will, in fact, partially fulfill
the expectations of those administrators who doubt the desirability of
code enforcement: rents will increase in the target area and tenants
who cannot "afford" the higher rents will leave the area to find new
abodes in the now slummier sections of Slumville.
position delienated in the discussion in the text: he will either incur code costs to save the
remainder of his $1000 annual income stream or he will withdraw the building from the
residential housing market. Since in this introductory analysis we have assumed that this
second alternative is not open, only the first alternative remains. All that code enforcement
has accomplished in such a situation is to change the identity of the owner of the fe; this
fact may be of significance, of course, and it will be considered at pp. 1174-75 infra.
15. It may be that an investment in code improvements will lengthen the economic
lifetime of the structure and therefore increase the value of the income stream it generates.
If such were the case, some owners who othenvise would be in this desperate position
would not withdraw from the market. For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall permit
this refinement to reside permanently in a footnote since it adds nothing important to the
analysis.
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B.
If, however, one assumes that the housing code is enforced strictly
in all of Slumville, the same result will not follow. Since we have
assumed that before the code was enforced, houses in Areas X and Y
were equally dilapidated, the comprehensive enforcement of the code
throughout Areas X and Y will raise the quality of housing in all parts
of Slumville to an equal degree, thereby providing no special incentive
for a resident of Area Y to want to move to Area X. Thus, rents will
not rise because of competition among Slumville residents as occurred
in the case of partial code enforcement just discussed.
Indeed rents will not rise at all in Slumville if only a single further
condition is met. Paradoxically, code enforcement will have "zero rent
impact" if and only if there exists a class of Slumville tenants who
do not believe that code enforcement will significantly improve their
lives. A simple mathematical example will make this clear. Assume
that, before the code is enforced, two types of families live in Slum-
ville's 100,000 rental units: 90,000 families (the "homelovers") would
be willing to pay a significant amount of money for code housing; in
contrast, 10,000 families (the "lukewarm" families) would not be
willing to pay extra rent for improved housing.10 This is not to say
that even the lukewarm do not recognize that they will benefit from
code enforcement-the improvement is simply not significant enough
in their minds to warrant allocation of any more of their scarce funds
to purchase it.
Now imagine that all of Slumville's landlords seek to pass their
code costs on to tenants by raising rents by $25. While the 90,000
homelovers initially respond by paying the premium, the 10,000
lukewarm families act differently. Rather than paying the higher
rent, they choose to pair up and share apartments instead, thus leaving
5000 units vacant. The lukewarm families will take this course since
they believe that half an apartment at a lower rent is a better deal
than a whole apartment at the inflated rental.17
16. This distinction between families who are relatively sensitive to market conditions
and those who are not has antecedents in the literature. See, e.g., W. Gnam, supra note
5, at 47-83; Maisel, Rates of Ownership, Mobility and Purchase, in EssYs iN Un.N
Lum ECONomcs 76-108 (Real Estate Research Program, University of California, Los
Angeles, 1966) although candor compels the recognition that our ignorance of the deter-
minants of housing demand, especially the determinants of demand among slumduellers,
remains quite profound. For the most systematic effort thus far, see R. Mtrr, supra
note 5. See also Paldam, What is Known About the Housing Demand, 72 Svnti J. or
ECON. 130 (1970), Tong Hun Lee, Housing and Permanent Income: Tests Based on a
Three-Year Reinterview Survey, 50 REv. OF ECON. & SrAT. 480 (1968); Winger, Housing and
Income, 6 WETrN ECON. J. 226 (1968).
17. There is no necessity that the rent charged to each family when they double-up
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When the 10,000 lukewarm families decide to double-up, however,
the owners of the 5000 vacant apartments are faced with a serious
problem. Since no new residents have (under our assumptions) been
attracted to Slumville as a result of code enforcement, there is no
reason to expect that they will successfully fill their apartments if
they persist in demanding the $25 premium. Rather, a landlord can
rent his units in only one of two ways: (a) by inducing one of the
homelovers to move by cutting the premium below the $25 level or
(b) by cutting the rent sufficiently to induce one of the lukewarm
families to prefer an entire apartment to its more crowded quarters.
It should be apparent that if a given landlord fills a vacant apartment by
offering one of the homelovers a better deal than his present landlord,
the competitive dynamic will continue, for the owner of the newly
vacated apartment will find himself in the same bleak position as his
now successful competitor once occupied. It is only when prices are
set low enough to induce the lukewarm families to resume their
former habits and live in individual apartments that the economic
situation will regain equilibrium. But if a significant number of luke-
warm families are willing to spend no additional money for the code
improvements, equilibrium will not be attained until the competing
landlords absorb all of the code costs and rent all of their units at the
pre-code price. Q.E.D.
In order to introduce the subject as simply as possible, we have
explained why rents will not rise by assuming that all landlords re-
spond to code enforcement by initially passing on all of their code
costs to all of their tenants. Additional complexities arise if one
modifies this premise by making the equally plausible assumption that
landlords will attempt to discriminate between the two different
kinds of tenants-increasing the rent for the 90,000 homelovers, but
absorbing the increase for the 10,000 lukewarm tenants. If landlords
respond in this manner, it would appear at first glance that they will
succeed in passing on the bulk of their code costs to the 90,000 home-
lovers.
A more thorough analysis indicates, however, that this attempt at
price discrimination will fail even if one assumes that landlords can
perfectly distinguish between homelovers and lukewarm families. For
there will remain a financial incentive for each landlord to replace his
be precisely one-half of the inflated rental charged to a family desiring a whole
apartment. It is only necessary that the per family rent for half an apartment be
somewhat lower than the charge made when an entire unit is leased.
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own lukewarm tenants with his competitors' homelovers, and thereby
subvert the entire price discrimination scheme. To put the matter more
concretely, assume that code enforcement will add $25 to the monthly
cost of the average Slumville apartment and that, in response, all land-
lords are charging the old rent of $X a month to lukewarm tenants and
X + $25 a month to homelovers. Each landlord clearly will profit in the
short run if, instead of contenting himself with SX a month from a luke-
warm tenant, he entices one of his competitor's homelovers by offering
him the apartment at a rental of X + $10. Of course, once a homelover
learns that a comparable apartment is available to him for X + $10 at
a competing apartment house, he may be expected to let his landlord
know that he will move unless the present rent is reduced. It can be
easily seen that this process will continue until the entire discriminatory
structure is undermined and homelovers are obtaining the full benefit
of their lukewarm companions' indifference to code housing.
Indeed, it may well be doubted that landlords would attempt a price
discrimination policy to begin with, given the difficulty of accurately
differentiating between "homelovers" and "lukewarms," the ultimate
futility that is likely to result and the danger of alienating tenants' good
will in the process. Rather, if a substantial number of landlords respond
to lukewarm tenant threats of moving by refusing to raise rents in the
first place, it is much more probable that the other owners will be
reluctant to raise their rents for fear of pricing themselves out of the
market, even if none of their tenants verbalize a threat. Thus, if a
strategically placed distribution of tenants threatens to move out in a
credible way, it will not even be necessary for very many families to
make good on their threat and actually double-up before a general rent
rise is averted.
Now, of course, if the housing code forbids families from doubling-
up,' s and this prohibition is enforced, the lukewarm families may not
be able to react to a prospective rent increase by moving in with friends
and relations or making a credible threat to do so. Instead, under a code
forbidding "overcrowding" they must resort to the remaining weapons
in the tenants' arsenal: they could refuse to pay rent and force the
owner to bear the costs of eviction and re-renting or they could vandal-
ize the apartment in retaliation for the rent hike and force the landlord
to bear the costs of repairs as well as eviction and re-renting. So long as
18. As suggested previously, see note 1 supra, the typical code does prohibit "over-
crowding" although the definition of the term is subject to significant variation. For a
brief and pointed discussion, see NATiONAL Com.cusst o UM.AN PROUMStS, BUILDLNG Mm
A2AE1UC-N Crry 278-80 (1969).
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a substantial number of lukewarm families makes use of these weapons,
the impact of code enforcement will remain on the landlord's shoulders
for the reasons which have already been canvassed.
Indeed, our argument is not dependent upon the peculiarities of
overcrowding, rent-skipping or vandalism, and may be generalized to
any technique tenants may use to reduce the number of housing units
they demand in Slumville in response to a rise in price. To see this
clearly, it is necessary simply to consider the manner in which the
rental value of Slumville apartments was set before code enforcement
became the norm: why was the typical rent $100 rather than $1000 a
month? The answer-by now-should be obvious: as soon as a signifi-
cant number of landlords attempted to raise rentals beyond $100, de-
mand for housing dropped (as a result of doubling-up, rent skips, etc.),
thereby creating an incentive for landlords not receiving any rents at
all to lower their prices to the equilibrium point (here $100). But if
tenants had sufficient market power to maintain the $100 price before
code enforcement, they will have the power to maintain the $100 rent
after code enforcement, provided that "lukewarm families" exist who
are unwilling to pay any more for code quality housing than for "sub-
code units," and who are determined to reduce demand in one of the
many ways at their disposal.
All this adds up to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. While a se-
lective program of enforcement may be expected to increase rents in
the "target area," a comprehensive program of enforcement will not in.
crease rents charged in Slumville, provided that there are a significant
number' 9 of lukewarm families who refuse to pay more for standard
units than they paid for "inferior" units. While the conclusion appears
counterintuitive, economists will recognize that it proceeds from an ap-
plication of classical economic theory. Fundamentally, the analysis has
invoked the theory of economic rent in a new context, whose contours
are suggested-at least in part-by the writing of David Ricardo, Henry
George, and Jens Jensen. 20
19. In a world of pure theory, no rent rise will occur if only two families choose to
double-up; nevertheless, as the number of tenants doubling-up or engaging in similar
"lukewarm" activities increases to a significant-albeit not overwhelming-sze, the speed
at which the competitive process will abort any landlord's effort to pass on his code costs
will increase dramatically.
20. D. RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33-45 (Every-
man's Library ed. 1965); H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 153-221, 333-97 (1953); 3.
JENsEN, PRorRTY TAXATON IN THE UNrr STATEs 48-99 (1931).
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C.
Perhaps the sharp contrast between the consequences of partial and
comprehensive code enforcement will appear overdrawn to some. While
it is true that partial code enforcement will inflate the rents within the
target area (X), will not this effect be dissipated completely by a cor-
responding rent decline in Y, where the code remains unenforced? If
this were so, of course, the average rent level would not change as a re-
sult of partial code enforcement, and so the contrast we have chosen to
delineate between a partial and a comprehensive program will appear
exaggerated.
In our introductory discussion of partial code enforcement, we lacked
the apparatus to deal with this issue; its resolution, however, should
now be quite a simple matter. It should be dear that as a result of code
enforcement in X, the rental situation in Y will temporarily be thrown
out of equilibrium, as Y'ers emigrate to the newly improved X. Since
some of the Y landlords thus find themselves with empty apartments,
they will soon be caught up in an effort to fill their units with paying
customers, even at the cost of lower rents. This cycle can be expected
to proceed unless it is aborted by those families who formerly lived in
X but are moving to Y as a result of the rent increase generated in the
code enforcement zone. Thus, the key question for us is the attitude
of these expatriate X'ers. Will they be willing to pay the rents previ-
ously prevailing in Y or will a significant number turn lukewarm at this
pre-code level, engaging in demand-limiting strategies like doubling-up,
rent skipping and such? Obviously, if a substantial number of ex-X'ers
turn lukewarm at the old Y rents, rents will be depressed by competi-
tion until they have been placated; if not, not. Thus, there is no "invisi-
ble hand" benignly assuring that the rent increases in the code enforce-
ment zone will be washed out by decreases in the non-enforcement area.
While the contrast between partial and total enforcement in our pri-
meval Slumville is sharp, it is not overdrawn.
Within the context of this basic analysis, however, it is possible to
provide a rule of thumb to indicate the degree to which partial code
enforcement will cause an increase in Slumville's average rent level.
The rule is simple: the smaller the code enforcement area relative to the
entire slum, the more probable that the overall rent level in Slumville
will rise. To make this dear, assume that the code is enforced with re-
spect to only one unit (X) out of the 100,000 units available in Slum-
ville, forcing the unlucky landlord to bear $30 in code costs a month.
If there is a single Slumville family that is willing to pay $29 extra for
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the unit,21 the landlord will be able to pass on the lion's share of the
cost by renting the unit at a $29 premium to that tenant after evicting
the present occupant. The evicted tenant must then find a home in
Y (containing 99,999 units) and, unless he acts lukewarmly when con-
fronted with the Y rent levels, Y's rents will remain intact. Since Y's
rents will most probably remain constant and X's rent has increased,
Slumville's overall rent level has increased. As the scope of the code
enforcement program expands, however, an overall rent inflation be-
comes less probable, for it will become progressively more difficult for
X's landlords to find Slumville tenants who value the improved hous-
ing so highly, while it will become increasingly likely that a significant
number of those residents evicted from X will act in a lukewarm man-
ner when confronted with the old Y rental structure.
Thus, even though partial enforcement may often fail to redistribute
as much income as the comprehensive program, its efficacy as an income
redistribution device is not necessarily minimal. For a last time, it is nec-
essary to emphasize the important fact that the marginal tenant's tastes
set the rent level. Thus, within X (the code enforcement zone), the
level of the rent increase will be determined not by those who believe
themselves benefited tremendously by code improvements but by those
who are willing to pay relatively small increments for code housing
without engaging in lukewarm strategies; similarly, it is the family
least willing to pay for its inferior apartment in Y which sets the price
level obtaining throughout the district.2
21. It is assumed here that the landlord cannot successfully raise the rental premium
beyond the $90 level, since if that were possible, it would have been profitable for the
landlord to make the improvements without government coercion because the marginal
revenue obtained from the investment of $30 per month would then exceed the cost of
the improvement. (The concept of cost is being used in the traditional economist's sense
to include the profits the landlord has foregone in investing in the code improvements.)
The only situation in which the landlord could theoretically charge a premium In excess
of $30 would be one in which code enforcement requires a community's landlords to
make improvements which exploit "external benefits" that would otherwise remain un-
exploited. Since this possibility requires the consideration of a complex set of factors,
its analysis has not been attempted in this introductory discussion, but has been deferred
to pp. 1177-82 infra.
22. The text invokes here the notion of consumer surplus, the analytical value of
which has been much disputed among economists in other contexts. See Patinkin, Demand
Curves and Consumer's Surplus, in C. CurISr ET AL., MEASURENMNT IN ECONOMICs 83
(1963) for the most precise analytical discussion known to me of the various mean-
ings of the concept; Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus, 8 REv. oF
ECON. STUD. 108 (1940) for the classic statement; and I. LrrLE, A CRiTIQouE oF WELFAR
ECONOimCS 166-84 (2d ed. 1957) for the best critique. While I recognize that the concept can
be misused, its most telling limitations do not significantly undermine its utility in the
present analysis.
One of the principal difficulties with the concept for economists in many contexts 1s
that increasing the "consumer's surplus" for consumers generally yields an equivalent
reduction in the "producer's surplus" going to producers; welfare economists, who remain
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III. Slumville's Housing Supply: A More Exacting Scrutiny
A.
Now let us change one of our assumptions about Slumville. In our
initial discussion, we assumed that even after code costs were imposed
upon the landlords, all of their buildings would still be earning a re-
turn which was higher than that which would be obtained either by
devoting the properties to a different use or by abandoning the parcels
altogether. If, instead, we assume that imposing code costs on all build-
ings will so drastically lower the return on some of them that parcels
will be either abandoned or converted to another use, our conclusions
about the effect of code enforcement must be modified. A numerical
example will clarify the problem. Assume again that there are 100,000
dwelling units in Slumville before code enforcement and that there
are 100,000 families who reside in the area. Assume further that a
broad campaign of code enforcement induces the owners of 5,000 units
to convert their properties to commercial establishments or to abandon
them entirely. It follows that 5,000 families will find themselves in the
streets. Finding this uncomfortable, the street dwellers will bid up the
rents in the remaining 95,000 units in an effort to obtain a dwelling
place. Of course, insofar as they succeed, other families will find them-
selves completely homeless. As the rents rise, however, some of the
dwelling units which were originally withdrawn from the market will
true to a commitment to value free science, find it difficult to explain why producers
should be deprived of their surplus simply to increase the consumers share. Within the
value context in which we are operating, however, this is not a significant problem sitice
the entire essay presupposes a social commitment to redistributing wealth to the poor
(who in this case are consumers). It remains to be shown, of course, that it is fair to the
producers (i.e., the landlords) to require the surrender of some of their surplus when other
producers are not placed under a sinilar obligation; this task will be undertaken at a
later stage in the essay. If it is successfully discharged, at least the difficulties with the
concept of consumer's surplus which have their source in the welfare economist's alleged
value neutrality will not prove an obstacle here.
A second difficulty with the use of consumer surplus in the "partial equilibrium"
framework invoked in this essay is that it is possible the extra consumer surplus gained
as a result of code enforcement will be offset by consumer surplus lost by tenants in other
transactions. Thus if the increase in demand for repair and maintenance services induced
by code enforcement generates increased prices in that sector, as well as in other sectors
which must bid higher for inputs as a result of the increased competition from the repair
and maintenance sector, consumers may face higher prices when they go into the market
to purchase goods other than a rental apartment. On the other hand, since the landlord
has been deprived of income by enforcement, he will demand less of a wide range of
goods, thereby inducing a decline in price for these articles. It is, of course, impossible to
know a priori whether the effect of a diminished demand from landlords will have a
greater or lesser impact on a wide range of non-housing prices than the increase in
demand generated by code-related activities. It is assumed throughout this essay, however,
that these second-order effects are relatively minor and need not be taken into account.
This is a conventional assumption made in all cost-benefit studies and I see no reason to
believe it is improperly made here. See Prest & Turvey, Cost-Beneit Analysis: A Sunrey,
75 EcoN. J. 683, 704-05 (1965).
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be again offered for rent. A new equilibrium position will finally be at-
tained in which, let us say, 99,000 units are occupied and 1,000 families
prefer to remain on the street rather than pay the prevailing rent levels.
Of course, the thousand homeless families cannot be expected to take
their fate passively-marches on city hall, sit-ins, even riots, may be
anticipated as the homeless attempt to induce the politicians to pro-
vide them lodgings at rents that the homeless consider "reasonable."
Once again, they might ameliorate their condition by agreeing to share
apartments. In contrast to our earlier Slumville model, however, this
"overcrowding" will not be a passing phenomenon which is simply a
stage in the competitive dynamic. Here, "overcrowding" will be per-
manent. Code authorities will thus find it difficult to continue their
strict enforcement campaign since "success" leads to a substantial wors-
ening of living conditions for the "lukewarm" families, who often may
be the poorest citizens of Slumville, thereby generating the cyclical
pattern of enforcement and neglect noted in the introduction. 23
Given our present assumptions concerning the rental market in Slum-
ville, the optimal strategy for the code enforcement authority would
not be comprehensive, strict code enforcement. Rather, the authority
would do best to enforce the code strictly only in those apartment
houses whose profitability was such that they would not be withdrawn
from the market. In contrast, the code should be enforced in low profit
houses only to the extent that doing so would not induce their with-
drawal from the rental market. Under this strategy, housing supply
would remain constant. As our earlier analysis indicated, however, rent
levels in "code" houses would rise somewhat as residents from "sub-
code" apartments find the code houses relatively more attractive than
before.
While the selective enforcement strategy is theoretically the soundest
one to pursue within the hypothesized market structure, it has obvious
practical difficulties. It would require the government to embark upon
a detailed, factual investigation of the profitability of every building.
In addition, it would subject the code enforcers to very substantial po-
litical pressures, since the strategy would lead to less code enforcement
in the oldest and most dilapidated buildings. While this course of ac-
tion might be justified on economic grounds, it does not commend it-
self to one's sense of justice; and it would probably be quite difficult
for the code enforcement agency to maintain such a position for long
in the political arena.
23. See p. 1095 supra.
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B.
1.
These factors suggest that before government can embark on a pro-
gram of vigorous code enforcement, it must insure that it will provide
a number of dwelling units equal to the number that landlords remove
from the market in response to the imposition of code costs (in our ex-
ample, 5,000 units). But before one quickly adopts this criterion as the
key to code enforcement success, another dimension of the housing
market must be considered which has been overlooked up to this
point. Until now, we have ignored the housing market in surrounding
Athens. As our model becomes more complex, however, we can no
longer afford this luxury. Activities in the larger housing market may
well determine the extent to which the government must subsidize low
income housing in support of vigorous code enforcement within Slum-
ville. For in order to attain "zero rent impact," code enforcement need
not rely solely upon government subsidy to make up the 5000 unit
deficit; it is possible that the private sector will make available units
which were previously inhabited by the upper classes of Athens, thereby
making up part or all of the deficit without public subsidy.
To make this point clear, imagine that Slumville is surrounded by a
lower-middle-class community (Middleburg) composed of decent build-
ings which do not at present violate the housing code, which in turn is
surrounded by an upper-class zone (Snobtown). As a result of new con-
struction for the rich and upper-middle class, a number of Snobtown
houses, formerly occupied by these groups, may open up for the lower-
middle-class Athenians who previously resided around the borders of
Slumville. As the lower-middle class moves to the dwellings once
occupied by their betters, Middleburg landlords will find it profitable
to rent to the "Slumville-types" they shunned before. In short, some
of the impact of new construction for the rich will "trickle down" to
the poor as the lower-middle class move to the homes formerly occupied
by the well-to-do.24
24. The literature on the "trickle down" effect, often also called "filtering," is sub-
stantial. It reflects a continuing uncertainty among researchers as to both the appropriate
way in which filtering should be defined and, consequently, the extent to which filtering
is occurring. For the best brief conceptual analysis, see Lowry, Filtering and Housing
Standards: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 LAND EcoN. 362 (1960); Professor Grigsby has usefully
canvassed the literature in his HoUSING MAIMMS AND PUmLc PouCY 84-180 (1963). Interest-
ing, though far from definitive, empirical studies have recently been provided by R. Murn,
supra note 5, at 241-303; J. LANSING, C. CLiFroN & J. MoRcAN, NEW HoMrs AND Poon
PEoPrE (1969); and Sigal, The Unchanging Area in Transition, 43 L*Na EcoN. 284 (1967).
While our empirical understanding of filtering is quite imperfect, it nevertheless should
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The rate at which housing can be expected to "trickle down" from
Middleburgers to Slumvillites will depend-among other things-upon
the degree to which the more privileged Athenians believe that new
housing offers a higher level of amenity than that provided by their
present dwellings, the birth rate experienced by Athenians of boi
high and moderate income, the willingness of the lower-middle-class
families bordering Slumville to move,25 and the intensity with which
Middleburg landlords discriminate against ghetto 6migr~s. Whether
the number of dwelling units trickling down is greater than, less than,
or equal to, the number of units removed from the market as a result
of strict code enforcement is an empirical question which cannot be
answered a priori. Assuming, for the moment, that the houses trickling
down are equal in number to the houses removed from the market, the
rent level in the now-expanding Slumville will be a function of the
quality of the houses which have recently been made available to Slum-
ville residents. If the "ex-Middleburg" houses are equal in quality to the
Slumville units which have been improved to code requirements, rent
levels will remain unchanged as a result of code enforcement for the
reasons previously considered. If the quality of the "new" housing is
higher than that prevailing in a code enforced Slumville, rents will in-
crease to the extent that Slumville residents are willing to allocate a
larger share of their budget in order to purchase higher quality housing.
Thus, the owners of the "ex-Middleburg" units will be constrained to
rent them at the prevailing rent level or remove the units from the
rental market altogether if there is no demand for "supercode" hous-
ing within Slumville. It should be emphasized, therefore, that rents
will not rise unless a segment of the Slumville community really values
the better housing that has trickled down.
be pointed out that several students have found that the number of vacant apartments
available for rent in buildings in the ghetto markets under observation is surprisingly
high: "A check of nearly six hundred dwelling units-owned by one individual and
scattered throughout Newark's slum areas-was undertaken. The vacancy rate, as of
April 1965, was nearly 18 percent. This rate prevailed at a time when the season was
mild enough to reverse the doubling-up in heated units during the winter." G. STr=najrz,
supra note 6, at 93. Of course, vacancy rates can be expected to fluctuate over time as the
rate of trickle down changes. See, e.g., the wide variations in vacancies ranging from 2.3
to 30 per cent observed by Grebler on New Yorks Lower East Side over a period in
excess of twenty years. L. GREBLER, HOUSING MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A DECLININO AREA
38 (1952). Nevertheless, the existence of high vacancy rates at least some of the time
suggests the possibility that filtering may sometimes make it relatively easy to enforce the
code comprehensively with a minimal rent increase even without government subsidy.
25. Of course, as ghetto 6migrds move into the area, oldtime Middleburgers may view
continued residence in a different light, choosing to accelerate their movement to Snob.
town. See T. Schelling, Neighborhood Tipping (Harvard Institute of Economic Researd,
Discussion Paper No. 100, 1969).
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Of course, if the number of housing units "trickling down" to Slum-
ville is less than the number of dwellings removed from the market by
code enforcement, the area will still confront a "housing shortage" as
a result of code enforcement, and the authorities will be faced with the
dilemma which has already been described-they will enforce the code
only at the cost of requiring the poor to pay higher rents or live in the
streets or double-up or skip rent more frequently than in the past. In
order to avoid this dilemma, the government must make up the differ-
ence between the number of houses withdrawn from the market and
the number of houses trickling down into Slumville through a subsidy
program. If the public sector fulfills this task, the paradoxical conclu-
sion reached in our earlier discussion remains intact: while a selective
program of code enforcement will raise rents in the target area, a com-
prehensive enforcement plan will not.
2.
Up to the present point, we have only considered "trickle down"
from a perspective which gives substantial comfort to the code enforce-
ment proponent. But, alas, there is a more troublesome aspect to this
phenomenon which is revealed when the code enforcement adminis-
trator stops asking "what can 'trickle down' do for me?" and considers
what his program is doing to the trickle: will code enforcement increase
the trickle to a flood of "new" housing for Slumvillites or will the code
regime reduce the trickle to a droplet?
The general answer to this question seems clear: code enforcement
will significantly diminish the trickle to the extent that the Middle-
burg landlord believes that Slumville-type tenants will wreak greater
havoc upon his buildings than will the more sober Middleburgers. In-
somuch as this is true, code costs will be heavier if the building be-
comes part of an expanding Slumville than if it remains in the
lower-middle-class sector. And the greater the anticipated code cost dif-
ferential, the more willing a landlord will be to continue renting his
unit to the Middleburger at a lower price than he can extract from a
Slumvillite, thereby attenuating the trickle down rate.2 0
26. This assumes, of course, that the code is being enforced in Middleburg as well as
Slumville. If code enforcement is restricted to Slumville, the extra cost of renting to
Slumvillites may be somewhat greater, for it may be that the profit-maximizing Middleburg
landlord would over time choose to violate the housing code in renting to Middleburgers;
once his neighborhood is identified in the code enforcer's mind as part of Slumville, how-
ever, the landlord will be unable to continue on this course since, by hypothesis, code
enforcement authorities will insist upon compliance once they decide that the building
has become part of an expanding Slumville. Thus, the added cost of renting to Slumvillites
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This unfortunate tendency of code enforcement may, however, itself
be checked by two important factors. First, effective enforcement of
civil rights laws assuring Slumvillites "equal access" to Athens' hous-
ing may make efforts at price discrimination between "Slumville-types"
and "Middleburger" tenants illegal, and therefore costly, to the Mid-
dleburg lessor.27 Second, successful code enforcement in Slumville may
itself have an impact upon the psychology of the Middleburg landlord.
Whereas, in the pre-code past, each time a Middleburg lessor found
his way into Slumville he was greeted by signs of obvious disrepair
which he was apt to assign to tenant vandalism, the number of cases of
scandalous living conditions will have been markedly reduced by a
successful code enforcement-subsidy scheme, thereby (perhaps) induc-
ing the Middleburger to revise his estimate of the degree of lower-class
vandalism. Since the trickle down effect will only be influenced by the
anticipated code cost differential, the creation of a more favorable im-
age of the lower-class tenant in the landlord's eye (by whatever means)
will diminish the differential, thereby reducing code enforcement's un-
favorable impact upon the trickle down.28
C.
It should be clear, then, that in fashioning a proper subsidy policy
it is not enough to consider the number of houses withdrawn from
may be not only the extra expense generated by their increased destructiveness, but also
the cost of fulfilling the code, once a Middleburg neighborhood is considered to be "Slum.
ville territory" and thereby triggers code enforcement action. Analysis of this extra cost is
complicated, however, by the fact that any individual landlord may successfully rent a
single apartment to a Slumvillite without the entire neighborhood being thereby identified
as a part of Slumville in the mind of code enforcement officials. Thus, it could well be
that while strict code enforcement will generate added costs if the neighborhood "tips"
and becomes part of Slumville, this cost will not be considered in the calculus of any
individual landlord, whose action in renting a single apartment to a member of the lower
class will have little or no effect upon the "tipping." Cf. T. Schelling, Neighborhood
Tipping, supra note 25.
27. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 forbids discrimination "in terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling," 42 U.S.C. § 3604kb) (Supp. V, 1970) and the
exceptions to this mandate do not apply to the typical leasing situation. Similarly, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as interpreted by Jones v. Alfred H. layer Co., 892 U., 409
(1968), also is applicable, as would be the typical local or state fair housing ordinance. See
Abrams & Baldwin, Local Fair Housing Legislation: Adoption, Enforcement, and Related
Problems, 2 URBAN Lxiw. 277 (1970). While theoretically it could be argued that a landlord
who charges a lower-class black a higher rental than a lower-middle-class white is not
"discriminating" against blacks because they are black but because they are members of
a class who are believed, on a statistical basis, to cause greater damage to the leased
property, there can be little doubt that such an argument would be rejected--especially
give the absence of objective, satisfactory data to support such a belief. Cf. Griggs v.Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. Housing codes may also increase the cost of dividing larger Middleburg units Into
smaller units more marketable to the lower class by requiring that certain amenities be
available in every unit. Insofar as the code has this effect it will, once again, slow the rate
of trickle down.
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Slumville; one must also consider the rate at which houses are trickling
down from Middleburg. However, some may suspect that even this is
too myopic a view. It may be argued that imposing "code costs" upon
Slumville owners will discourage new housing construction in the pri-
vate sector, thereby lowering the supply of housing to low income
groups in the long run-which in turn will mean an increase in rents
to the poor. If it were economically feasible for the private sector to
build new housing for the poor without government subsidy, this ob-
jection would have very substantial weight. But, in fact, unsubsidized
new construction for the poor has long since ceased to be economically
feasible.29
Since the poor are dependent upon old buildings, the argument that
code enforcement discourages new construction must be recast in a
different, and far less imposing, form. One must argue that when a de-
veloper is considering the profitability of a middle-class residential
apartment house, he will seriously take into account the possibility that
in twenty or thirty years time the building's profitability might be sig-
nificantly reduced if (a) it is then within a slum district and (b) the city
is then actively pursuing a comprehensive code enforcement program.
Even those who have the greatest faith in the entrepreneurial abilities
of the American businessman would concede that the sensible developer
would discount the possible costs of code enforcement twenty years
hence as de minimis. Thus, if the government wishes to run a com-
prehensive code enforcement program without (a) increasing rent levels
or (b) forcing Slumville families onto the streets or into permanently
overcrowded conditions, it simply must make up the difference between
the number of units withdrawn from the Slumville market and the
number trickling down from Middleburg. It may properly ignore the
alleged "long run" impact the program will have on housing supply.
D.
While the preceding discussion has delineated the extent govern-
ment must subsidize the housing market in Slumville before it can in-
stitute a broadly based code enforcement program without raising rents,
it may be properly argued that the subsidy program of the dimension
29. The most sophisticated contemporary analysis of the costs of new construction,
which amply justifies the assertion in the text, may be found in von Furstenberg, Improv.
ing the Feasibility of Houseownership for Lower-Income Families Through Subsidized
Mortgage Financing and von Furstenberg & Moskof, Federally Assisted Rental Housing
Programs: Which Income Groups Have They Served or Whom Can They Be Expected to
Serve?, in 1 REPoar oF TnE PPmENr's CoirmrrEE oN Uzma. HousWG (KALsx Rnorm),
TEcHmcA.L Srunms 113-65 (1967).
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envisaged does not in reality place rents at the levels they would have
attained if the free housing market would have been permitted to op-
erate without either code enforcement or subsidy. Under a free market
regime, the arrival of additional housing trickling into the Slumville
market would have depressed rental levels below those formerly pre-
vailing. Old Slumville landlords who previously rented an apartment
for $80 would reduce the rent to $70 in an effort to induce tenants to
remain and not move to the "new" dwellings. Rents would be bid
downward until a sufficient number of landlords found it more profit-
able to devote their properties to non-residential uses. If 5,000 units
trickled down, rents would nose-dive until 5,000 units were removed
from the Slumville market. Thus a code enforcement-subsidy program
like that described in subsections III (B) and (C), which simply assured
that rental levels remained constant, would deprive Slumville's tenantry
of the benefit of the lower rents they would otherwise have obtained
from the free market.
This argument is correct as far as it goes. It falls short, however, in
failing to consider some of the peculiarities of the housing market.
Once a landlord has reached the decision to remove his building from
the rental market, the decision to relet his apartments is far from cost-
less. If the property was converted to another commercial use,
another investment will be required to ready it as a dwelling place.
Similarly, if the property was simply abandoned because the owner
could not make a return exceeding his variable costs at the lower rent,
it will be expensive for the landlord to rent it out again. For once a
building is abandoned in the slums, it is a victim of substantial depre-
dation by the community: plumbing may be stolen, walls defaced and
destroyed, windows broken.30 Consequently, rent levels in Slumville
would have to increase very substantially from the level they would
reach on the free market before any significant number of the 5,000
houses removed in our hypothetical slum would be offered for rent
again.
This means that the rent level attained as a result of competition
among Slumville's landlords when faced with an influx of 5,000 units
of "new" housing will not be in long run equilibrium. Once 5,000 units
have been removed from the market, an individual landlord still in
business will find that he can raise rents a bit without losing his tenant,
since a small increase in rent will induce none of the owners of the
withdrawn units to absorb the substantial costs of reentering the mar-
30. See W. GRIGSBY ET AL., supra note 7, at ch. 6, p. 21-22.
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ket. Rents will continue to rise in this incremental fashion until there
is substantial reentry.31 Thus, Slumville's tenantry will obtain substan-
tially less long run rent relief from an influx of housing "trickling
down" from Middleburg than they will obtain in the short run. Never-
theless, if policy makers wish to assure themselves that code enforce-
ment will not increase Slumville rents over the level they would attain
under a completely free market regime, the government must take into
account that tenants under laissez faire would have been receiving
substantial short-term, and less significant long run rent relief from the
houses trickling into an expanding Slumville.
Our discussion, then, has yielded an embarrassment of riches. Not
one, but two, significantly different subsidy programs may be proposed
to support a sustained code enforcement program: a smaller subsidy is
required if government's goal is simply to assure that code enforce-
ment will not cause a rent rise; a somewhat larger program is needed
if policy makers wish to guarantee Slumville's tenantry the lower rents
they would have obtained in the absence of a code enforcement pro-
gram. Some principles are required to permit government to choose in-
telligently between these alternative plans. Even more fundamentally,
it is necessary to decide whether the government should be spending its
limited resources on a housing subsidy program at all. Would not the
subsidy dollars be better spent if they were simply given to the resi-
dents of Slumville in the form of cash income-maintenance payments




Thanks to the advocates of the negative income tax, ranging from
Milton Friedman to James Tobin -32 all of us recognize much more
clearly that the city's particular difficulties in housing, education,
health care and mass transit are in significant part merely symptoms
of a more basic maldistribution of economic power which permits the
31. While the costs of reentry are considerable, Grebler found that over time a
significant number of long-vacant structures did return to the market in response to
changes in economic conditions. See L. GR.BLm, supra note 24, at 40-42. More contemporary
studies, unfortunately, have not attempted to view the same market over a substantial
period of time and, hence, Grebler's report stands alone in the published literature.
32. M. FIErita , CAPrALISam AND FaREo.t 190-95 (1962); J. Tobin, lRaising the Incomes
of the Poor, in K. GORDON, AGENDA FOR THE NAToN 77-116 (1968).
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bottom quarter of our population only five per cent of the national
income.33
The advocates of the negative income tax invite us to discard slip.
shod, ad hoc subsidy efforts which seek to cure particularly troublesome
sorespots and instead pursue a much more generalized subsidy scheme.
They argue that the money spent on special purpose subsidies will yield
the poor greater benefits if spent upon income maintenance pay-
ments. The substance of the position can be made clear by the follow.
ing hypothetical. Imagine that a Slumville family, if given a monthly
$100 income supplement, would choose to spend none of its extra
money on improved housing services. Indeed, if the family were forced
to choose between receiving a $70/month car and $100/month in im-
proved housing services, it would have great difficulty making up its
mind which was preferable. On these facts, a $100 monthly subsidy
which is tied to housing actually wastes $30 since a family would have
obtained as much satisfaction from a $70/month car as the $100/month
housing supplement. In economists' terms, there has been a "misallo-
cation" of resources--"too much" money has been invested in housing;
"too little" in automobile production. Thus, if government wishes to
maximize the benefit the poor will receive from each subsidy dollar,
it should choose to support a general income maintenance scheme-
which permits the greatest degree of consumer sovereignty-rather than
to persist in relying upon old fashioned special purpose subsidy
schemes.3 4
Unfortunately, it would take us too far afield to launch a broadly
based analysis of the conditions under which the general argument,
adumbrated above, is valid.35 Instead, I shall simply seek to indicate
33. G. KATONA ET AL., 1969 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, TAnLE 1-3 (Survey Research
Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970). The figures report
the income distribution prevailing in 1968. There is little reason to believe that the poor's
relative share has significantly increased since that time, given the increasing rates of
unemployment experienced from 1968 to the time of this writing. Cf. U.S. DuT. or Cort-
MERCE, CuRRENT POPULATION REPORTs, CONSUMER INCOME (Series P-60, No. 79, 1971). Analysis
of the 1970 Census will permit more precise information on this point.
34. For a balanced statement of the received learning, see J. Tobin, On Limiting the
Domain of Inequality, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 263, 275-76 (1970).
35. Surely a full fledged defense of this position would require its advocate to deal
satisfactorily with the implications of the theory of the "second best" developed originally
by Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 R. EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956),
which has generated a debate that has not yet come to an end. For some of the more
interesting contributions, see Davis & Whinston, Welfare Economics and the Theory ol
Second Best, 32 R. EcoN. STUD. 1 (1965); Davis & Whinston, Piecemeal Policy in the Theory
of Second Best, 34 R. EcoN. STUD. 323 (1967); Fishlow & David, Optimal Resource Alloca-
tion in an Imperfect Market Setting, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 529 (1961); McManus, Comments on
the General Theory of Second Best, 26 R. EcoN. STUD. 209 (1958-59); Turvey, The Second-
Best Case for Marginal Cost Pricing, in J. MAARcos & H. GtnrroN, PtaLIC EcONOlic
336-43 (1969).
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the extra dimension the preceding analysis of code enforcement adds
to the general subsidy problem. I shall do so by demonstrating that,
even if all the assumptions of the cash subsidy argument were ac-
cepted, it would still not necessarily undermine the case for a special
purpose housing subsidy of the kind envisioned here.
The argument can be most easily understood if once again we take
recourse to a simple mathematical example. As we have shown, a com-
prehensive code enforcement scheme in Slumville will induce a redis-
tribution of income from landlords to tenants: landlords' expenses will
increase; tenants will procure better living quarters; but rents will not
increase so long as the housing supply and demand remain constant. Let
us imagine that the average Slumville tenant family would value the im-
proved apartment which code enforcement has produced at $20/month.
Now also assume that, as a result of code enforcement, 5,000 of Slum-
ville's 100,000 apartments are withdrawn from the market and that
only 2,000 units have trickled down from Middleburg. In other words,
the government must subsidize 3,000 units if it is to prevent an increase
in Slumville rents. Suppose that it costs the government $50 a month
to subsidize these 3,000 units and that these 3,000 subsidized families,
like their unsubsidized neighbors, value the housing improvements at
$20 per month on the average.
We can now compare the costs and benefits of the combined code
enforcement-subsidy program with the costs and benefits of an income
maintenance program of comparable dimension:
PROGR.AM1 COSTS BENEFITS
Code enforcement- 3,000 families 97,000 families in un-
housing subsidy X $50 per month = $150,000 subsidized housing X
$20 per month = $1,940,000
3,000 families in
subsidized sector X
$20 per month = $ 60,000
$2,000,000
Income 3,000 families 3,000 families
maintenance X $50 per month = $150,000 X $50 per month = $ 150,000
Putting aside for the moment all secondary costs of administering
the alternative programs as well as their comparative effect on govern-
ment tax revenues, the benefits of the code enforcement-special hous-
ing subsidy scheme are approximately fourteen times the benefits of a
comparable expenditure of government funds upon an income main-
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tenance program. The basic explanation for this phenomenon is quite
simple. An expenditure of government funds on a negative income tax
does not permit the government to initiate a second program which
redistributes additional income to the poor at no expenditure of gov-
ernment money. A dollar spent on a negative tax yields a dollar in
benefits to the poor: there is no "leverage" effect. In contrast, a dollar
spent on a special purpose housing subsidy does have a "leverage" ef-
fect since it permits the government to initiate a second income redis-
tribution program-comprehensive code enforcement-at no increase
in government expenditure. Thus a dollar spent on the special housing
subsidy not only benefits the direct recipient of the subsidy but also
benefits all those families who receive better private rental housing-at
no increase in rent-as a result of code enforcement.
Now, of course, the "leverage" effect is not a magic wand by which
the government may generate benefits for the poor without social cost.
Ex nihil nihil fit. Code enforcement does not cost the government any-
thing beyond administration expense precisely because the program
places the principal redistributive burden upon the private landlords
of Slumville rather than the Athenian taxpayers at large: as a conse-
quence, a major portion of the redistributive impact of the program
only appears in the landlords' private budgets without denting the pub-
lic fisc. Thus, it clearly would be improper at this stage in the analysis
to embrace a code enforcement-special housing subsidy scheme for
Slumville simply because the program generates more (redistributive)
bang for the (government's) buck. Before passing final judgment, it is
necessary both to consider the fairness of imposing a special burden for
redistributing the wealth upon the landlords of Slumville and to assess
the overall efficiency with which the code enforcement scheme redis-
tributes both the government's and the landlord's contribution. This
broader analysis will be attempted after an examination of the impact
of housing code administration upon rent levels is concluded; never-
theless, even at this early stage, it seems important to emphasize the
limited function of the question we are presently pursuing. At best, the
analysis attempted in this section of the essay can establish that code
enforcement-when backed by a special housing subsidy-can have a
place within a larger redistribution strategy. It remains to be considered
whether it ought to have such a place; and the simple perception that
the code-housing subsidy approach may generate more bang for the
government's buck cannot provide the basis for a sophisticated approval
of the plan.
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B.
In introducing the "leverage" concept, we found it simpler to ignore
for a time the governmental costs generated by the two programs other
than those state expenditures which directly passed into the hands of
the recipients. In order to put "leverage" into perspective, however,
the existence of costs of two other kinds must be considered. First, it
may be argued that when costs of administration are taken into account
the code enforcement-special housing subsidy scheme will appear far
more expensive than our original comparison indicated. Indeed, since
this essay only suggests the propriety of supplementing a national cash
grant program with the code-housing subsidy scheme, the bureaucratic
cost argument may be cast in a way which, on the surface, seems very
strong indeed. For the bureaucratic costs involved in running both a
negative income tax and a code-special subsidy scheme would appear
to exceed by far the bureaucratic costs involved in relying exdusively
upon the cash grant scheme. In order to redistribute supplementary in-
come through the manipulation of the slum rental market it would be
necessary to create a distinct, specialized bureaucracy to administer the
program. In contrast, if the supplementary income generated by code
enforcement were simply replaced by a higher cash payment adminis-
tered through the pre-existing negative income tax bureaucracy, there
would be almost no added bureaucratic expense involved in delivering
the supplementary income to the poor. Thus, it could be argued that
the "leverage" effect will be counterbalanced significantly-if not com-
pletely-by the added bureaucratic costs of regulating the rental hous-
ing market on behalf of the poor.
This argument loses much-though not all-of its surface appeal,
however, when its critical premise is scrutinized with care. Only if it
is assumed that code enforcement would be completely abandoned
should it fail to fulfill the requisites of national redistribution policy
will all of the bureaucratic costs involved in its administration be saved.
As we shall see, even if code enforcement did not redistribute supple-
mentary income optimally, certain aspects of the program could still
be justified on the ground that enforcement provides the most efficient
way to eliminate costly fire, health and safety risks imposed by individ-
ual slum dwellings upon the larger community (a phenomenon econo-
mists characterize by the increasingly familiar "externality" label)." 0
Consequently, the bureaucratic costs appropriately charged to the
added dimension of code enforcement justified by exclusive reliance
56. See pp. 1177-83 infra.
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upon the income redistribution goal is only the added expense involved
in maintaining a somewhat larger bureaucracy for regulating the hous-
ing market than would otherwise exist. When understood in this way,
the extra bureaucratic costs seem quite small, though not de minimis,
Once a code inspector has arrived in the tenant's apartment to deter-
mine whether the wiring system is a fire hazard (a step justified on
externality prevention as well as income redistribution grounds), how
much more expensive will it be for him to determine whether the
apartment has hot running water (a code requirement which we shall
assume can be justified exclusively by reliance upon the income redis-
tribution objective)? It would seem that the added inspection time will
be measured in minutes rather than hours, and the same can be said
at later stages in the enforcement process. While even extra man-min-
utes add up when they are expended upon a large number of occasions,
added costs of administration will probably counterbalance only a
small part of the leverage effect.
37
While our discussion has revealed that the omission of administra-
tive expenses in our original cost-benefit analysis of the alternative
programs does not lead to substantial distortion, costs of a second kind
may be of greater significance in striking the proper cost-benefit com-
parison. The critic of code enforcement may suggest that depriving
landlords of income will reduce the tax revenues the public treasury
will receive from landlords, thereby increasing the true expense to the
public treasury substantially beyond that originally suggested. Assum-
ing that landlords are either in relatively high personal income tax
brackets or are subject to the corporate income tax, will not the federal
(and state) governments be losing in tax revenue a substantial portion
of each dollar by which the landlord's profits are reduced through code
enforcement?
The answer to this question is quite complex, even assuming rela-
tively full employment of resources within Slumville. 8 Code enforce-
37. In addition to the costs of administering the code enforcement effort, there may be
an additional cost involved in administering the housing subsidy component of the
program. The importance of these bureaucratic costs will depend upon the form the
subsidy takes. If government operates public housing, it is difficult to envision any "costs
of administration" arising over and beyond the costs of building (or rehabilitating) and
then operating the units, all of which have been already taken into account in our prior
discussion of direct subsidy costs in subsection A at p. 1121 supra. If, however, the state
chooses to subsidize private landlords, then in addition to the direct subsidy costs, there
will be a significant cost of administration.
88. Following the custom of contemporary cost-benefit analysis, I am here assuming
that the government has already selected the most appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal
policy to achieve full employment and that the only question before us is the extent to
which limited government resources should be devoted to one program rather than another.
It is possible-indeed likely-that subsidized housing and code enforcement could some-
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ment will induce a shift of resources into repair and maintenance
operations, generating increases in total profits for management and
total wages for labor in this sector and lower total profits and wages in
those sectors from which resources have been shifted. Given both the
imperfections in labor and product markets as well as the differing tax
rates applying to different market sectors, it does not seem possible to
determine a priori whether the increase in income tax revenue gen-
erated in the repair and maintenance sector will more than offset the
decrease suffered in the sectors from which resources have been di-
verted. Thus it remains unclear whether the tax loss suffered as a re-
sult of the decline in landlord profits will be offset in part by an
increase in tax revenues generated in the maintenance and repair sec-
tor. Even assuming absolutely no offset, however, the revenue loss suf-
fered by the Treasury can weaken, but certainly not destroy, the logic
of the leverage theory we have been exploring since loss of tax revenue
can in the nature of things be but a fraction of the total amount ex-
pended by landlords upon code compliance.30
C.
With the "leverage effect" a bit battered but more alive than dead,
it is necessary to consider its dynamics more precisely than a single
example has permitted us to do. Indeed, it is not even always true that
a housing subsidy-code enforcement scheme will yield greater benefits
to the poor than will a comparable expenditure of public funds on a
general income maintenance plan. A careful consideration of the sim-
ple example we have discussed reveals that the "leverage" of the special
purpose housing subsidy is a function of six variables:
1. The number of Slumville housing units driven off the market
by code enforcement has a profound impact since the larger the num-
ber of units, the greater the number of families that must be subsi-
dized. The impact of withdrawal of Slumville units is offset by:
times be justified on Keynesian macroeconomic grounds as appropriate mechanisms for
increasing aggregate demand at low points in the business cycle. Of course, when macro-
economic considerations support the microeconomic factors argued in the text, the merits
of the effort at regulation will be enhanced. Nevertheless, I have not chosen to pursue the
Keynesian arguments principally because they will at best support the program over
only the depressed portion of the business cycle and consequently are insufficient to support
a public commitment to a decent home in times of prosperity as well as depression.
39. Paradoxically, real estate taxes upon buildings which have been improved can be
expected to increase, at least according to Sternleb's study of Newark, which suggested that
landlord improvements tend to induce tax assessors to raise their appraisals and hence
the ultimate levy. See G. STERNLI=, supra note 6, at 203-24. This counter-productive
tendency of real estate assessors has properly been condemned, id., but it should never-
theless be taken into account as a revenue gain generated by code enforcement until some
mechanism is devised to control this real estate assessor response.
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2. The number of units trickling down from Middleburg. It should
be clear from our previous analysis4" that the trickle down effect, if
it is significant, mitigates the consequences of landlords withdrawing
units from the Slumville market.
3. The cost to the government of subsidizing each unit it must
place on the market. Obviously, the unit subsidy cost will depend on a
variety of factors including the form the subsidy will take (traditional
public housing, subsidized mortgage financing, rent supplements, etc.)
as well as the number of abandoned buildings that could be rehabili-
tated at a price which is lower than that required by new construction.
While the first three variables are basically concerned with housing
supply, the last three focus upon the demand for improved housing in
Slumville:
4. The benefits of the housing subsidy-code enforcement plan in-
crease with an increase in the dollar value the average tenant in the
private housing sector places upon the improved quality of his dwell-
ing. This factor, in turn, is to some extent counterbalanced by:
5. The extent to which the average tenant in the subsidized sector
would prefer spending his subsidy dollars on non-housing services.
6. Finally, there must exist a significant number of Slumville resi-
dents in the private sector who are "lukewarm" in the sense previously
defined and therefore are unwilling to pay an increased rent for the
code improvements. It should be clear from the discussion in Section
II that landlords will succeed in passing on their code costs up to the
point where this condition is satisfied.
4'
40. See pp. 1113-17 supra.
41. Thus, imagine the extreme case in which the state undertook to house only those
among the very poor who would react lukewarmly if confronted by a substantial rent hike
in the private sector. If the state succeeded in this effort, our analysis indicates that private
landlords would successfully pass on a substantial portion of their code costs despite the
subsidy program. From this perspective, it would appear that the policies of traditional
public housing programs, which tend to house the poorest of the poor, can be subjected to
severe criticism on income redistribution policy grounds. Since the poorest members of
the underclass are, for obvious reasons, most likely to act lukewarmly when confronted
by a rent hike, a subsidy program like old-fashioned public housing, which attempted to
house only the very poor, would deprive the private sector of the very tenants necessary to
beat back the landlords' effort at raising rents. Housing subsidies made available through
more recent programs, however, would seem to be less open to this attack, since they tend
to subsidize a broader class of ghetto residents, selecting the lucky beneficiaries among tlis
class on a relatively haphazard basis. A useful comparison of the various federal subsidy
programs along these lines may be found in 2 NATIONAL INsriTuTt FOR EDUCATION IN LAW
AND POvERTY, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAw, ch. V, pt. II, at 4-22 (1970). See also von
Furstenberg, The Impact of Rent Formulas and Eligibility Standards sin 1ederally Assisted
Housing and studies cited, supra note 29.
While the nature of the group receiving the housing subsidy is of considerable im.
portance in the case of comprehensive code enforcement, it is even more critical in those
situations in which the code is enforced only in Area X while Area Y remains untouched,
Area X wiU not undergo a significant rent inflation only if the state subsidizes housing for
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- The value the average tenant places upon improved housing ser-
vices in both the subsidized and private sectors (factors four and five
above) greatly affects the relative desirability of a code enforcement-
subsidy program. If, for example, the average Slumville tenant only is
willing to pay 500 for the improvements accruing as a result of code
enforcement, a direct subsidy program would yield greater benefits:
PROGRAM COSTS BENEFITS
Code enforcement- 3,000 families 97,000 families in ua-
housing subsidy X $50 per month = $150,000 subsidized housing X
50g per month - $ 48,500
3,000 families in
subsidized sector X
50¢ per month $ 1,500
S 50OO
Income .3,000 families 3,000 families
maintenance X $50 per month = $150,000 X $50 per month $150,000
Unfortunately, although both tenant preference variables are of great
importance in evaluating the desirability of the special purpose housing
subsidy, it is not easy to obtain very reliable data to measure them. It
would be possible, of course, to interview residents of subsidized and
unsubsidized housing and ask them an appropriate set of questions to
determine the dollar value they place upon their improved housing
conditions as a result of a code enforcement program. But the interview
questions which must be asked would require tenants to engage in
imaginative exercises of a sort to which they are ill accustomed. In-
deed, even under the best of conditions, it is difficult to respond with
much certainty to an interviewer who wishes to know, for example,
whether the tenant would rather live in a very bad slum and drive a
good car which costs $65 a month, or live in a code apartment and not
drive any car at all, or whether-finally-the tenant would prefer a
moderately defective car and a moderately substandard house to either
of the two extreme alternatives. Casual answers to such questions may
poorly reflect what the tenant would in fact do if he were faced with
the hard choice in reality. Nevertheless, such questions must be asked
if the interview is to yield results which would permit a meaningful
those (richer) tenants living in Y who would be willing to pay a substantial premium on
the "new" code units in the enforcement zone (X). If, in contrast, the state provides housing
for only those poorer tenants who are most likely to act lukewarmly, then substantial rises
can be expected not only in Area X but also in Y as well, as will become readily apparent
to the reader who reviews the material presented in subsection II(C) at pp. l1O8-10 supra.
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economic comparison between the income maintenance and housing
subsidy-code enforcement programs.
While the obvious flaws of the interviewing process substantially
undermine the validity of the results yielded, it is possible to devise
an alternative method of obtaining more reliable data. Imagine an
experiment in which a slumdweller were forced to choose between
receiving supplementary incomes of varying amounts and the right to
demand that his landlord improve his apartment to code level. Pre-
sumably, the amount of the supplement payment the slumdweller
would forego in order to obtain code housing would indicate the money
value he would obtain as a result of a comprehensive code enforce-
ment program under conditions like those postulated in our Slumville
model.2
In the absence of a social experiment of this kind, however, it would
appear that decision makers must simply try to guess the dollar value
of code enforcement to Slumville tenants both in the subsidized and
unsubsidized sectors. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the
guesswork will yield a completely arbitrary figure; it is only reasonable
to expect, however, that a substantial error will enter in. Neverthe-
less, despite the error, the guess must be made before one is to support
(or oppose) a housing subsidy of the dimension considered here. It
is true, of course, that special purpose housing subsidies can be advo-
cated (and opposed) on entirely different theories than the one which
has been discussed in this essay. But unless both sides agree that
aiding the poor is only a trivial part of the issue, they will be obliged
to engage in the guesswork of the kind suggested here: they must try
to quantify the dollar values both subsidized and unsubsidized tenants
place upon their improved housing before determining whether a code
enforcement-special housing subsidy is to be preferred over an income
maintenance scheme.
One's guess at the value of housing improved to code levels will, of
course, be in substantial measure determined by the skill of the drafts-
men of the Athenian housing code. If the code is replete with trivial
requirements, the value of code enforcement to the typical tenant
42. Of course, precautions must be taken to structure the experiment to simulate
"real world" conditions. It should be recognized, however, that even under the best of
conditions, quantification of benefits will be infected with significant error. Moreover, this
is true not only in the evaluation of the program under discussion, but also of cost-benefit
analysis generally, although on occasion more sophisticated statistical techniques are
available. See MEASURING BENEFrrs oF GOVERNMENT INVE ITENTS, (R. Dorfman cd. 1960).
Cf. von Furstenberg, The Inefficiencies of Transfers in Kind: The Case of Housing Assis-
tanee, 9 WESTEMN ECON. J. 184 (1971).
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will be minimal. At the same time, poorly conceived code requirements
will place a substantial burden upon Slumville's landlords, increasing
the number of houses withdrawn from the market-thereby increasing
the subsidy expenditure required to support effective, comprehensive
code enforcement (factors one through three above). Consequently, our
analysis cannot-without detailed case by case study of presently en-
acted codes--be taken to suggest that the comprehensive enforcement
of existing codes, together with an appropriate housing subsidy, gener-
ates greater tenant benefits than would the expenditure of government
money on a negative income tax in an urban setting similar to Slum-
ville's. Nevertheless, the logic of the "leverage effect" certainly suggests
that, given a market structure similar to Slumville's, a code could be
proposed which would benefit a very substantial proportion of the slum
tenantry-assuming government is willing to subsidize a relatively
small number of them through a direct housing subsidy. It is possible,
of course, to imagine a situation in which the enforcement of any code
-no matter how skilfully drawn-will induce a massive withdrawal of
rental housing. An extensive landlord exodus, coupled with a large
per-unit subsidy cost, could conceivably require the government to
spend such volumes of money that the benefits accruing to the tenantry
as a result of code enforcement would not be greater than those which
would accrue as a result of a comparable negative income tax scheme.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that such a massive withdrawal from
the market would occur.
D.
While the foregoing suffices to demonstrate that a code enforcement-
housing subsidy plan may yield greater benefits to Slumville's poor
under a broad range of conditions than a comparable expenditure of
public funds on a negative income tax scheme, we have yet to con-
sider, in a precise manner, the optimal level at which the housing
subsidy program should operate. As has already been noted, there
comes a point at which a special housing subsidy is no longer as effec-
tive as the more generalized income maintenance program like the
negative income tax. To put the matter concretely, let us renew our
consideration of the hypothetical considered in subsection IV(A), the es-
sential characteristics of which may be summarized in the following
chart.
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SLUMVILLE
No. of families 100,000
No. of houses before code
enforcement 100,000
No. of houses forced off
market by code enforcement 5,000
No. of houses trickling into
Slumville 2,000
Average dollar value of improved
housing to non-subsidized tenants $20/month
Average dollar value of improved
housing to subsidized tenants $20/month
Assume further that for every 1000 houses removed from Slumville,
average rents increase by $20.





For purposes of simplifying the analysis to its bare essentials, we shall
also assume that all families evicted from buildings forced off the mar-
ket by code enforcement choose to remain on the streets rather than
to double-up in one of the remaining apartments. Thus, if a munici-
pality enforces the code comprehensively without a subsidy program,
both the 97,000 families which find houses and the 3,000 which find
themselves in the streets are worse off than before: the 97,000 families
with homes each lose $40 (the difference between the value of the
improvements to the average family and the rise in rent); the homeless
lose even more. In strict monetary terms, their loss is something less
than $60/month since we know both that the homeless were formerly
willing to spend $100/month on a "sub-code" house and that they
could now obtain a dwelling simply by bidding somewhat more than
the $160 prevailing rent. But decision makers will also consider the
political consequences of forcing poor people into the streets and let
us assume that, when this factor is taken into account, the cost of hav-
ing any significant number of families homeless is simply intolerable.
If a housing subsidy is then introduced, rent levels decline and fewer
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families are left homeless. The dynamics of the situation may best be
portrayed diagrammatically:
$ Benefit
Number of Units (ht thousands)
R=Total Benefi '-to Residents; TB=Total Benefit; ."=A line drawn, tangent to TB
and parallel to SC at 100,000 unit supply; H = Total Benefit to Homeless; SC = Subsidy
Cost.
As the graph indicates, measuring the total benefit accruing to the
tenant class is somewhat more complicated before 3,000 units of sub-
sidized housing are provided. As the number of subsidized units is in-
creased within the 0-3,000 range, the total benefit curve rises relatively
rapidly for two reasons. First, every additional subsidized unit entering
the market marginally reduces the general rent level, thereby benefiting
all those Slumville residents who already have homes. Second, each
additional unit entering the market provides a home for one of the
3,000 Slumville families remaining on the streets, thereby transferring
a family which would have been bitterly angry as a result of the code
enforcement program into one which has obtained a house which is on
the average $20 per month better than those which were available
formerly. Once 3,000 homes have been provided, however, the total
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benefit curve increases much less rapidly-after that point, an increase
in the number of housing units available in Slumville does not provide
housing for the homeless; rather, it only benefits the tenantry by reduc-
ing the prevailing rent level.
While tenant benefits increase less rapidly beyond the 3,000 house
level, the subsidy cost of providing additional housing units does not
suffer a similar decline; indeed the marginal subsidy cost may well in-
crease. For as rent falls below the $160/month level prevailing when
there were only 97,000 houses on the market, some high cost landlords
in the private sector will be driven off the market, and publicly subsi-
dized housing must replace the newly abandoned properties if there is
to be a permanent addition to the housing stock. If the rate at which
houses are driven off the market increases as the rent is depressed below
the 5100 point prevailing with 100,000 houses, the marginal cost of
providing housing beyond the 100,000 house level will increase. Assum-
ing that the decision maker wishes to maximize only the efficiency of
government expenditure, it follows that he will no longer prefer to
spend government funds upon a special purpose housing subsidy rather
than a negative income tax if the marginal subsidy cost of providing the
100,001st house exceeds the marginal benefit Slumville tenantry receive
in the form of decreased rents. Since the rate at which a curve increases
at a given point may be represented graphically by a straight line which
is tangent to the curve at that point, the subsidy should cease when a
line tangent to the total benefit curve is parallel to a line which is
tangent to the subsidy cost curve. Thus, in the situation portrayed in
the preceding diagram, the special purpose housing subsidy should
terminate with the 3,000th house since a straight line (X), tangent to
the total benefit curve (TB), may be drawn which is parallel to the
subsidy cost curve (SC) at that point.
It is important to recognize, however, that there is no divine law
which ineluctably commands that the special housing subsidy cease
when the government makes up the loss of those houses driven off the
market by code enforcement which are not replaced by dwelling units
trickling down from Middleburg. As our previous discussion suggests,
the point at which marginal subsidy cost will equal marginal tenant
benefit will depend upon:
1. The elasticity of housing demand within Slumville. The greater
the decline in rent levels precipitated by a given increase in supply of
housing above the 100,000 mark, the greater the tenant benefit.
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2. The elasticity of housing supply within the unsubsidized sector.
The larger the number of dwelling units removed as a result of a
given decline in rents, the larger the subsidy required to maintain the
overall supply at a level higher than 100,000 units.
3. The cost of adding an extra unit of housing to the Slumville mar-
ket.
If housing demand is relatively elastic, housing supply relatively
inelastic and the cost of subsidy relatively low, the optimal subsidy
level may well exceed 3,000 units.
We are now in a position to resolve the conundrum with which
this section of the essay opened.43 We were then confronted with the
task of choosing between two different subsidy plans which colorably
could be advanced to support a comprehensive code enforcement pro-
gram. The first, more modest, proposal simply sought to maintain rents
at pre-code enforcement levels. The second, somewhat more ambitious
plan, sought to secure to the tenantry the rent decrease it would have
otherwise obtained as a result of the flow of housing units trickling
down from Middleburg. It is now easy to see that neither of the plans
may be optimal in a given situation. Although they differ in other
respects, the two proposals have a common flaw. Each plan sets
as its goal a rent subsidy program that will lower the Slumville rent
level to a certain "target" figure. In neither program, however, is the
target necessarily set at the level at which the marginal benefits of the
subsidy equal its marginal costs. And it is only when this point is
reached that the subsidy should be terminated, assuming that the
decision maker's goal is simply to maximize the impact of government
expenditure. Using this "marginal cost-benefit" test we have seen that
while a subsidy plan must fulfill the less ambitious subsidy goal (in our
hypothetical 3,000 units), it may not be rational to go beyond this
point-as suggested by the second, more ambitious plan-depending
upon the elasticity of total housing demand, housing supply within the
private sector and the marginal cost of adding an additional unit to
the Slumville rental stock. At a later point in this essay, we shall modify
this "marginal cost-benefit" test as we find it necessary for the decision
maker to accommodate interests other than maximizing the redistribu-
tive impact of government funds in designing the code-subsidy pro-
gram. Nevertheless, the cost-benefit discipline set out in this section
43. See p. 1119 supra.
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demarcates the outer limit beyond which the code enforcement-subsidy
approach should never be pursued, providing an important reference
point for our subsequent consideration of factors which could well
temper government's reliance upon code enforcement as a redistribu-
tion technique.
V. Slumville Revisited
It would be helpful, before continuing, to recapitulate. In the second
section of this essay, an attempt was made to specify a model of a slum
in which landlords could not pass on any of the costs of comprehensive
code enforcement to their tenants. Finding the model's assumptions
about housing supply primitive, the third part of the essay sought
to state with greater sophistication the supply conditions under which
landlords could not pass on any of the costs of a comprehensive code
enforcement program. We found it possible to state a formula which
would determine the extent to which a government subsidy was re-
quired to prevent landlords from passing on their code costs to tenants.
After doing so it proved possible to develop a distinctive rationale to
support the claim that a special purpose housing subsidy benefits the
slum tenant class more than the expenditure of the same amount of
government money upon a more general income maintenance scheme
(Section IV). We are now in a position to consider the extent to
which the assumptions made in Section II as to Slumville's market
structure were necessary in reaching our conclusion that government
money could-up to a certain point-generate more benefits to the




In our earlier discussion we assumed that all of Slumville's housing
was of equally poor quality before code enforcement. If this premise
is abandoned, the analysis is complicated considerably, as the follow-
ing exercise suggests.
Imagine once again that Slumville is divided into two districts, X
and Y. On this occasion, however, we will be obliged to describe the
nature of the two areas in somewhat greater detail. Assume, then,
that for a significant number of Slumville residents, X and Y are
comparable in all those aspects of community life which do not
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depend upon the quality of the physical structures housing the in-
habitants. Thus, with respect to such factors as the quality of edu-
cational, shopping, and recreational facilities as well as distance from
employment centers and access to mass transportation facilities, a
significant number of residents would be indifferent as to whether
they lived in X or Y.4 The only salient difference between the two
neighborhoods lies in the quality of housing prevailing in the two
areas. While the houses in X are below standard, the houses in Y are
in substantially worse shape. Consequently, before code enforcement,
X's houses rent for $100 per month while Y's are going for $60, the
rent differential being determined, of course, by the actions of those
who are relatively indifferent when they consider whether to live in
one area or the other. With the imposition of comprehensive code
enforcement, however, housing quality in Y will reach the new
high code level attained in X and housing quality will no longer dis-
tinguish the two zones. Consequently, provided that there are a
significant number of tenants in Y who will react lukewarmly to an
attempt by Y's landlords to increase the rents beyond the old $60
level, rent levels in X will decline from $100 to $60 as a result of the
newly intensified competition generated from area Y which has now
become the equivalent of area X in all relevant aspects. Thus, compre-
hensive code enforcement will force rent levels down in slum areas
which formerly offered relatively superior housing to the level prevail-
ing in neighborhoods containing formerly inferior housing but com-
parable non-housing amenities.
If, however, Areas X and Y not only offer different housing quality
but different levels of other kinds of community amenity, the situation
must be analyzed further. X may stand in one of two relationships with
Y. On the one hand, along with its better housing, X may also have
better transportation, education, recreation etc. than Y; on the other
hand, along with its better housing, X may possess non-housing ameni-
44. It should be apparent that the invocation of the notion of a "significant number"
of Slumville residents who are indifferent to "non-housing" amenities in X and Y is an
oversimplification. How large must the number be to be "significant'? Individual evaluations
of housing, transportation and other facilities will, of course, differ substantially among
Slumvillites. Thus, one group may think that X's "non-housing" amenities arc far superior
to Ys and another group may hold the opposite view. So long as the "pro-X" (or pro-Y)
contingent is insufficient in number to fill all the units available in Area X (or Area Y),
however, the rent level prevailing in the area will be determined by those Slumvillites who
are indifferent as between the non-housing services generated in X and those provided
in Y and who will leave X if rents there get out of line with those prevailing in Y. Thus
a "significant number" of indifferent Slumvillites is a number large enough to make it
impossible for a given area to be occupied completely by tenants who believe that its
non-housing facilities are superior to those available in other slum zones.
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ties which, in the aggregate, Slumvillites find less attractive than those
offered in Y. These two cases must, alas, be considered separately.
Starting with the more likely situation, imagine that X is superior
both in housing and non-housing characteristics. Here, the impact of
comprehensive enforcement will be easy to assess: rents in X will de.
dine to something below $100 as some residents find Y's $60 rent at-
tractive, given the improved housing that it now offers; as X's rents
decline to $90 (for example) some members of Y will find the $90
rental more attractive than the $60 level in Y, given X's superior non-
housing amenities; if at $90, the number of ex-Y'ers moving into X
equals the number of ex-X'ers moving into Y, X's rent will remain
stable, and if not, the rent will continue to plummet until equilibrium
is reached; while all this is happening in X, however, the $60 rental
in Y will remain constant provided that a significant number of old-
time Y residents are lukewarm to code improvements. Thus, when
one area is more desirable with regard to other parameters as well as
housing, its rents will decline somewhat, but will not plummet to the
level obtained in the generally poorer quality area; at the same time,
no compensating increase will be generated in the poorer area, provided
that a significant number of old-time residents react "lukewarmly" to
landlord efforts at raising the rent.
A different result follows when X only possesses superior housing
structures, and contains inferior facilities of other kinds. In this case,
rentals in Y will move beyond the $60 mark as a result of compre-
hansive code enforcement. Since Y will now have equal housing quality
and superior non-housing amenities, it will attract X'ers who will be
willing to pay at least their old rents of $100 for Y's units, while no
Y'ers will voluntarily move out of their newly improved units so long
as they remain priced at $60. This means that rents must increase in
order to force Y'ers out of their old apartments so that the ex-X'ers'
desires for high quality living can be fulfilled.
Thus far, however, we have only established that rents in Y will
move beyond the $60 level. Can one go further to estimate the extent
to which they will rise? The answer to this question depends upon
how much X'ers and Y'ers value the area's non-housing amenities,
If only a relatively small number of ex-X'ers arrive in Y, they will
first successfully outbid those old-time Y families who were lukewarm
about their code improved apartments at $60, then those who were
lukewarm at $61 ... etc.; but the supply of newcomers to Y will be
exhausted long before Y's rent level approaches the old $100 mark
previously prevailing in X. While Y's landlords would, of course, love
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to charge the newcomers at least the $100 they were spending formerly,
the competitive dynamic we have already examined will prevent this
from occurring, since it is the spending propensities of the marginal
families who will maintain Y's apartments at full occupancy which set
the rent for all. If, however, a sufficient number of ex-X'ers arrive on
the scene to displace all those Y'ers who are umvilling to meet the
ex-X'ers' offer of $100 for their apartment, rents will of course increase
to the old level formerly prevailing in X; if even more ex-X'ers arrive,
rents will even be bid beyond the $100 mark.
Meanwhile, former Y residents who are unwilling to pay the new
higher rents, must, of course, move somewhere. And since, in our
model, they will find it difficult to move beyond Slumville's borders,
they must, perforce, move to X. Once in X, the expatriates will find
the price determined-as always-by the conduct of those residents
(both new and old) who are least willing to pay the rent, even though
X's houses formerly fetched $100 a month. Thus, assuming there are
families who are lukewarm about housing code enforcement among
the expatriates from Y, it follows that the new rent level in X will fall
below $60. For if the lukewarm ex-Y'ers would have been unwilling to
pay more than $60 a month for code-improved housing in Y, they will
be unwilling to pay even that sum for newly code improved housing
in X, since (by hypothesis) this area is substantially worse in other
respects-having poorer schools, shops, transportation, etc. If the ex-
patriates are willing to act in a lukewarm manner and double-up or
skip rent until the rental levels are reduced below $60, rent reductions
will in fact take place, regardless of the $100 level which generally
prevailed prior to code enforcement when X had better housing
quality than Y. It would appear, then, that in this last, most compli-
cated and least likely case, comprehensive code enforcement will in-
duce rents in Y to increase beyond the 60 level and may indeed
generate a rent level exceeding $100 if enough ex-X'er's and old-time
Y'ers value living in Y very highly; in the meantime, rents will plum-
met in X from $100 to something below $60 if there are a significant
number of families among those emigrating from Y who are lukewarm
about code enforcement. Thus while code enforcement here will some-
times induce an overall decline in rents (when the aggregate decline in
X > aggregate increase in Y), it will sometimes lead to an increase in
the average Sluraville rental (when the reverse occurs).
Our original Slumville model, then, in assuming that the city's slum
contained structures which were equally slummy included a significant
oversimplification which served to understate the income redistribu-
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tion potential of code enforcement. Except in one class of cases, com-
prehensive code enforcement may be expected to depress rent levels in
the primeval Slumville hypothesized earlier rather than leave them
unchanged, as our earlier analysis suggested. It is only in those unlikely
cases where the area having relatively poorer housing also has rela-
tively better non-housing amenities that comprehensive enforcement
could conceivably generate an increase in the average rent level, and
even here, there is no necessity that such a result obtain.
This is not to say that it is impossible to structure a housing code
under which landlords would be unable to pass on any of their code
costs even in those relatively rare cases where the poorer quality hous.
ing is located in areas having the better non-housing amenities. All
that would be required here is a code which is "zoned" to demand a
lesser degree of housing improvement in the area in which non-housing
amenities were thought by significant numbers of residents of Slumville
to be superior 45-in our discussion, Area Y. For as our analysis made
clear, rents in Y will increase beyond $60 only insofar as X'ers were
attracted by the superior living conditions now made available in Y
as a result of enforcement. And as the "zoned housing code" is struc-
tured to require fewer improvements in Y's housing, Y would attract
fewer and fewer X'ers since the total package of housing and non-hous-
ing amenities obtained by living in Y no longer would seem superior in
the judgment of many Slumvillites to those obtained by living in X.
Thus the zoned housing requirements could be manipulated until a
substantial number of X'ers and Y'ers would not care very much about
the area in which they lived if apartments in both sectors rented at the
same price. At that point, landlords in Y could no longer raise their
rent above $60, since they would find themselves suffering a contraction
of demand as some lukewarm Y'ers doubled-up, and others moved to
X, while X'ers would no longer be attracted by Y's superior non-hous.
ing amenities since this superiority was now counterbalanced by its
inferior housing. Similarly, landlords in X would find themselves
forced to reduce their prices from $100 to $60 to meet the suddenly
intensified competition from Area Y. Thus, with a properly zoned code,
comprehensive enforcement can always be expected to depress prices
throughout the slum to the levels prevailing in the areas which have
the best non-housing amenities.
While "zoned codes" would thus make it impossible for landlords
45. Zoned housing codes, and the constitutional problems arising under them, are
discussed in Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 E-ARv. L. REv. 1115, 1120-23 (1956).
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to pass on their costs, even in those limited number of situations where
they might succeed in shifting some of their costs under comprehensive
enforcement of a uniform code, there are two obvious costs in using
the zoning device. First, zoning means that the code's protection will
be watered down for those who live in the worst structures-a position
which is difficult to maintain in the political arena even though the
worst buildings will be located in areas which offer compensating non-
housing advantages. Second, adoption of a zoning scheme of any sub-
stantial complexity would invite large-scale corruption, as landlords
seek to have the zone structured in a manner which is in their financial
interest. Nevertheless, even when these costs are given full weight it
remains likely that a moderate degree of zoning could appropriately
be invoked to eliminate all attempts to pass on code costs in the limited
number of situations in which this is a serious danger.
2.
Just as the earlier Slumville prototype assumed that the ghetto's
housing was of equal quality, it also assumed that the ghetto's tenantry
wreaked havoc equally upon their rented dwellings. Fortunately,
modifying this assumption in the direction of realism does not require
extensive discussion. If landlords obtain accurate information about a
particular tenant's propensity to damage the premises, they will attempt
to charge a rental which takes this fact into account, rewarding "good"
tenants with lower rents and vice versa. Thus, since under our proto-
type it was assumed that landlords believed all tenants to be average,
we are obliged to make a minor modification in the conclusions we
have reached. Instead of talking about a uniform rent level, as has been
our custom, we should have been speaking of an average rent level
which was the mean value in a range of rents representing the effort
by landlords to assess the extent to which particular tenants are better
or worse than average. Needless to say, each landlord will be subject to
a competitive constraint in making his determination of a specific
tenant's propensity to destroy. For if he incorrectly guesses that a tenant
is "bad," another landlord is always free to bid his customer away by
charging the tenant a rent appropriate for an average or good risk; on
the contrary, if he guesses that the tenant is "good" when he is "bad"
this fact will soon become apparent as greater code costs are incurred
than were anticipated. In this event, the landlord will either raise the
rent or evict in the hope of finding a better tenant. Thus, while im-
perfect landlord information as to the quality of any particular tenant
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may cause some pricing errors, there is little reason to believe that they
will be of extremely long duration.
46
B.
Our previous analysis assumed that a substantial improvement in
housing quality would not induce a large number of Athenians living
in Middleburg, let alone Snobtown, to consider moving into Slum-
ville. This is clearly a critical premise which provides the underpin-
ning for our argument that a special purpose housing subsidy may
often generate greater benefits than a generalized income maintenance
scheme. For if, as a result of comprehensive code enforcement, a large
number of middle-class Athenians will enter Slumville, bidding up
the rents, it should be quite clear that a very substantial proportion
of code costs will be passed on to the tenantry within Slumville,
perhaps forcing the poor into relatively small areas in which the code
is not enforced because of the politicians' fear that a large number
will be left homeless. Nevertheless, I believe that it is unnecessary to
analyze in detail the dynamics of a possible in-migration of the lower-
middle-class Middleburgers to Slumville, since it seems clear that the
46. While the recognition that tenants have unequal propensities to destroy their
apartments has not substantially undermined our earlier analysis, it does reveal an
important issue which the primitive Slumville model assumed out of existence. Thus far,
we have concerned ourselves solely with the impact of imposing code liabilities upon
landlords; but if tenants themselves vary in their propensity to destroy their accommoda-
tions, should not the law seek to deter serious tenant malefactors who are themselves
causing code violations? If-as we have suggested- the market can discriminate with
moderate success between good and bad tenants, this fact should be critical to a satis-
factory resolution of the problem of tenant sanctions. For our discussion of market forces
suggests that even without any state intervention, a tenant believed responsible for a
serious code infraction can expect an eviction notice or rent hike from his present landlord;
moreover, if the tenant finds himself evicted, he can expect to keep his past history
secret only with difficulty. Landlords may generally be expected to protect themselves by
asking tenants where they formerly lived and whether previous landlords were satisfied
with their conduct. Once these questions are asked, the prospective tenant has only three
options: he may tell the truth, lie, or refuse to answer. But lies may be checked by a
telephone call to the landlord or credit bureau, and landlords may be expected to suspect
the worst when their reasonable questions as to past history are answered evasively or not
at all. Finally, even those few tenants who slip through the information net will again
be confronted by either a rent hike or eviction notice if they continue their past practlccs.
Thus a tenant who imposes $100 in code costs upon a landlord will commonly hnd him-
self obliged to pay a "risk of ruin" premium which is suggested by hig past history of
vandalism. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the tenant who hias generated
$100 of code costs in the past will ultimately pay a premium far greater than that sun
in the future: since serious vandalism may substantially strain limited landlord resources, and
the opportunities for obtaining risk-spreading insurance against vandalism in the slum
are virtually nonexistent, ghetto owners can be expected to be quite risk-averse and charge
high premiums to tenants whose histories suggest vandalism.
Consequently, if the tenant contemplating vandalism considered the pay-off In a
sober manner, he would typically conclude that vandalism did not pay, given the relatively
heavy penalty imposed by the market and the relatively small chance of avoiding detection,
This is not to say that vandalism does not occur in the slums. The analysis simply suggests
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mere enforcement of housing code standards will not generate such a
population movement to any significant extent.
47
On the other hand, the possibility of a different kind of population
shift should be taken much more seriously. If (contrary to our previous
analysis) one assumes that there is more than one Slumville in the
city of Athens, it should be clear that the city cannot hope to enforce
the housing code in one of the slums without taking into account
the chance that inhabitants of the slums which are being ignored by the
code inspectors will seek to move into the improved Slumville, bidding
up the rents. Thus our earlier conclusion dearly assumes that if
there is more than one slum in a community, the code must be com-
prehensively enforced in all of the slums. Of course, if slums are
distant from one another, only a small number of families will be
tempted to move as a result of code enforcement limited to any one
of them. As distance increases, code enforcers will properly consider
the problem of inter-slum movement to be insignificant. How great
the distance must be before a slum is ignored will be determined
after considering the city's transportation network, each slum's prox-
imity to employment centers, the mobility of the population and
similar factors. Despite the complexity of these factors, it is quite likely
that a policy maker who is intimately involved in the life of his city
should be able to make a rough guess as to intra-city movement which
has considerable reliability.
It may be argued, however, that a code official who limits his concern
to the possibility of intra-city population shifts--as is suggested here-
will be ignoring a basic factor which will tend seriously to under-
mine his income redistribution effort. Jay Forrester, in his contro-
versial effort at constructing a mathematical model depicting the
growth and decline of the American city,46 has argued that his model
demonstrates that any public attempt to improve housing quality
in the slums will in the long run prove counter-productive because it
will induce an in-migration of the poor and unskilled from regions
that it is folly to expect that a systematic effort by the state to impose relatively small
money fines on tenants who violate the code will be a very successful deterrent to tenant
depradation; for the extra marginal deterrence to be gained by threatening the tenant
with a $100 fine must be minimal if the threat of more substantial money penalties
exacted by the market has been ineffective. In short, except for the most egregious cases
of tenant vandalism which cry out for a symbolic display of public disapprobation, the
cost of supplementing the rough justice meted out by the market seems far too substantial
to merit the use of governmental sanctions.
47. Karl and Alma Taeuber in their comprehensive study, NErROES IN CrMs (1965),
found overvhelming data indicating the "virtual irreversibility" of the shift of a unit
from white occupancy to non-white occupancy. Id. at 112 and see esp. Table 28.
48. J. FoaarsEr, URAa DNAmcs (1969).
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beyond the city. This, it is said, will in turn generate an enormous
exodus of modern business enterprises into suburbia, thereby leaving
the city in an economically stagnating condition. Thus, it could well be
that Professor Forrester would consider the code enforcement-housing
subsidy program examined here to be fundamentally misconceived.
Nevertheless, an attack on code enforcement based upon the teach-
ings of Forrester's Urban Dynamics should be rejected. A careful
reader of the book will at no point find a reasoned defense of the
author's belief that improving housing in the central city will generate
substantial population movements on a national scale. 40 Moreover,
49. In theory, the power of Forrester's effort rests in its attempt at constructing a
model containing a large number of simultaneous equations, each incorporating a
mathematical statement of a well-known and non-controversial relationship between factors
conditioning a city's rise and decline. The strength of this approach, of course, is that
building from a set of relatively non-controversial equations, the mathematical model may
generate a set of counter-intuitive conclusions, since the computer-when it is pro.
grammed correctly-may canvass the relationships implicit in the multi-equation model
far more systematically than the human mind can organize the relationships which the
model's equations incorporate. I have no difficulty with this approach on the level of
methodological theory. However, it should be clear that the conclusions ultimately derived
from the model can only be as sound as the original equations which attempt to describe
the relationships obtaining between the basic factors conditioning a city's growth, decline,
and fall. Thus, when the Forrester model grinds out a "counter-intuitive" conclusion which
holds that the more and better housing provided to the poor, the greater the poor will be
injured in the long run, the first question to ask is whether this counter-intuitive conclusion
is a consequence of a faulty equation system which describes reality incorrectly. Insofar as
the conclusion proceeds grom faulty premises, the student should remain resolutely
unimpressed by the argument, no matter how ornate the mathematical jargon in which
the premises are expressed.
Applying this test to Forrester's Cassandra-like predictions, one finds them sorely want-
ing. The fifth equation in the model purports to describe the relationship which is alleged
to exist between increasing housing supply on the one hand, and the in-migration of the
poor on the other. Not surprisingly, given Forrester's "counter-intuitive" conclusions, the
equation says that as the housing supply for the poor moves from shortage to surplus,
the rate at which the poor will enter the city from the hinterland increases dramatically.
Id. at 139-40. Given this equation, there can be little surprise when Forrester's model
"concludes" that increasing the supply of housing will lead to a counter-productive Influx
of the unskilled-for the "counter-intuitive conclusion" was already explicit In the
"counter-intuitive premise." Despite the critical nature of Equation 5's assertion that
migration increases dramatically with relatively small increases in housing quantity,
Forrester does not even attempt to cite a single piece of empirical research which tends to
corroborate Equation 5, although he recognizes that "fs]ome social scientists who read
the typescript of this book have objected to this housing multiplier on the basis that
studies show that housing is not a strong determinant in regulating urban migration of
the underemployed." Id. at 140. The author suggests, without any detailed analysis, that
these studies are "not necessarily contradictory" (emphasis added) with his equation. Even
taking this statement on faith, it nevertheless remains true that not a single study
affirmatively supports Forrester's conclusion while a significant literature appears to
refute it. At the very least, it appears incumbent upon Professor Forrester to explain in
detail wherein the seemingly competent studies are mistaken. To make matters worse,
Forrester's eleventh equation asserts that the existence of a public housing program will
increase yet further the in-migration of the poor. Id. at 143. The meagre evidentiary
basis for this equation is revealed by the following discussion, which contains the author's
complete explanation:
Equation 11 describes the influence of a low-cost-housing program. Living spaces
were accounted for in Equation 5. Here in Equation 11 the attractiveness arises from
the low-cost-housing-construction activity and the image of aid to the underemployed
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Forrester's assumption is undermined by the substantial amount of
empirical work which has attempted to explain migration patterns
in general and those of minority groups in particular. These inquiries
have unequivocally concluded that the primary magnet for migrants
has been a strong job market. Indeed, even for those who have not
uprooted themselves in search of work, there is some evidence that
"the presence of friends and relatives matters a great deal more than
such things as the housing supply or the availability of public assis-
tance. If these conditions do make some marginal difference in the
volume of a city's migration, most likely it is through the encourage-
ment or discouragement friends and relatives already there give to
potential migrants, rather than through a general spreading of the
word among the would-be freeloaders."' 0
Another trend in urban population movements may prove much
more important, although at present it is little more than a hope. It
is conceivable that over time public policy will permit a substantial
number of inner-city blacks to move directly from the urban core to
the suburbs, thus skipping over Middleburg.51 To a certain extent, im-
proving all inner-city housing to code levels will slow the exodus by
which this creates. It says that active low-cost-housing-construction creates attractive-
ness above and beyond what arises from the physical housing units. This is partly
because of the atmosphere of activity in behalf of the underemployed and also be-
cause the living units will be seen as more attractive than the deteriorated units
composing much of the underemployed-housing pool itself.
Id.
The superficiality of this analysis speaks for itself; once again, no effort is made to deal
with the seemingly inconsistent empirical literature Nor is there a thoroughgoing effort
to explore the extent to which the model's ultimate predictions are sensitive to changes
in the equations discussed here.
50. Tilly, Race and Migration to the American City, in Tim 14M-T opoLrrAN E qesA
124, 130 (J. Wilson ed. 1967). TUlly's article is an excellent summary of work in the field
prepared by a sociologist of international reputation. For the overriding importance of
economic opportunity, see H. SHRYOcK, JR., PopuLtp.AToN Monmrry TWrttmr TE UNrrED
STATES 403-09 (1964); Kuznets, Introduction: Population Redistribution, Migration, and
Economic Growth, in H. ELDRIDGE & D. THO3EAS, Dmtroapnric ANALYSES AND IN, nnEA-
TIONS, VoL II of POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOSnC GROwru, UNrrED STATES,
1870-1950, xxiii-xx.xv (1964); Turner, Migration to a Medium Sihed American City: Atti-
tudes, Motives, and Personal Characteristics Revealed by O en-End Interview Methodology,
30 J. OF Soc. PsYcH. 229-49 (1949); for the factors which impel migration other than the
search for a job, see H. ScmAnZvxu.ntu, FAMILY Tirs, MIGRATION, AND TRANsmo.AL Ao-
JUSTMNT OF YOUNG MEN FRor EASrmN KENrucKY (196-1); J. MacDonald & L. MacDonald,
Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networhs, 42 M t&Lto, Mwto-
jrAL FUND Q. 82-97 (January, 1964); Rubin, Migration Patterns of Negroes from a Rural
Northeastern Mississippi Community, 39 SoCLAL FORCES 59-66 (1960).
51. David Birch, in his study of TrE EcoNoNUC FUTrRE OF Crry AND Sunurna (Com-
mittee for Economic Development, Supp. Paper No. 30, 1970), indicates that the rate at
which blacks are migrating into suburbia increased significantly during the second half
of the 1960's, although the absolute number of blacks involved in this particular migration
remains so small that it cannot be expected to lead to a significant degree of black diffusion
unless aided by far more affirmative governmental action than is now currently forth-
coming. Id at 31. See A. DowNs, URAN PROBLEISS AND PRosPEcrs 27-74 (1970).
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making ghetto life more attractive. However, a simple code enforce-
ment program will probably have a limited effect on the outflow so
long as other municipal services remain in their present condition
of disrepair. If, on the other hand, the exodus became substantial, there
would probably be a large number of excess housing units on the
market. While, over the long run, one may expect marginal landlords
to respond to the diminution of housing demand by withdrawing from
the market, it seems likely that there will be a substantial time lag
during which the excess housing will cushion the impact of the with-
drawal of some units precipitated by code enforcement. Thus the sub-
sidy cost of comprehensive code enforcement may be reduced signifi-
cantly if, for independent and pressing reasons, the government under-
took a substantial effort at integrating blacks into the lily-white ring
which surrounds the depressed core.
C.
Thus far this canvass of the theoretical underpinnings of the prime-
val Slumville model should bring joy to the heart of the code enforce-
ment proponent. If anything, increasing the sophistication of the
analysis has suggested that code enforcement, when backed by an ap-
propriate housing subsidy, is an even more potent redistributive tech-
nique than our more primitive discussion indicated. Nevertheless, in
our second visit to Slumville, we have thus far refrained from evaluat-
ing the fundamental assumption which serves as this essay's major
premise. We have assumed throughout that the market for slum
housing may be appropriately analyzed with concepts enshrined in
economics theory textbooks. Does this assumption make sense? As we
shall see, there is far too little empirical evidence collected to convert
the confirmed skeptic to a new belief in the applicability of the analysis;
nevertheless, the following paragraphs can at least suggest to those who
tend towards skepticism that they may too easily discount the possibility
that the theoretical market system is a slum reality, at least so far as
rental housing is concerned.
1.
The critic of an economic analysis of code enforcement may appro-
priately begin by emphasizing the artificiality of our assumption that
tenants incur no significant costs in moving from one apartment to an-
other in Slumville. This assumption is dearly false as it stands. And
one may argue that a rational landlord, recognizing that the tenant
will incur moving costs, will exploit this fact by passing on at least
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some of his code costs, confident that the tenant will bear the costs
instead of going through the expense of moving.
There are, however, several weaknesses in this argument. First, a
landlord also incurs costs when his tenant moves-the apartment may
remain vacant for a considerable period of time, during which he re-
ceives no income. Moreover, a departing slum tenant may impose
another set of costs on the landlord by departing with the plumbing,
breaking windows or committing other acts of vandalism. While it is
impossible to say how often such conduct occurs in fact, my impression-
istic conversations with landlords indicate to me that vandalism by the
departing, judgment-proof tenant is widely feared.52 And it is the fear
-rather than the fact-which will count in the landlord's decision
whether to raise the rent. In short, it may well be that the landlord
finds the departure of an average tenant just as expensive as does the
tenant, in which case one would not expect the landlord to raise rents
if there is any great chance that the tenant will respond by leaving.
Since substantial evidence suggests that ghetto mobility is extremely
high,O there is thus good reason to believe that rational landlords
would not attempt to trade heavily on the exit costs of their tenantry.
There is yet another flaw in the argument that landlords will exploit
tenant inconvenience in moving by passing on code costs. Assume-
contrary to our argument above-that landlords will seek to exploit
52. The reality of tenant vandalism is further attested to by Professor Grigsby and
his group in their study of Baltimore. See note 30 supra.
53. faisel in his study of the determinants of mobility based upon 1960 census data
in the Western United States found on the basis of standard statistical techniques that
mobility increased as income declined. Mfaisel, supra note 16, at 95. Lower-class mobility
is further suggested by the massive movements of blacks into formerly white neighbor-
hoods, systematically documented by Taeuber & Tacuber, supra note 47, at 99-166. It
should be noted that the Taeubers found that the areas which had recently changed from
white to black were not composed of extraordinarily high proportions of blacks who had
recently migrated into the region, id. at 145, thereby further rebutting the notion that the
typical black ghetto resident, once settled, is relatively immobile. Finally, the raw data
collected by the 1960 Census tells a similar story, although it has not been analyzed
using sophisticated statistical techniques. The Philadelphia City Planning Commission,
for example, describes the patterns revealed in the Philadelphia area:
More than half the residents under age 45 moved during the 1955-60 period, but less
than one-third of those 45 and older changed residence. Men were proportionately
more mobile than women and non-whites more mobile than whites. Movers had more
formal education and higher occupational status than non-movers; but curiously, they
also had higher unemployment rates. Among the mobile population alone, "long
distance" movers (migrants and movers between City and Environs) were )ounger,
better educated and more highly skilled than "short distance" movers (those who
remained within the City or within the Environs) (emphasis added).
PHILADELPHIA CnTY PLANNING COsueSSION, fOBILITY IN TIE PHILADELPHIA M£TVOOLITAN
AREA, 1955-1960, at 11 (1965). These patterns are typical of those premiling in metropolitan
areas during that period according to my inspection of data available. See Uurrw STATrs
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUs oF POPULATION: 1960, Suajrcr Ruorrs: Monturry
roR MErRoporrAN AREAS, FINAL REPOnir PC(2)-2C (1963); unfortunately, this report con-
tains no effort to analyze the raw data contained in its tables.
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substantially the tenant's moving costs. There is no reason for the ex-
ploitative landlord to await code enforcement in order to do so. In-
stead, it would make sense for the profit-maximizing lessor to increase
his rents up to the point where his tenant would seriously consider
moving, even if code costs were not imposed upon him. And if exit
costs have already been fully exploited before code enforcement, the
landlord cannot exploit them again, without inducing his tenant to
leave. The argument from exit costs, then, falls between two stools-
either "exploitative" landlords have already taken advantage of the in-
convenience of moving before code enforcement or else they never will.
2.
Thus, those unpersuaded of the utility of classical forms of economic
analysis cannot take refuge in vague claims that tenants are "locked
into" the apartments they occupy, but must move to a higher plane of
abstraction and directly question whether it makes sense to assume
that landlords act to maximize their profits. If one abandons the
profit-maximizing premise, it is, of course, quite easy to sketch out
an argument which would indicate that landlords will pass on a large
share of their code costs to tenants even under the market conditions
developed in this essay. Under this view, one can claim that landlords
only attempt to profit-maximize in a slipshod way; they do not con-
stantly reevaluate the profit potential of their properties. Rather, once
a rental for a particular apartment is determined it tends to be main-
tained until an extraordinary event jars the landlord into reevaluating
the situation. Thus an apartment rented out to an individual for $100
will probably be rented out at that sum until the individual voluntarily
moves despite the fact that it could be rented out to another tenant
for $140. If, however, the code inspector requires repairs which cost
$30 a month, the landlord will overcome his inertia and increase the
rent charged to his tenant by $30.
I am unimpressed by this argument. Most important, it assumes
that but for the code enforcement campaign, no other "extraordinary"
event will occur which will rouse the landlord from his inertia and
induce him to reevaluate his profit picture. But when one attempts
to visualize the typical landlord's economic environment, it seems full
of events which can be expected to induce an agonizing reappraisal of
the rental structure: real estate taxes will be raised, mortgage payments
typically must be met, the premises must often be repaired, and one
tenant will be replaced by another at a new rental, all of which call the
entire rental schedule into question. Thus the "inertia" argument
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seems to hypothesize an idiosyncratic landlord psyche. For the argu-
ment assumes that the landlord will not reappraise his rental policies
when confronted with other seemingly catalytic events, but will under-
take a reassessment when prodded by code enforcement. It is much
more plausible to recognize that the kind of stimulus code enforcement
provides to landlords is not fundamentally different from that provided
by numerous other events in the landlord's life: if some landlords are
really that inert they will simply absorb code costs without thought; if
they are not that sluggish, they will be induced by other events to maxi-
mize profits regardless of the existence of a code enforcement campaign.
Nevertheless, it remains true that no researcher has yet attempted
to describe, let alone assess, the mental processes by which slum land-
lords of various kinds devise their rental schedules. 54 And in the ab-
sence of a substantial amount of research along this line, committed
skeptics may retain their belief that prices are being set quite quixoti-
cally in the slum rental markets, despite the confidence of those who
worship different gods that the profit-maximizing premise is legitimate.
3.
It may also be suggested that the models discussed in ie essay are
woefully defective in assuming that Slumville renters are both aware
of the housing opportunities open to them and are conscious of the
price differentials between units. The question is a controversial one,
with some commentators claiming that the lower class does not en-
deavor to control its future in any way, let alone engage in a con-
sidered comparison of costs and opportunities. Other commentators,
however, affirm that the poor are constantly aware of the problem of
comparative cost, although they often resolve the problem by purchas-
ing goods which are disfavored by the (upper) middle-class academics
who analyze them.55 I admit to holding the latter view, although given
54. Researchers have, however, discovered a substantial degree of landlord ignorance
concerning the availability of federal programs which could assist them if they choe to
improve the quality of their housing. See, e.g., G. SrNUMaru, supra note 6, at 1S9; more-
over, Professor Grigsby's study of Baltimore indicates that especially the small-time
absentee owner lacks many of the special skills needed to obtain financing and deal with
the distinctive problems of poor tenants. See W. GicsnY rr AL., supra note 7, at d. 10.
Nevertheless, the fact that a substantial number of landlords lack an insight into the
complexity of federal subsidy programs or lack the skills required to deal with the lower
class does not of itself suggest that they do not attempt to maximize their profits, given
the constraints implied by their own personal limitations. That is to say, because land-
lords are unsophisticated, their cost curves are higher than they might be had they
received better training; given this higher cost curve, however, it still remains likely
that they price their units with a profit-maximizing goal. And it is only this premise
which is required by the analysis advanced in this essay.
55. Professor Banfield is a leading exponent of the view which holds that, psycho.
logically speaking, the lower class has never transcended Rousseau's state of nature:
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the present state of our understanding, candor again requires the con-
fession that it is faith and not compelling evidence which impels my
choice (and, I might add, the choice of everyone else).
On a somewhat lower level of abstraction, however, it does seem pos-
sible to present three reasons why slum residents should be expected to
compare alternatives when selecting an apartment. First, there is the
simple fact that rent takes up a very substantial share of the poor
person's budget. Second, beyond the cost, the place one lives has a
great impact upon one's entire pattern of life. Third, the process of
apartment hunting takes hours at least, and oftentimes days. As a result
of this time-consuming process, it is reasonable to believe that the
prospective tenant obtains some sense of the alternatives open to him
in his area. Given that all the available evidence indicates an extremely
high rate of ghetto mobility, 6 it would therefore seem remarkable if
large numbers of ghetto families were not, at every point in time,
engaging in the process of comparing and acting upon perceived alter-
natives. It is only necessary to indulge this modest assumption to accept
the framework presented here.
D.
Finally, there remains the ultimate empirical question whether a
significant class of slum residents exists which will act in an appropriately
"lukewarm" fashion when faced with a rent increase on their newly
code improved apartment. There is, alas, no evidence on this issue
that I have found, in part because its significance has not been ap-
If [a member of the lower class] has any awareness of a future, it is of something fixed,
fated, beyond his control: things happen to him, he does not make them happen.
Impulse governs his behavior, either because he cannot discipline himself to sacrifice
a present for a future satisfaction or because he has no sense of the future. He is
therefore radically improvident: whatever he cannot consume immediately he considers
valueless.
E. BANFIELD, THE UNMEAVENLY CITY 53 '(1968).
While Professor Banfield is careful to deny that all slum inhabitants are true members
of the lower-class culture as he defines it, id. at 47-48, his entire analysis of the urban
scene presupposes that a substantial number of sluradwellers are imbued with lower-
class culture. In contrast, Elliot Liebow, in his brilliant study of the behavior of a
group of ghetto blacks whose social center was a street comer, concludes.
[Tjhe streetcomer man does not appear as a carrier of an independent cultural tradi-
tion. His behavior appears not so much as a way of realizing the distinctive goals and
values of his own subculture, or of conforming to its models, but rather as his way
of trying to achieve many of the goals and values of the larger society, of failing to do
this, and of concealing his failure from others and from himself as best he can.
E. Lynow, TALLY's CORNER 222 (1967). The book also contains a substantial bibliography
of basic writings in the field for those who wish to explore these mysteries in depth.
For a selection of more recent studies, see THE GHrro AlARNrPLAac (F. Sturdivant ed.
1969).
56. See data discussed at note 53 supra.
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preciated in the pastY7 Nevertheless, while opinions may appropriately
differ as to whether a class exists which will respond lukewarmly to
a minimal rate increase, there can be little doubt that a point will
come at which a relatively small percentage of the tenantry will start
limiting their demand even though a preponderant portion of the
slum population (the homelovers) would be willing to pay higher prices
for their code improvements before turning lukewarm.
In other words, even if rents did increase by $5 before marginal
tenants began acting lukewarmly, the average tenant-who values his
new improvements at $10-will receive at least a $5 advantage as a
consequence of code enforcement. Thus, even if it were found that
a significant lukewarm group did not exist when a very small rent
rise was attempted, this finding alone would not critically impair the
main thrust of this analysis. Indeed, the only empirical conclusion
which would utterly destroy this essay's argument would be a finding
that all of Slumville's residents valued code improvements in precisely
the same degree. For it is only among this perfectly homogeneous
tenantry that the distinction between the "lukewarm" and "home-
loving" subclasses would be completely abolished-with disastrous
effects for income redistribution policy. In such a world, the first signi-
ficant group of tenants would turn lukewarm only after the rent has
increased $10, thereby generating no improvement for the average
tenant who similarly values the code improvements at $10.
VI. Slumville-Monopoly (Oligopoly) Style
While the preceding models of Slumville have departed substantially
from the economist's conception of a perfectly competitive market,
they have nevertheless assumed that Slumville is endowed with a large
number of independent landlords, none of whom possess an appreci-
able share of the market. On the face of it, this assumption seems a
reasonably plausible one. Certainly when housing is contrasted to
other basic durable goods industries in this country, the comparison
is striking: it must be the rare city (or city slum) in which the largest
rental landlord has a market share equivalent to that enjoyed by
General Motors or Ford or even Chrysler.58 Nevertheless, appearances
57. Efforts at devising sophisticated estimates of the quantitative impact of quality
variables are in their infancy. For the most interesting effort in this general area, sw
Kain & Quigley, Evaluating the Quality of the Residential Environment, 2 E. %viomr
AIND PLAN. IG 23 (1970).
58. See the empirical evidence on this point discussed in note 7 supra.
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may be deceiving-it is conceivable, for instance, that in many cities
the rental policies of large numbers of small landlords are coordinated
(indeed determined) by a small number of rental agents. Much more
empirical work must be done before one can be certain of the answer.
While I, myself, would be quite surprised if the typical slum rental
market were revealed to be even an extremely loose oligopoly, I can
quite understand that many of my readers would suspect that monop-
olists (or oligopolists) may have a much greater ability to pass on "code
costs" to tenants than would landlords confronting a more competi-
tively organized market structure. The point is, of course, a critical
one. As we have seen, the greater the special housing subsidy required
to support a given comprehensive code enforcement program, the less
attractive the program seems when it is compared to alternatives. Thus,
it may well appear that if a monopoly or oligopoly controls Slumville
the comparative case for comprehensive code enforcement would be
substantially undermined.
It develops, however, that intuitions about the power of monopolists
and oligopolists to impose code costs upon their hapless tenantry have
no basis in economic theory. Indeed, as the succeeding sections will
demonstrate, the prospective benefits to the poor that result from a
given public investment in a code enforcement-housing subsidy pro-
gram are greater in a monopolistic or oligopolistic Slumville than they
are in a Slumville composed of a large number of independent land-
lords.
A.
To make this dear, we shall begin by tracing a hypothetical scenario
from the halcyon days before the code, through the announcement of
a code-subsidy program. After a concrete example is explored, we shall
attempt a more general theoretical statement of the dynamics described.
Assume, then, that before code enforcement, Slumville's monopolist
(named Avarice) knew that if he rented 70,000 units in Slumville, the
typical rent would be $210 while if he offered 80,000 units, the average
rent would be $200; under these circumstances, Avarice would rent
the extra 10,000 units if the marginal costs of doing so were less than
$1.3 million, the difference between total revenues at the 70,000 house
level ($210 per unit X 70,000 = $14.7 million) and total revenues at
the 80,000 house level ($200 per unit X 80,000 = $16 million). Since
we shall assume pre-code marginal costs were $1 million, Avarice will
rent the units, make a $300,000 profit happily until code enforcement
strikes, at which time code costs of $310,000 are incurred upon the
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marginal 10,000 homes, thereby increasing marginal costs of operating
the last 10,000 units beyond the $1.3 million level to $1.31 million.
In response, Avarice will evict 10,000 families, generating a situation
in which 70,000 units are now renting at $210 with 10,000 families on
the streets or leaving town.
The scene shifts dramatically, however, with the intervention of
government. Let us suppose that in support of its code enforcement
program, the state announces its intention to open public housing in
sufficient quantity to force the private sector to depress its rent level
to the $200 per unit which was charged before the code. Thus, as
Avarice is evicting his marginal 10,000 families, the state is equally
busy providing these families with code level homes at the $200 rental,
perhaps using for this purpose the very 10,000 units Avarice has re-
moved from the market after gaining possession of them through
eminent domain. Moreover, the government goes further and opens
5000 additional units at $200 in order to induce Avarice to think again
about his decision to limit supply for the purpose of charging a $10
premium in the private sector.
The ball is now in Avarice's court, and the government's subsidy
moves make it impossible for Avarice to count upon renting 70,000
units at $210 as he could in the good old days before the sustained
governmental effort at regulating the housing market-for the princi-
pal reason that Avarice formerly believed he could obtain a $10 pre-
mium at 70,000 units was that 10,000 displaced Slumvillites would bid
vigorously for the remaining apartments. 9 Given the state's decision
to supply 15,000 apartments at $200, Avarice will only be able to rent
65,000 if he insists upon the $210 fee; it is only if he drops his rent
to $200 that he can expect to meet the state's competition and keep
his 70,000 units fully occupied. Avarice's position can be portrayed in
tabular form:
NO. OF UNITS
RENTED RENT TOTAL REVENUE
65,000 X $210 = 13.65 million
70,000 $200 14.00 million
59. Of course, given the fact that code enforcement has made each of Avarice's
units somewhat more desirable than they formerly were, it can be expected that the
70,000 renters might be willing to spend a somewhat greater sum of money for the
units when they are competing for their occupancy with the 10,000 families who will
eventually be homeless. Nevertheless, this fine point may be ignored without prejudice to
the analysis presented in the text.
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The "70,000 units-$200 rent" strategy, then, yields $350,000 more
revenue than the strategy involving a rent hike. Thus, if Avarice's cost
of operating the 65,000th through 70,000th units does not exceed
$350,000, he will maximize his profits by charging a $200 rent, thereby
filling 70,000 units in successful competition with the government. In-
deed, if Avarice finds it more profitable to reduce his housing stock to
65,000 in pursuit of a $210 unit rent, it should be clear that he has only
served to postpone the day of reckoning. For if the government remains
steadfast in its "no rent rise" subsidy policy it will simply place thou-
sands more additional units on the market in an effort to force Avarice
to lower his rent in order to retain his remaining 65,000 tenants.
Indeed, only one of two possible outcomes is ultimately conceivable:
either (a) at some output level, Avarice will find it more profitable to
capitulate to the government and lower his rent to the $200 level
rather than continue losing tenants or (b) Avarice will leave the market
entirely, permitting the state to house all 80,000 Slumvillites.
Now, it is worthwhile to ponder the significance of this second alter-
native, for it contains the kernel of a more general understanding of
the particular scenario we have been considering. In retrospect, it be-
comes clear that if code costs imposed on Avarice's original 80,000
units were less in the aggregate than his total monopoly profit, Avarice's
effort to raise his rental was foolhardy indeed-for it has resulted in
a situation in which Avarice has lost his entire monopoly profit as a
result of government preemption of the market. In contrast, if Avarice
had simply absorbed all code costs, continuing to rent 80,000 units at
$200, he would have only sacrificed a part of his monopoly profit.
To make our point clear we have, of course, assumed that Avarice has
embarked upon his supply reducing strategy without reckoning with
the ultimate consequences of the government's subsidy strategy. But
there is no reason to believe that Avarice would be that shortsighted
if he controlled an entire city slum in reality; he could have seen the
ultimate futility of his strategy as well as the reader of this article can.
So long as he was convinced that the government meant business when
it announced its intention to keep adding to the housing supply until
rents went down to $200, he would never take the path of reducing
his housing stock in a fruitless effort to increase the per-unit rental.
Instead, if he were earning a monopoly profit of $50 on his marginal
unit, he would simply absorb code costs which were less than $50 and
make no effort to withdraw his unit from the market in the vain hope
of raising the rent he could charge on his remaining houses. Indeed,
the only time Avarice would find it profitable to limit supply would be
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if code costs were in excess of $50, thereby pushing his marginal costs
of operation beyond the $200 he would earn by renting the apartment.
For it no more pays a monopolist to spend more than $200 in order to
earn a mere $200 than it pays anyone else.
This means that simply by announcing a credible subsidy program,
calculated to maintain rents at their old level in the private sector,
the government can coerce the monopolist to pay the costs of compre-
hensive code enforcement out of his monopoly profits, rather than
seeking to pass on any of the code costs to his tenantry. So long as
the monopolist is convinced that the government means business, it
is theoretically possible that many typical code enforcement programs
could be undertaken without the actual expenditure of a single subsidy
dollar, so long as they do not exhaust the monopoly profit the slum
landlord was formerly earning on his marginal buildings I
Of course, this dramatic conclusion will hold in its pristine purity
only if the monopolist is convinced that the government is determined
to continue expanding the supply of subsidized housing until he capit-
ulates by lowering the rental for code housing to the level stipulated
by the state's policy makers. If, for example, Avarice does not believe
that the state will ever provide more than 15,000 units to effectuate
its goal, he will of course no longer be threatened with the loss of all
of his monopoly profits but only with the extra monopoly profits (if any)
he would earn by renting 80,000 units at the $200 rental, rather than
65,000 units at a somewhat higher price. Consequently, in this case,
Avarice will maintain the original 80,000 housing stock only if code
costs are not greater than the extra monopoly profits that could be
earned by renting out 80,000 units rather than 65,000 units at a some-
what higher price. The effectiveness of the government subsidy an-
nouncement will, therefore, be a function of its credibility. We have
already explored one polar situation in which the state's policy is
recognized as announced in perfect earnest; at the other pole, of course,
is the situation in which Avarice believes that the state is "only bluff-
ing" and that he consequently can cut back his housing supply to
70,000 with perfect confidence that he will then be able to increase
the unit rental from $200 to $210-in which case, the government will
be obliged to start making houses available in sufficient number to
make its threat credible. In most cases the government's subsidy threat
will be neither completely believed nor completely disbelieved and the
monopolist's decision whether to absorb code costs or call the state's
subsidy bluff by reducing supply will be determined by a complex
combination of personal, political and legal elements. In all cases,
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however, the profit-maximizing monopolist will ask himself the same
questions: (1) How much monopoly profit will I be making if I simply
absorb code costs? (2) How much monopoly profit will I earn if I cut
back supply?-which in turn requires an estimate of the rent rise the
government will tolerate before it increases the supply of subsidized
housing.60
60. I have tried to discuss the impact of subsidy policy upon code enforcement under a
monopoly in intuitively plausible terms, at the cost of the inevitable imprecision which
comes from using English rather than some more precise symbolism. For those who wish









Number of Units Offered
The straight solid declining line labelled MR represents the monopolist's marginal
revenue curve before the code enforcement-subsidy scheme is announced (before code),
while the solid line labelled MC represents Avarice's marginal cost curve before code.
Following classical economic theory, the monopolist has rented out 80,000 units at rent d
and has kept the remaining Slumvlle properties vacant-for his marginal revenue is equal
to his marginal cost at this 80,000 unit level. Now assume that the housing code is en-
forced comprehensively without the announcement of any subsidy program and that code en-
forcement increases the monopolist's marginal cost schedule to MC1. Without an announce-
ment of an appropriate subsidy policy, the monopolist would move to a new equilibrium
point (labelled f) where MR = MC1 and charge rent e to each of 70,000 tenants. However,
as a result of a credible government announcement that the state will continue increasing
the supply of units until the private sector returns to the old rent level, Avarice's marginal
revenue schedule takes the discontinuous form marked out by the line d-c-b.a. Since the
monopolist's new discontinuous marginal revenue schedule intersects his new marginal cost
curve at point c, he will continue offering 80,000 units at the old rental. If the new
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In contrast, in a competitively organized Slumville, the government's
announcement that it will support code enforcement with a special
subsidy plan will have no similar impact on the number of units with-
drawn from the market. In a competitive Slumville, none of the land-
lords have any monopoly profits-none of them have so substantial
a market share as to have an incentive to limit their output to increase
the rents they can obtain on the limited number of units they deign
to place on the market. Instead, each competitor treats the prevailing
market rent as his marginal revenue curve. Since, under our hypothesis,
the government has merely announced that it will subsidize the housing
market to keep the rent in Slumville constant, this announcement
induces no change in the competitor's economic environment---even
before the government's announcement he considered the prevailing
market per unit rental as determining the marginal revenue he had
obtained from the unit.
There is, then, excellent theoretical reason to believe that the amount
the poor will benefit from the expenditure of a dollar of public funds
upon a code enforcement-subsidy scheme will be far greater in a
monopolistic Slumville than in a competitive one. Since it has al-
ready been demonstrated that a code enforcement-housing subsidy
scheme often yields greater benefits for the poor tenant class than
would a comparable expenditure of funds under a negative income
tax plan in a competitive Slumvie, the same result follows for an
even broader range of cases in a monopolistic Slumville.
B.
It is quite doubtful, of course, that there exists a pure rental monop-
oly in any city or substantial slum in the United States.0 ' The vision
of a monopolist coerced into doing good by the mere threat of sub-
sidized housing, without the actual expenditure of a nickel in cold cash
from the public till does, however, provide a guide to the impact code
enforcement, plus special housing subsidy, will have in those slums in
which there is oligopolistic control over the rental market. Oligopoly
theory is in an extremely unsatisfactory condition, with wildly varying
marginal costs are higher than the ones drawn in the graph (i.e., the new MC curve is
farther to the northwest), however, Avarice will begin to cut back somewhat on the units
he will supply, since the marginal costs of operating the 80,000th house will be greater
than marginal revenue. Similarly, if the government's announcement is not believed com-
pletely, the d-c segment of the new marginal cost curve will begin to move from the perfect
horizontal which appears on the graph to a line which more and more closely resembles
the old MR curve as the government's subsidy policy is increasingly disbelieved.
61. See material discussed at note 7 supra.
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opinions as to the extent to which oligopolists of various kinds act
more like monopolists or competitors. The question appears to be an
empirical one, depending in large part on sociological as well as eco-
nomic factors conditioning the ability of oligopolists to act consistently
with their interests in retaining their monopoly profits. 2 Once again,
there must be much more empirical work before one can make even
an educated guess whether slum oligopolists in general perceive their
community of interest in monopoly profits and are willing to act upon
it. The most one can say is that-contrary to initial suspicions-the
arguments presented in the monopoly case suggest that the redistribu.
tive potential of a code enforcement-special housing subsidy scheme is
improved substantially to the extent that Slumville's oligopolists have
approximated a monopolistic pricing and output strategy.
It is only in the case of a loosely organized oligopoly, whose member
firms have failed to coordinate their pricing practices successfully,
that the arguments canvassed previously do not apply and that a
different factor-heretofore undiscussed-may come to the fore. If
oligopolists have had difficulty communicating and agreeing upon a
joint profit-maximizing strategy, it may be that they will fall back
upon certain "natural signals" to indicate the propitious occasions
upon which prices should be raised. Thus, just as two persons who
wish to meet each other in New York City but have not agreed upon
a meeting place may both head for Grand Central Station, so too
oligopolists, who are unable to use other communications channels,
may each choose to raise their rents and reduce their output because
this action is "natural" when confronted with a coordinated code
enforcement campaign and it is "reasonable" to expect that others
will act in a similar manner.6 Thus, it could be argued that code
enforcement will generate widespread rental increases as oligopolists
use it as a "signal" to embark upon their own campaign to obtain
monopoly profits through a coordinated effort at limiting output.
Nothing is impossible in practice which is possible in theory.
Nevertheless, there is every reason to discount the plausibility of
the "signal" theory in this particular context. First, there is no
reason to believe that oligopolists lack opportunities to engage in
62. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 118-24 (1968); T. SciTOvsKY, ",VRLFAR AND
ComraTrTIoN 884-92 (1951).
63. For an interesting philosophical analysis of this phenomenon, see D. Lwis,
CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 1-82 (1969); for a treatment of this problem In
oligopoly theory, see J. BAIN, supra note 62, at 08; for the classic work in the theory of
games, see T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52, 119-62 (1960).
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more explicit communication and agreement if they so desire. Local
trade associations are common; moreover, further coordination can
be supplied by rental agencies which are in a perfect position to pass
on recent pricing movements from one oligopolist to the next. Second,
it is likely that communication is not restrained by the fear of prosecu-
tion under federal or state anti-trust laws which, to the best of my
knowledge, have never been invoked against landlord cartels. Con-
sequently, it would appear that a loose oligopoly will not need a
catalyst like code enforcement to serve as a signal for a monopolizing
strategy if it chooses to embark upon one. This is not to say that it
will be easy to maintain an effective cartel-policing countless rent
transactions to detect violations of pricing and market division policies
will doubtless be costly and of limited utility. Nevertheless, an in-
cipient oligopoly is unlikely to founder upon the failure of commun-
cation upon which the "signal theory" is premised.
VII. Fairness
The most we have shown thus far is that a dollar of government
money will in many cases yield greater benefits to the poor tenantry
when it is invested in a code enforcement-special housing subsidy
program than when it is spent on a cash grant plan like the negative
income tax. But how do the programs compare when the decision
maker assumes a broader perspective and takes account of the fact
that a substantial portion of the total costs of code enforcement does
not appear in the public budget, simply involving an in-kind transfer
of housing services between landlords and tenants without the inter-
mediation of the public treasury? The succeeding two sections of
this essay consider two fundamental aspects of this question. The
present segment inquires into the fairness to landlords and tenants
of creating a system of in-kind transfers rather than relying exclusively
upon a system of cash payments; the next (Section VIII) considers the
relative efficiency of requiring a system of in-kind payments.
A.
Let us first consider the extent to which code enforcement and cash
payment schemes fairly distribute benefits among the poor. With
regard to this dimension, it would appear that the advocate of a system
like the negative income tax can properly claim a significant advan-
tage. For such a scheme benefits all poor people on the basis of their
relative need; in contrast, code enforcement redistributes income only
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to poor tenants and the benefit each tenant family receives does not
necessarily relate to the family's overall need. Two slumdwellers
may have substantially different incomes, yet code enforcement treats
each as equally needy if their houses are of equally poor quality.
Moreover, even assuming that two tenants have identical incomes
and live in similar slums, it still does not follow that each family will
receive equal benefit from code enforcement. For one family may place
a relatively high money value (say $20 a month) on the improvement
in housing quality wrought by code enforcement, while another family
would place a much lower value (say $2 a month) on the same im-
provements. Even though the two families obtain an "average benefit"
of $11 each, the program would, of course, be much fairer if the two
families each actually received $11. To put this last point in more
general terms: the greater the variation of slumdwellers' desires for im-
proved housing, the less just will be the distribution of benefits gen-
erated by code enforcement. Since we have shown that the success of
code enforcement as a redistribution scheme depends upon the ex-
istence of a significant class of "lukewarm" tenants who place a rela-
tively small value upon their improved housing, it would thus appear
that the distributional impact of code enforcement will be far from the
ideal since equally poor families will not be receiving equal benefits. 4
Nevertheless, the significance of this unfairness may be overempha-
sized. For there is something very artificial in the notion-adumbrated
in the preceding paragraph-which postulates one "family" placing
a high monetary value on housing improvements. What we mean,
of course, is that one set of parents value housing more than another.
For it is the adults who have the preponderant voice in allocating the
family budget. "Our 'individualism' is really 'familism'; all minors,
the aged, and numerous persons in other classes ... have their status-
determining bargains made for them by other persons.... It is hardly
necessary to point out that all arguments for free contracts are nullified
or actually reversed whenever one person contracts on behalf of an-
other."10 5 Thus the simple fact that one set of parents desires housing
improvements more than another does not necessarily indicate that
their children's interests or desires have a similar relationship. Indeed,
64. For an effort to quantify the extent to which unequal disbursement of a benefit
compromises the justice of a distributive scheme, see N. RESCHER, DisrsuaunvE JUsTICZ 35-38
(1966). I have not attempted to invoke Rescher's approach in this essay because I 1am
far from certain about its ultimate value. Nevertheless, it is extremely suggestive and
merits more careful treatment than lawyers have thus far given it.
65. F. lKIourr, THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION 49 (1935).
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given the children's lack of access to economic power, it does not appear
inappropriate for the state to intervene on their behalf to assure that
certain of their "basic needs" are fulfilled in a minimally decent
fashion before parents have the right to spend money upon activities
which may not benefit their progeny in any significant way. Therefore,
although housing codes distribute benefits unequally to parents of
the same income level, this inequality may be considered in a more
sympathetic light when the interests and desires of the children are
placed in the balance.60
Even when this last factor is given some weight, however, the
considerations of fairness considered in this section will suggest that
a code enforcement-special housing subsidy scheme cannot be the ex-
clusive plan invoked by a society determined to redress inequities in
the pre-existing distribution of economic power. Indeed, to some
extent this conclusion was already implied in the preceding analysis.
For it was suggested that the code enforcement-housing subsidy strat-
egy be used until the point at which the marginal costs of the subsidy
equalled the marginal benefits of the plan. And it should be expected
that a society which exclusively adopted a code enforcement strategy
would find, after a relatively low subsidy level was reached, that the
dollar value the tenants placed upon a further improvement of hous-
ing would be quite small-i.e., they would trade off additional housing
improvements for increasingly smaller quantities of food, entertain-
ment, clothing or whatever else they desired most intensely. Thus the
marginal benefits of a housing subsidy would be exceeded by marginal
costs at a relatively low level of code enforcement. If the redistribution
effort -were to proceed beyond this point, a different strategy-like the
negative income tax-would need to be invoked. The considerations
66. Doubtless far more could be said on the proper scope of the government's right
to protect the interests of the child against their possible abuse by parents. I have
refrained from expanding on the single paragraph m the text principally because an
adequate discussion would require a consideration of factors far removed from the main
concern of this essay. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to note that on a constitutional level,
there seems a broad consensus which upholds not only the right of the state completely to
deprive natural parents of the custody of their child when they generally fail to conform
to minimally decent standards of treatment as defined by the state in its "child neglect"
statutes, but which also upholds the state's right to require compulsory education (limited
but not denied in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)), see People .
Donner, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. CL, City of N.Y. 1950), affJ'd 103
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1951), reaff'd, 302 N.Y. 857 (1951). appeal dismissed, 349 US. 884
(1951), and compulsory vaccinations and transfusions even in the face of the parent's
religious objections, see People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 NE.2d 769 (1952); State v.
Perricone, 37 NJ. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). Of course, the
constitutionality of such state intervention does not warrant its wisdom, and given the
limitations imposed by the scope of this article, it remains for each reader to ascertain
the weight he would give to this factor in his fairness calculus.
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of equity discussed in this subsection, however, may well take on deci-
sive weight before the point at which marginal cost-benefit analysis
would require that the government shift its redistribution efforts from
a code enforcement-housing subsidy program to a negative income tax
plan. 7
B.
Proponents of the negative income tax may well claim that their
plan is fairer along yet another dimension. They could plausibly
argue that the tax scheme not only distributes benefits more fairly
among the poor but that it also distributes the burden of supporting
the poor more fairly among the richer social orders.
Under a fair income tax system, all of the members of the upper
classes would each pay a substantial contribution to income mainte-
nance in accordance with their "ability to pay";" in contrast, a
substantial share of the housing plan is borne by the landlords of
Slumville, who are by no means the richest members of the general
society. Thus, it may be argued that code enforcement unfairly re-
quires a relatively small landlord class-principally composed of petty
bourgeois-to pay a disproportionately large share of society's debt
to the poor.
This argument is not without force: once the propriety of income
redistribution is conceded, it seems quite clear that no single class
should be required to bear the exclusive financial burden. Insofar
as a single-minded reliance on code enforcement would permit the
rich in Snobtown to avoid a significant role in the redistribution pro-
gram, the plan would dearly be wanting in equity. However, we have
just seen that even the most zealous proponent of code enforcement
cannot properly suggest that code enforcement should be the only
weapon in a governmental war on poverty. No one is suggesting that
67. Thus, in the subsidy policy problem explored in the text at pp. 1129-34, it might well
be appropriate for the decision maker to refrain from subsidizing more than 8,000 units--
even in those cases in which the marginal cost-benefit test suggested a more ambitious
policy-if, for example, he found that the extra subsidy money required for more than
3,000 units would be more equitably spent upon a program which would prindpally benefit
those relatively poor families who own their own homes and hence do not benefit from
code enforcement's redistributive potential.
68. For purposes of this essay, we shall ignore the ambiguities involved in the "ability
to pay" formula and assume further that a progressive income tax based upon "ability
to pay" is, in the absence of some special justification of the kind considered In the
following pages, the fairest way to assess citizens for the cost of governmental projectg.
For critical discussions of these premises, see C. GALVIN & B. BrrrFXR, Tim INcoMEt TAX:
How PROGREssIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969); W. BLi h & H. KALVEN, TnE UNEASY CAsM voi
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).
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the slum landlord bear the preponderant burden in society's redistribu-
tion program. Consequently, the critic of the code enforcement-housing
subsidy plan must make a more ambitious--and more vulnerable-
claim: to attack the equity of the program, he must argue that it is
unfair for the government to impose even a somewhat larger burden
on the slumlord than the simple "ability to pay" standard would re-
quire.
1.
In order to come to grips with this claim of injustice, it is essential
to distinguish among several different elements upon which it may
be based. On the simplest level, there is the question whether the
landlord was given fair warning of his potential liability at the time
he embarked upon his adventure in slum ownership. If it should be
decided that fair warning was lacking, code enforcement would appear
to offend against a fundamental principle in our legal system forbid-
ding the imposition of liabilities upon persons who had no reason
to believe their conduct was socially suspect. It is beyond the scope
of this article to assess the strength of the reasons given to support
the "fair notice" requirement; the only question to be considered
here is the extent to which landlords can plausibly claim to be victims
of this fundamental kind of unfairness.69
As to those increasingly large numbers of owners who purchased
after a housing code was enacted in their jurisdictions, the answer
seems quite dear. Many of them, of course, may have gambled that
the code would not be enforced and consequently paid a higher price
69. The reasons for the fair notice policy have been discussed most thoroughly in
connection with the mens rea requirement imposed in traditional criminal statutes as
well as the constitutional prohibition barring ambiguous criminal statutes. see HJ .A. HARr,
PuNismEN- AND REsPONSsarry 136-58 (1968); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. Cr. R.Ev. 107; Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. or PA. L.
R y. 35 (1939); on vagueness, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. or PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). The impact of these policies may be somewhat
attenuated in the context of a conviction for a housing code violation which does not
carry with it the same social stigma as conviction for offenses which are more unequivocally
condemned as immoral by the community. Thus, in order to establish a housing code
violation, the state typically is not required to prove negligence on the part of the land-
lord, let alone recklessness or wilfulness. See Gribetz 9- Grad, supra note 2, at 1279.81. Cf.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoI. L Rav. 55 (1933); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability
in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN L. REV. 731 (1960). Nevertheless, even though a landlord
may be held criminally accountable for a particular infraction of the code for which he
could have had no knowledge despite supreme diligence, it would be quite another
matter for a landlord to be held responsible under an entire regulatory scheme of which
he had no fair warning at the time he assumed his landlord status. This is not to say, of
course, that a policy maker should always consider absence of fair warning of potential
liability to be a decisive reason for rejecting a proposed regulatory scheme; it is simply
to say that the fair warning argument should be considered extremely important where
it appropriately can be advanced.
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than was justified given code costs generated under a regime of strict
compliance. Nevertheless, since these unlucky landlords clearly rec.
ognized the possibility that the law on the books could be enforced,
their gamble certainly has no higher status than the countless others
that arise in the life of every risk-taking entrepreneur and, in itself,
justifies no special plea of unfairness when the gamble is lost.
In contrast, the expectations of a second class of owners affected
by the code are much more worthy of a decision maker's concern.
What of the landlord who sold out at a depressed price because he
believed that the state meant what it said about requiring minimal
levels of housing quality? These "true believers" in state credibility
will doubtless be considerably demoralized if the state subsequently
permits the code to lapse into desuetude. For this will simply mean a
windfall for the new owner who bought in at a low price. It is one
thing to suffer a loss so that the poor will benefit; quite another to be
the gullible victim of a state scheme which has simply resulted in the
transfer of income to another landlord who is in no way more deserving
than the old owner. Since the state has an obvious and substantial
interest in increasing the number of persons believing in governmental
credibility, decision makers should be wary of demoralizing "true
believers" by creating a situation in which they suffer windfall losses for
no significant social purpose. This is not to say that a course of affirma-
tive state action should not be terminated if it proves to be wrong.
headed; it is simply to suggest that the decision will incur demoraliza.
tion costs of an important kind70 which should not be ignored, espe-
cially in close cases.
The analysis of the "fair notice" issue, therefore, suggests the de-
sirability of enforcing the regulations, rather than the reverse, in the
case of owners who bought after the code was enacted in their juris-
dictions. A more difficult problem arises, however, when the spotlight
is turned upon landlords who purchased before the code was enacted,
and who have not yet sold their properties. Even with regard to these
owners, I believe that few will be in a position to raise a substantial
70. Demoralization of the kind considered here seems the mirror.image of the
phenomenon Frank Michelman describes in his essay Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L, Rcv.
1165, 1214 (1967). There, Michelman describes the demoralization suffered by the "true
believers" in a private property system when they are either victimized by, or spectators
of, state action which substantially deprives a property owner of the beneficial use of a
thing he "owns" without compensation. Just as widespread demoralization of this kind
has important, if difficult to quantify, social consequences, so too does demoralization of
"true believers" in state credibility---especally in a society in which affirmative state
regulation plays as important a role as it does in our mixed economy.
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claim that they lacked fair warning of their potential liability when
they purchased the building now in violation of the code. I begin from
the premise that the purchaser of a long-lived asset, like an apartment
house, is not entitled to assume that the American legal system, which
has experienced constant change in the past, will remain immutable
over the generation or more during which the apartment house will
remain standing. Thus, a private property owner of a capital asset
cannot make a substantial claim of "unfair notice" each time govern-
ment moves to alter the legal status quo. Instead, the most the owner
can demand is that the state abstain from imposing constraints upon
property use of a kind which were antithetic to the premises upon
which the economy was functioning at the time of purchase. For in such
circumstances, the property owner can properly argue that even with
the use of reasonable foresight, he had no reason to weigh the possibility
of the type of government regulation he now confronts. While doubtless
this formula is vague, it is easy to imagine clear cases in which it would
apply. In an economic system based upon a rather thoroughgoing
commitment to laissez faire with a principled reluctance to extend
the ambit of affirmative governmental control, for example, I have
little doubt that a landlord could properly claim unfair surprise if
he were suddenly informed that henceforth he was under an obliga-
tion to provide a minimal level of housing quality to tenants who
voluntarily and knowingly chose to rent inferior apartments. Despite
some inspired efforts at self-deception, however, there can be little
doubt that our economic organization is no longer permeated with a
bias towards laissez faire in general; nor is there a particular prejudice
against affirmative governmental action in matters relating to land
use control-if anything, interventionism is even more common here
than elsewhere. Consequently, the only real question open for dis-
cussion concerns the point in history at which it was no longer plaus-
ible for a landlord, in the exercise of reasonable foresight, to profess
surprise when it was suggested that a housing code could well limit
the use of his apartment house during its economic lifetime.
When the inquiry is framed in this way, it is obvious that it cannot
be answered with great precision. The activist welfare state (of which
the housing code is a minor part) did not "arrive" at a particular
"point" in time; there is no litmus that will turn immediately from
blue to pink to aid the legal historian when he considers whether it
was Euclid v. Ambler Co. of the 1920's,71 the first federal public housing
71. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Indeed, the antecedents of the contemporary housing code
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programs of the 1930's, 72 or the slow diffusion of housing codes from
the eastern seaboard across the nation during the '40's and '50's,11
which marked "the" point at which it was no longer reasonable for
the entrepreneur to claim that he had no reason to expect that a
housing code would constrain the use of his apartment house during
the useful life of the asset. All that can be confidently asserted is that
the historian's litmus would have turned a dangerous shade of blush-
ing red at least twenty years ago, a good deal before Congress made
housing codes a permanent fixture on the urban scene in 1964 by
requiring a code of any city which wished to tender a "workable
program" for H.U.D. subvention. 4
And for our purposes, dating the demise of laissez faire in real
estate markets even so late as 1950 suffices to defeat almost all "unfair
notice" claims that could be plausibly made at the time of this writing.
For, in order to establish a significant unfair notice claim, it is neces-
sary for a landlord to show not only (a) that at the time of purchase
he lacked reasonable warning of his potential liability but (b) that
if he had received notice, he would have insisted upon a significantly
lower price before purchasing the apartments. And no landlord who
purchased in 1950 or before could properly fulfill the second branch
of this test, which essentially requires a showing of significant harm
resulting from the failure of notice. For as we have suggested earlier";
the entrepreneur purchasing rental apartments in 1950 or before
would discount the future costs of anticipated code enforcement a
generation later in 1971 and beyond as de mimimis. Thus, those
landlords who, on the most generous reading of history, can plausibly
argue that they had no reason to believe that they would be charged
may be traced to the New York tenement house law of 1867 described in L. FlUEDMAN,
GOVPNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING, 25-29 (1968).
72. See M. STRAUS 9. T. Waco, HOUSING COMEaS or AG. (1938); L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 71, at 101-09, provides a succinct account of the most prominent events of the 1930's.
73. By 1955, some fifty-six communities--including such large eastern cities as Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington-had adopted codes. The Housing
and Home Finance Agency then "req.uired" a housing code as part of the "workable
program" necessary to qualify for its assistance. In response to HHFA's demands,
the number of localities with housing codes began to mushroom, reaching 493 by July
1961 and 736 by July 1963. HHFA 17TH ANNUAL REPORT 387 (1963); See L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 71, at 49-50.
74. "[C]ommencing three years after [September 1964], no workable program Shall be
certified . . . unless (A) the locality has had in effect, for at least six months prior to
such certification . . . a minimum standards housing code, related but not limited to
health, sanitation, and occupancy requirements, which is deemed adequate by the
Administrator, and (B) the Administrator is satisfied that the locality is carrying out an
effective program of enforcement to achieve compliance with such housing code." 78 Stat.
785 (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
15. See p. 1117 supra.
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with the obligation of meeting housing quality minima cannot per-
suasively suggest that they would have acted any differently in 1950
if they had known the truth about code enforcement in 1971. Con-
sequently, their "fair notice" argument fails for want of the sub-
stantial reliance that makes lack of fair notice a source of concern.
2.
The fair warning issue, however, does not exhaust the larger ques-
tion of justice. Even if the state were to give "fair notice" of its in-
tention to place a surtax on all left-handed citizens, it nevertheless
is clear that left-handers could raise a substantial claim of injustice.
Similarly, the question before us is whether, regardless of notice,
slum landlords have been unjustly singled out to shoulder a somewhat
heavier burden in the overall redistribution effort undertaken by our
society. Doubtless this issue is not of a constitutional dimension-even
the most activist conception of the "new" Equal Protection Clause 0
would not justify the invalidation of a legislative decision to burden
slum landlords on behalf of tenants through the imposition of housing
quality minima. Nevertheless, Equal Protection-either new or old-is
not the sole source of distributive justice in American society, and
the non-judicial policy maker is entitled to a serious answer to the
question whether he should weigh important considerations of fair
treatment which courts-for familiar, if complex, institutional rea-
son 7 -do not take into account in constitutional adjudication.
At this non-constitutional level, we may approach the problem of
justice in the following way. Imagine that a slum landlord complained
that the special burden imposed by code enforcement simply repre-
sented an ad hoc decision to single out "slumlords" without justifying
the decision further by relating it to more general principles of public
policy. I take it that this charge establishes a burden upon a just
government to explain what further public good will be advanced
by a decision which has dearly injured some of its citizens-here, the
landlords.
76. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAMLv. L. REV. 1065, 1159-89
(1969); for a convincing and succinct discussion of the constitutional dimension of an
analogous issue, see Kurkland, Guidelines and the Constitution: Some Random Observa-
tions on Presidential Power to Control Prices and Wages, in G. Smxurz & . ALmnn,
GUI DEINEs, INFoRmAx CoNmRors, AD T=E M =EXEF PLAcE 209, 211-18 (19G6).
77. See A. Bic~m, THE LEAsT DANrEous BmNcH (1962); L. HAND, TnE Br L or
RIGnTS (1958); Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in L W Vn.En,
PR, csprmv, PoLmcs, Am FuNDnmztEAL LAw 3 (1961); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy,
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 SrM,.
L. R v. 169 (1968).
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To fulfill this burden, the code enforcement apologist may invoke
several arguments drawn from different intellectual traditions. First,
he may suggest that placing a special burden upon slum landlords
serves the broader policy of assuring a more efficient allocation of
resources. Most taxes have the consequence of raising the price of one
class of commodities more than another, thereby disturbing the pre-
existing allocation of resources. Assuming that the pre-existing alloca-
tion has some claim to superior efficiency, leading contemporary com-
mentators have advocated "neutral taxing" schemes which disturb as
little as possible the relative prices of goods generated by the presump-
tively efficient market mechanism.78
This neutrality rationale may sometimes serve as a powerful justifica-
tion for imposing a special burden upon slum landlords. As the hypo-
thetical Slumville which introduced this essay demonstrated,70 an impost
upon landlords may generate no change at all in the price of rental
housing; similarly, an impost, combined with the threat of a special
housing subsidy, may have an identical consequence in a monopolized
Slumville.80 Thus, insofar as the real world approximates these two
models, imposing a special levy upon landlords can be justified as a
ifneutral" tax which will not interfere with efficient resource alloca-
tion."1
78. See R. MUSGRAvE, THE THEoRY oF PUBLIC FINANCE 140-54 (1959) which in addition
to containing an illuminating discussion, collects the important literature. The "neutrality"
formula has recently been taken up by Professor Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,
83 HAxv. L. REv. 705, 725 (1970). Of course, "non-neutral" taxes are not per se evil since
they may be justified on a wide variety of grounds, including the improvement of the
allocation of resources, by requiring business enterprises to "internalize' social costs they
would otherwise "externalize." See G. CALABREsi, THE CoSr or: AcciDENrs: A LEGA, AND
ECONoMic ANALYsis 68-94 (1970). I am only suggesting here that "neutrality" is one
of the acceptable rationales for a tax, not the exclusive one.
79. See pp. 1100-08 supra.
80. See pp. 1150-57 supra.
81. Even if it is conceded, however, that the "neutral tax-resource allocation" ra-
tionale justifies a special levy on the slum landlord on some occasions, the question
remains whether the levy should take the form of a governmental demand that the
landlord make an in-kind transfer to the tenant by providing code improvements or
whether the governmental demand should rather require the landlord to make a cash
payment into either a special fund to be distributed to tenants or a general fund to
support any public activity.
This question is the central concern of Section VIII inIra. For purposes of the present
discussion, it will be assumed that code enforcement is the most appropriate way in
which the landlord may be required to discharge his state-imposed burden. This will
mean that increased sums will be spent on repair and maintenance services than was
the case before the landlord was subjected to a special burden. Thus the price of repair
and maintenance services may be expected to increase while the price of goods formerly
demanded by landlords may decrease. However, this change in relative prices does not
suggest an impairment of the resource allocation mechanism, but instead represents an
appropriate market response to the fact that the distribution of income has been al.
tered to benefit tenants at the expense of landlords.
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It is true, of course, that in many contexts, code enforcement will
induce a reduction in the private housing supply and so will fail to
satisfy the "neutrality" test perfecdy. While a government subsidy
may make up the housing deficit, it will do so with funds collected
by taxes which commonly generate misallocations of their own. Thus,
as the market structure diverges from the primitive Slumville model,
the resource allocation rationale should carry less weight.
Even in those cases, however, where the "resource allocation-
neutral tax" argument for imposing a special burden upon landlords
is relatively strong, the slum landlord's advocate may still raise the
question whether it is responsive to his claim of unfairness. For he may
argue that, unlike constitutional adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it is not enough here simply to invoke a policy which
could conceivably justify code enforcement. Instead, in this non-judi-
cial context, it is incumbent upon the code enforcement proponent to
show that the state is in fact substantially committed to the "neutral
tax-resource allocation" principle. The existence of such a commitment
could be established by demonstrating that the state in fact follows a
relatively consistent policy of selecting those taxes which promise to
impair resource allocations least. If, however, one looks to our own
society, it is not at all clear that such a demonstration can actually be
made. The slum landlord may properly demand to know why, for
example, his rents should be singled out for appropriation for govern-
mental purposes, while the economic rents earned by other landowners,
as well as the monopoly profits garnered by industrial enterprises, are
not similarly treated, although taxes could be devised which would
deny these rentiers and monopolists their infra-marginal returnss with-
out inducing a diminution in the supply (or an increase in the price)
of the goods they provide.
The claim that it is unjust to single out the slum landlord's economic
rent and monopoly profit (if any) can be dismissed out of hand too
easily. On first appearance, the slumlord's cry of injustice seems almost
identical to the frivolous plaint of the speeding motorist who argues
that he has been unfairly arrested since the highway patrolman has
permitted countless other speeders to escape unscathed. Nevertheless,
82. I am invoking here the elementary economic propositions that both lando-ners
and monopolists receive returns in excess of the marginal cost of providing their services
and so may be induced to sacrifice these infra-marginal returns without altering price
or output. For a sensitive discussion of the received theory, see R. MAuscnAvF, supra note
78, at 276-87; for a discussion of taxing the infra-marginal returns earned by landowners,
see sources cited in note 20 supra.
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the slum landlord cannot be dealt with so easily as the speeder. In the
case of the motorist, one can plausibly explain that the administrative
cost of catching (virtually) every speeder far outweighs the "cost of
injustice" which arises as a result of enforcing the law against only
one speeder in a hundred. In contrast, it is far from clear that a taxing
program which sought to confiscate the infra-marginal returns earned
by landowners and monopolists would be so expensive to operate as
to be administratively impractical. Instead, it seems likely that such
an ambitious taxing program has been rejected because the economic
interests which would be prejudiced by monopoly and rentier taxes
are so powerful that such a scheme has been rendered simply politically
impractical. 3 Thus, if the government has not adopted a general
policy in favor of "neutral taxes" which do not affect resource alloca-
tion, is it not unfair to rely upon the "neutral tax" argument in this
single instance to justify imposing a special burden upon slum land.
lords?
I must confess that I am not at all sure. At times, I tend to the view
that, since the legitimacy of the slum landlord's profit can be established
principally by reliance upon the allocative efficiency of competitive
markets inhabited by profit-maximizing entrepreneurs, those who
earn profits as a result of their rentier or monopolist positions can
advance no substantial reason why the profits the government is taxing
were rightfully theirs in the first place.84 At other times, even though
the extra profits are mere windfall gains which cannot be legitimated
by reference to the resource allocation objective, I am still impressed
by the suggestion that fairness requires treating similar windfalls simi-
83. It is of course one of the purposes of antitrust law and industrial regulation to
curtail the possibility of earning monopoly profit, although their effectiveness In this
regard may well be doubted. Even more relevant here is the virtual failure of American
jurisdictions to attempt to appropriate land rents through the use of a Henry George.
type tax.
84. There are doubtless other theories which may be advanced to justify an economic
system based upon the pursuit of private profit. Most important, private property
regimes have been hailed as a safeguard for the development of personality, sec Reich,
The New Property, 73 YA L.J. 733, 778-86 (1964) and the preservation of political
freedom, see M. Famn mN, CAPrrLSM AND FaRmoar 7-21 (1962). Sec also Professor Frank
Michelman's useful canvass of justifications for private ownership in Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, supra
note 70, at 1202-13. However, it is difficult to see how the slum landlord may per-
suasively invoke these rationales in the present context. Enforcing a housing code does
not so seriously undermine the entire private property s)stem as to endanger slg-
nificantly the assistance the system allegedly provides political freedom. Similarly, re-
distribution of income via enforcement, while diminishing the ability of the landlord
to develop his personality, increases the ability of the tenant to do so. Since this essay
is premised on the notion that a serious maldistribution of income existg between
these two classes, it follows that, all other things being equal, it is better to permit the
tenant to develop his personality than to permit the landlord to retain his income. For
a fuller discussion of this point, see pp. 1170-74 infra.
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larly and that there is a significant unfairness involved in singling out
a small subclass of renders and monopolists (i.e., "slumlords") for spe-
cial unfavorable treatment. However this may be, there can be no
doubt that the "neutral tax-resource allocation argument" does in a
significant number of cases substantially attenuate-if not completely
eliminate-the plea of unfairness by highlighting the desirability of
levying imposts upon those income streams which least distort the
effective operation of a competitive economy.
3.
Even if the "neutral tax-resource allocation" argument is relied upon
for all it is worth, however, it cannot itself be a complete answer to
the fairness question. For it is perfectly clear that the "neutral tax"
ideal cannot justify code enforcement in those contexts in which a
forceful inspectorate will induce a very substantial contraction in
the private housing supply, thereby requiring large state housing sub-
sidies-garnered by non-neutral taxes-if the code enforcement pro-
gram is to have a satisfactory redistributive impact. Thus, if one
is to exhaust the fairness question fully, he must abandon reliance
upon the conceptual tools of the microeconomist and consider the
question of distributive justice on its own terms.
Why is it fair to impose a special obligation upon slum landlords
to redistribute their wealth beyond that assumed by the rest of the
population who simply pay their allotted share of the progressive in-
come and estate tax? The intellectually easy ansver to this question
takes the form of a confession and avoidance. Doubtless a substantial
number of persons would confess that there is something unfair in
singling slum landlords out, but would respond that this unfair-
ness is far outwveighed by the larger injustice presented by the
existence of poverty in contemporary America. These committed re-
distributionists would simply remain unmoved when the Slumville
landlord complains that the Snobtown rich are far wealthier than he
and yet are not subject to similar special obligations. They would
reply that there is no compelling reason to release the landlord from
his redistributional obligations merely because other richer and more
powerful groups have sufficient political weight to evade the proper
measure of their responsibility to the poor.
While I have a great deal of sympathy with the committed redistri-
butionists' view, two serious costs are involved if the state were
to adopt a tax which even it conceded placed an unfair burden upon
a small group. First, the group unfairly singled out for special burden
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will be substantially demoralized by the prospect of a freeloading
majority which concededly fails to contribute its fair share to the redis-
tributionist effort. Second, by imposing unfair burdens upon relatively
small groups in the population, the state will divert public attention
from the larger contours of the income distribution issue, thereby de-
basing the quality of public discourse about society's obligation to the
poor. Thus, imposing concededly unfair burdens in the name of a trans-
cendent redistributionist goal threatens to undermine the coherence of
the public discourse and consensus which must underlie a viable pro-
gram of fundamental importance in a democratic society. While these
factors are difficult to quantify, they are real enough to prompt a
consideration whether the easy "confession and avoidance" answer to
the slum landlord's complaint is the only possible reply, or whether,
instead, one may properly deny the existence of any unfairness whatever
in imposing a special obligation upon the landlord to sacrifice income
by providing a minimally decent home to his slum tenants.
An affirmative defense of the justice of this special imposition must
establish that a landlord retains an element of individual responsibility
for his conduct in a society afflicted by maldistribution of economic
power, while at the same time recognizing that the landlord is not
exclusively responsible for the plight of the slum tenant. It appears to
me that the argument advanced by the Tenant in the following dia-
logue satisfies these two criteria, asserting individual responsibility on
the one hand, without indulging in scapegoatism on the other:
Landlord: I am only minding my own business; if you don't like this
freezing, rat-infested apartment then either pay a higher rent or look for
another place to live; I am not forcing anything upon you.
Tenant: This is true, but in a just society I would be able to afford
a decent home.
Landlord: You might be right; but this is an argument better addressed
to the legislature, which can enact a generous cash grant plan raised
out of general revenue. Why am I responsible for the world's ills?
Tenant: Both you and I are perfectly aware that the legislature will
not within the foreseeable future grant me my fair share of the national
income. How long can you escape from any responsibility to act as if
the world were justly organized? 5
85. Cf. AISroTLE, Book III, ch. 4, in 10 Tni- WoRKs or ARISOTLE TRANSLATED INTO
ENGLISH §§ 1277a-1278b (Oxford 1921) which considers the extent to which the obliga-
tions of the good man are identical to those of the good citizen. Our question here Is
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Landlord: Even if I conceded that, given the failure of our social insti-
tutions to achieve social justice, I had an obligation to act as if justice
were achieved, that's an awfully vague formula. What kind of practical
maxim for conduct can you propose?
Tenant: Act so that in none of your ongoing relationships you permit
another human being to exist under conditions which constitute a
serious affront to his dignity as a person. 0
Landlord: Well, I certainly see why a moral man wouldn't want to
tolerate such an ongoing relationship. But, once again, how in the
world do I know which relationships violate this maxim and which
do not?
Tenant: Well, surely the easiest way is to imagine whether, if you were
in my position, you would consider living in this apartment to be not
merely inconvenient, but as making it virtually impossible to engage
in many of those activities which make living a valuable experience,,
Landlord: Perhaps I can see how this principle applies here. But I am
still unclear why I owe you this duty simply because I have rented
you an apartment. Why don't I have a similar duty to share my wealth
with any passerby who demonstrates to me that he is in dire need?
Tenant: Well, of course, a saint would respond to the cry of the pas-
serby in the same way as he would to the indignation of his indigent
tenant. But there is a difference, nevertheless, between the two cases.
You, as a slum landlord, are making disregard for human personality
a fixture in your life, an aspect of one of the fundamental activities in
which you engage. And while I do not demand that you be a saint, I
do assert that at the very least you should refrain from weaving the
larger social injustice of the maldistribution of income into the fabric
of your life,8s as you do when you embark upon this continuing re-
lationship with me.89
related but different: what are the obligations of the good ctiken in an unjust society
which is nevertheless capable of ultimate, but not immediate, reform?
86. Cf. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE AE"APHYSICS OF mwOis 53-54 (Beck transl. 1959),
corresponding to 434-36 in the Standard Akademie edition.
87. Cf. R. HARE, FpxaDO.r AND RFASON 7-50, 86-111 (1963).
88. It is true that in the relatively rare case, slum dwellings are operated by large
publicly owned corporations. This fact raises the complex question whether individuals
can legitimately argue that personal responsibility is diminished when such a corporate
entity intervenes between the tenant and the ultimate beneficiary of shum onerhip.This question is of fundamental moral significance in contemporary corporate societyo but
to mount the lengthy discussion it requires would be inappropriate here, given the limitedpresence of large publidly held corporations in the slum rental marketL
89. Cf. Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in EssAYS IN MOaAx PmwsOsr 198 (Melden ed.
1958).
There is a weak analogy here to the obligation the criminal law imposes upon per-
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Landlord: But where will this straight-laced moralism get you in the
long run? For your argument permits me to wash my hands of our
continuing relationship simply by abandoning the property. This
will only worsen your position since the remaining landlords will
thereby be enabled to charge even higher prices for their awful apart-
ments. Moralism is unprofitable not only for me, but for you.
Tenant: I don't believe you. If you want to wash your hands of this
relationship, you would rather sell out at a depressed price to someone
else who would fulfill the code rather than abandon entirely. But even
if you do abandon, I am told that the state is supporting code enforce-
ment with a special housing subsidy, so I won't be worse off anyway.
Morality may not pay for you; but it pays for me. And you shouldn't
complain that you find morality somewhat unprofitable, at least
financially. Isn't that what morality is all about?
I have sketched this argument in dialogue form to emphasize the
tentative spirit in which it is presented. Obviously, an essay lengthier
than this one would be required to explore adequately each of the
stages in the Tenant's argument. Without undertaking this examina-
tion, we should nevertheless note at least one important difficulty in-
volved in adopting the Tenant's position as the basis for singling out
the Landlord as appropriately carrying a special redistributive burden
with regard to his tenants. Even when generously construed, the
Tenant's argument has its substantial appeal at the level of personal
morality: it is relatively easy to understand, I think, why a moral
man living in an unjust society would, at a minimum, personally
seek to refrain from entering into long-lasting relationships which
epitomize the larger social injustices surrounding him, at least where
refraining does not exacerbate the condition of the impoverished. It is
far less clear, however, that this dictate of personal morality justifies the
legislative decision requiring each person to do the least that a person.
ally moral man would undertake. Indeed, is it not high hypocrisy for
a legislature to require some of its citizens to act "decently" in renting
apartments to the poor when the need for this act of conscience is
sons to act affirmatively when, at no danger to themselves, they may save their close
relations from serious harm. See Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J, 590, 599
(1958); Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HAv. L. REv. 615, 621-23 (1942); ef. The
Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, in F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TILE LAW
OF TORTs 291 (1926). Certain jurisdictions, moreover, impose the obligation to assist
strangers in dire need. Hughes, supra at 631-34. Of course, the analogy to the duty owed
by a close relation is far from perfect-thus, while a father may still have an obligation
to protect his child even in a world in which income were fairly distributed, It may well
be that in such a world a landlord ought not to be charged with a similar obligation with
regard to his tenant. Such a world, however, is not our own.
1172
Vol. 80: 1093, 1971
HeinOnline -- 80 Yale L.J. 1172 1970-1971
Regulating Slum Housing Markets
generated precisely by the legislature's failure to enact an income re-
distribution program which would assure to each individual his fair
share of the national wealth, thereby making it difficult for the poor to
"afford" decent housing?
It is certainly possible to view the matter in this way, but this sim-
plistic response is inappropriate given the political difficulty of achiev-
ing a more just distribution of income in our society. Given the vested
and powerful political interests involved, the movement towards a just
society will not be a matter of a single legislative session but of genera-
tions of effort. Thus, it need not be hypocrisy for a legislature to im-
pose a special obligation upon those privileged citizens who enter
into long-lasting relationships with the poor by requiring them to
conform to certain minimum standards of decency. It is simply a recog-
nition that the pursuit of distributive justice is one of society's most
difficult tasks and that while the debate and struggle over the division
of economic power continues, it is at least appropriate to require the
beneficiaries of the presently flawed scheme of income distribution
(among whom slum landlords are numbered) to conduct their lives
with some restraint, cognizant of the moral ambiguities that accompany
their superior wealth. Indeed, it may well be that the legal system's
acceptance of the principle requiring the relatively advantaged to
exercise self-restraint in dealing with the poor is an important factor
permitting our political system to retain that modicum of integrity
which enables it to function as a forum for the increasingly bitter dis-
pute over the requirements of distributive justice which afflicts the
polity at the present time.
It would appear, then, that it is not necessary to resolve the land-
lord's complaint that he has been victimized by an unprincipled de-
cision by simply declaring that the inequity involved in imposing a
special burden is outweighed by the more substantial injustice im-
plied by permitting the average slum tenant to remain impoverished.
Instead, one may affirmatively argue that in a society in which wealth
is unjustly distributed it is fair to impose a requirement of decency
upon those in the relatively privileged classes who engage in long-
lasting relationships with the impoverished. The proper limits of
this argument should be clearly marked, however. It is invoked here
to support a legislative scheme which promises successfully to redis-
tribute income from a generally richer to a generally poorer social
class. I most emphatically do not suggest that the pursuit of decency
can of itself justify a code enforcement program which lacks appropri-
ate subsidy support, and which thereby leads to the improvement in
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the position of some of the poor at the expense of a significant sacrifice
made by others equally impoverished. In such a context, housing code
enforcement would indeed be a form of hypocrisy, in which the
legislature loudly proclaims its adherence to a tradition of social civility
in matters of income distribution, while in fact, the "decency" is
being purchased, at least in part, at the expense of some of the poor.90
C.
We have thus far considered the fairness of burdening landlords as
if it made sense to believe that the equities of all landlords were alike.
Whatever evidence we have suggests, however, that while a large num-
ber of rental apartments in the typical slum are owned by full time
professionals, a substantial portion of the remaining units are owned
by small time "amateur" landlords (often members of the lower-mid-
dle class who have fled the slum but have not sold their old homes);
moreover, resident landlords also own a significant number of units.
The class of resident owners contains a surprisingly large number
of minority group members, and American ideology should be expected
to be especially solicitous of the fate of this incipient group of "black
(Puerto Rican, American Indian) capitalists."91
If decision makers do have a special concern in this direction, then
they will view comprehensive code enforcement with some concern.
Code compliance will cost money and financing is notoriously difficult
within the ghetto. Since it is probable that black resident landlords
will have the hardest time obtaining an improvement loan, it seems
likely that they will sometimes be induced by code enforcement to
sell out to larger "professional" landlords who have somewhat greater
access to the money markets.
Code enforcement will therefore generate some forces leading to
90. Thus, the argument presented here would not justify a minimum wage law which
had the effect of permitting some workers to receive more decent wages at the cost of
forcing some other low income workers on to the unemployment and welfare roles un-
less there was reason to believe that the welfare payments given the idle workers were
higher than the wages they would have earned but for the minimum wage statute.
91. Over a third of the parcels investigated in Sternlieb's Newark study were lived In
by their owners. The study further revealed that more than one third of the parcels located
in the sample area were ownedb blacks. G. SrRNLiB, supra note 6, at 131-37. Although
Sternlieb does not provide the precise percentage of parcels owned by blacks that werelived in by th~eir owners, he does indicate that "the bulk of Negro owners own single
parcels," id. at 137, and that resident landlords constitute 70 per cent of the sample of
single parcel owners, id. at 135. Thus, it would appear that a very substantial proportionof: black owners were resident landlords. Resident owners bulked less si[,niflcantly in the
New York study since the larger size of the multiple dwellings common i that city madcit far more difficult, especially for poorer residents, to achieve ownership. See G. SrraaniE,
supra note 7, at 13-12.
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a marginal shift in ownership from the incipient black bourgeoisie
to the larger professionals unless active governmental steps are taken to
assure adequate financing for minority owners. On the other hand, en-
forcement may generate other forces moving in the opposite direction.
Fragmentary empirical data suggest that resident landlords maintain
their slum properties in a significantly better condition than large
professionals,92 who in turn do a very much better job than small-time
non-resident amateurs. Thus comprehensive code enforcement may
be expected to hurt proportionately more non-resident than resident
owners. If indigenous owners are, in fact, in a better position to main-
tain their properties as a result of their permanent residence, Slum-
villites may be able to purchase subcode buildings from non-residents
at prices which non-residents would consider acceptable, thereby in-
ducing an increase in the number of units offered for sale to aspiring
ghetto homeowners.
Thus, comprehensive code enforcement will generate opposite for-
ces which may, or may not, cancel each other out, depending upon the
dynamics of the particular urban situation, and the effectiveness of
government efforts to provide mortgage money to minority groups.
Even assuming, however, that the net effect of the program is the elimi-
nation of a number of marginal resident landlords, the question
remains whether the upwardly mobile member of a minority group has
a weightier claim upon social concern than the slum tenant. This obvi-
ously is a question upon which reasonable men may differ. In my view,
however, the equitable claim of the poor black tenant to a decent
dwelling is much stronger than the claim of the black petty bourgeois
to a fee simple absolute; consequently, I would not give much weight
to the marginal displacement of resident landlords, even if it were
found to exist, in my own consideration of the relative merits of a
program contemplating comprehensive code enforcement, supported
by a special housing subsidy.
D.
We are now in a position to attempt an answer to the question
with which this section of the essay began: which program apportions
burdens and benefits more fairly-one which relies entirely upon the
disbursement of cash grants like the negative income tax, or one in
which the cash grant system is supplemented by a code enforcement-
housing subsidy scheme?
92. G. STERN=, supra note 6, at 171-76.
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Our consideration of the equities of the two programs has yielded
mixed results. On the one hand, it seems clear that a system exclusively
relying upon cash grants distributes benefits more fairly than does
code enforcement, even when the interests and desires of slum children
are taken into account. On the other hand, the question of the fairness
by which the two programs allocate burdens is a good deal more com-
plicated.
I have argued that the slum landlord can advance no substantial
claim that code enforcement unfairly singles him out as a scapegoat
for society's ills: the landlord cannot advance a persuasive claim that
he lacked fair warning of his potential liability at the time of his
purchase; moreover, his special obligation can sometimes be justified by
reference to the resource allocation objective and can always be sup.
ported by invoking an obligation upon members of the privileged
classes to act decently in their continuing relationships with victims of
an unfair distribution system. Similarly, the problem posed by the
prospect of code enforcement forcing relatively poor black landlords
to sell at a loss to those larger entrepreneurs with better access to capital
does not seem serious, and in any event, may be resolved by appropriate
government support of the slum mortgage market.
Even if the fairness of imposing a special burden upon slum land.
lords is conceded, the question of code enforcement's relative fairness
in comparison with cash grant programs still remains. And, in order to
answer this question, it is necessary to appraise the justice of the taxes
levied by the state to support the negative income tax plan. Fortu.
nately, the immediately preceding discussion provides a useful ana-
lytical benchmark in approaching this task. Our previous arguments
have all responded to the question whether it would be appropriate
to impose a special burden upon the landlord even in a society which
relied solely upon a progressive income tax for raising revenue. 3 It
follows a fortiori that code enforcement's relative equity is enhanced
in a society like our own in which the general revenue fund is collected
in significant part from taxes which are either regressive (like the
sales tax) or haphazard and probably regressive (like the real estate
tax),94 and in which owners of real estate receive substantial federal tax
advantages.
Thus, when one focuses simply upon the equities of the matter, it
would appear that neither a program relying exclusively upon a cash
93. See p. 1160 supra.
94. See D NETZE, ECONOMICS OF in PxorE'rY TAx 82-62 (1966).
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grant system nor one in which somewhat smaller cash grants are sup-
plemented by a code enforcement-special housing subsidy scheme is
dearly the superior. Consequently, if a local government should con-
sider the merits of supplementing a state or national cash grant
scheme by launching a code enforcement program which makes
distributive sense, considerations of equity should not prove to be a
significant constraint.
VIII. It May Be Cheaper for the Government, But is it Cheaper
for Society?
There remains one critical dimension along which code enforce-
ment must be assessed. While we have shown that in a wide variety of
cases, a dollar of government money will generate greater benefits to
the poor tenant class, the suspicion remains that the dollars spent by
the landlords in response to code enforcement could yield greater
benefits to the tenants if they were not spent on improving housing,
but instead were given directly to the tenants in the form of cash. The
point can best be introduced by considering the following simple prob-
lem. Assume that it costs a landlord $5 a month to maintain an apart-
ment at code standards. Assume further that-because of the structure
of the market and the government's subsidy policy-the landlord can
pass on none of his code costs. Will the tenant's benefit be greater or
less than $5?
A.
Sometimes the average tenant will benefit by more than $5 as a re-
sult of a $5 investment in code enforcement. As Davis and Whinston
have pointed out in a somewhat different context,0n many improve-
ments undertaken by an individual landlord will yield substantially
greater benefits when similar improvements are made by all (or almost
all) of the other landlords in the community. If only one landlord un-
dertakes a rat prevention program, the rats will likely respond by mov-
ing to a neighboring house, where they will be an almost equal menace
to tenants of the "rat free" house; on the other hand, if all landlords in
a neighborhood attempt to kill the rats, all of the tenants will be free
from the obvious and subtle dangers of close exposure to an expanding
95. Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw & Co.wzw. Pron.
105, 107-12 (1961). See also Davis, A Pure Theory of Urban Renewal, 36 LAND Eco.N. 221
(1960).
1177
HeinOnline -- 80 Yale L.J. 1177 1970-1971
The Yale Law Journal
rat population. While the small benefit a particular landlord (and his
tenants) obtain from an individually initiated rat control program will
often exceed the cost of such a program, the total benefits of a com-
munity-wide program would far exceed the costs borne by each of the
individual landlords engaged in the cooperative effort. Although it is
theoretically possible that a neighborhood's landlords will voluntarily
undertake a community project, recognizing that all will ultimately
profit thereby, the costs of coming to such an agreement will generally
be extremely high and the temptation felt by each landlord to obtain
a "free ride" as a result of the efforts of the others will be very great
indeed. Consequently, it is unlikely that landlords will agree voluntar-
ily to undertake a rat control program, even though it is in their interest
to do so. Similarly, it would even be less likely that the neighborhood's
tenants will band together to contribute to a fund devoted to bribing
the landlords to invest in rat control. 0 For the costs of organizing such
an agreement in the face of the natural tendency of each tenant to take
a free ride would almost always be prohibitive. Thus, if enactment of a
housing code requires the community to undertake rat control
it could well be that a landlord investment of $5 per month will
generate far more than that amount in benefits to the average tenant.
In addition to the benefits arising out of the coordinated activity
made possible through enforcement on a community-wide basis, code
regulation, when artfully devised, can force landlords to take steps that
inexpensively reduce costs which would otherwise be externalized upon
others living in the area.97 Thus, if a building constitutes a fire risk
which members of the surrounding community would pay $5000 a year
to avoid, a code which requires the landlord to eliminate the risk at a
cost of $2000 yields an efficiency gain of $3000.08 Needless to say, the
importance of the externality reduction argument depends to a con-
siderable degree on one's estimate of the causal relationship between
poor housing quality and various forms of anti-social activity which
tenants may pursue. Thus, if one believed that poor housing substan-
tially increased tenants' criminal propensities or undermined their edu-
96. Moreover, even if tenants could organize cheaply, requiring them to bribe land.
lords to undertake the improvements would have the undesirable redistribution effect of
shifting income to the landlords.
97. An excellent general discussion of the factors which identify the individual who
can most cheaply avoid a potential external cost may be found in G. CALADPXSI, supra
note 78, at 135-73.
98. We are assuming here once again that if the fire prevention burden were not
placed upon the landlord but upon the other members of the community, the costs of
organizing those threatened by the fire risk to band together to bribe the landlord to
eliminate the danger would be prohibitively expensive.
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cational achievement, the externality prevention rationale would be
extremely weighty. Even if one's view is limited to uncontroversial
matters involving the cheapest way of reducing damage to health and
safety, however, the argument remains of obvious importance.
B.
While a properly devised housing code will yield many benefits of
the kinds considered above, comprehensive enforcement will often
create significant costs to the tenants by forcing at least some buildings
off the market. Abandoned buildings impose a heavy external cost upon
the surrounding community: they are fire hazards, uncontrolled gar-
bage dumps, centers for the propagation of disease, hangouts for the
criminal.
In theory, the external costs generated by code enforcement can be
significantly reduced by the housing subsidy program which, as we
have seen, is an essential lynch pin of an effective code enforcement pro-
gram on those occasions when a substantial contraction of the private
supply is generated. If the state assumes control over abandoned build-
ings either through the exercise of its power of eminent domain or
through its police power,19 and seeks to rehabilitate the properties, it
will in effect be performing two services. First, it will be providing
housing units required by the subsidy policy; second, it will be elim-
inating the serious external costs imposed by vacant buildings. None-
theless, emerging case law promises seriously to constrain the use of
housing subsidies in this way. Increasingly, lower federal courts are
limiting governmental efforts at building new housing in the ghetto.100
This tendency, taken to its extreme, would oblige policy makers to
respond to the contraction of the private housing supply in Slumville
by building new subsidized homes in Middleburg and beyond. While
moving some Slumvillites into these more lily-white sectors may sub-
99. For an interesting discussion of the steps the state may constitutionally take to
correct the problem caused by abandoned houses without compensating their owners, see
Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, and Just Compensation: A Rationale
for the Exercise of Public Powers Over Slum Housing, 67 Micu. L. Rnv. 635 (1969).
100. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), 304
F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ii. 1969) (judgment order reported); Hicks v. Weaver, -302 F. Supp.
619 (E.D. La. 1969); Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dmv.,
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); for a state court decision, see El Cortez Heights Residents
and Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d
294 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). Gautreaux and its progeny are discussed in 83 HAnv. L REV.
1441 (1970); 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1172 (1969); Note, Racial Discrimination in Public
Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970); 44 TUL. L Rm'. 385 (1970); Note,
Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection and Public Housing. 118
U. oF PA. L REv. 437 (1970); Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YA.E L.J. 712 (1970).
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stantially improve their lot, this will be accomplished to the prejudice
of the poor remaining in the slum, who will be obliged to bear the
heavy costs of the deserted buildings caused by code enforcement.
Clearly, this is not the place to canvass the constitutional arguments
which are increasingly impelling the judiciary to check further sub-
sidized construction in the heart of the ghetto. All that our discussion
here can emphasize is that there are significant costs in funnelling all
subsidized housing into white areas which should be fully considered
by courts before adopting a per se rule against increased state support
of ghetto rental markets-a course which has only been suggested, but
not explicitly adopted, by the courts thus far.10' Even if the use of hous-
ing subsidies is constrained significantly by the courts, it would still
be possible to convert the abandoned sites into vest-pocket parks, com-
munity centers and other public facilities. While such conversions
would of course require subsidy beyond that demanded by the code en-
forcement program, it is quite possible that these additional expendi-
tures will be justified on distributional and cost-benefit grounds as well.
It also seems that just at the time courts are constricting the supply of
housing subsidies into the slums, the judiciary is beginning to discern
that the Constitution requires the state to provide municipal services
in the ghetto to the same degree that they are supplied in more privi-
leged sectors.1 2 Thus, while decision makers may be barred from re-
habilitating an abandoned house for continued residential purposes,
they may be required to transform it into a vest-pocket park: a note-
worthy example of constitutional litigation almost simultaneously ex-
101. In Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. IlL. 1969), 304 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. II. 1969)
(judgment order reported), the court required the Chicago Housing Authority to construct
the next 700 units of public housing plus 75% of all units built thereafter in white
neighborhoods. This judgment order was based on the court's finding that the Chicago
Housing Authority had intentionally limited sites for public housing to already black
areas of Chicago in order to maintain racial segregation. Thus, it does not necesarily
apply to cases in which intentional discrimination cannot be shown. Similarly, the court
in Hicks v. Weaver, 802 F. Supp. 619 (ED. La.. 1969) granted a preliminary injunction
against both the Bogalusa Housing Authority and the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development enjoining further construction on those public housing sites which had
been chosen for the purpose of maintaining racial se&regation.
Finally, in Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 4816 F.2d 809
(3d Cir. 1970) the court held that HUD must consider the potential effects on racial con-
centration when reviewing an urban renewal plan contemplating subsidized rental
dwellings, but it explicitly refrained from imposing a per se rule:
There will be instances where a pressing case may -e made for the rebuilding of a
racial ghetto. We hold only that the agency's judgment must be an informed one;
which weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical rehabilitation or
additional minority housing at the site in question dearly outweighs the disadvan-
tage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration.
Id. at 822.
102. Hawldns v. Town of Shaw, 487 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
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acerbating and partly resolving a problem of which the litigants (and
the judges) are, at best, peripherally aware.
C.
Whatever the constitutional trends, it should be clear that there is
no ineluctable law which requires that external benefits (of the kinds
considered in subsection A) be greater than, equal to, or less than ex-
ternal costs (of the sort considered in subsection B). Nevertheless, for
purposes of further analysis, it will be useful to consider whether a
tenant will benefit more or less from a $5 cash payment than from a $5
landlord investment in code improvements on the assumption that ex-
ternal benefits and external costs will precisely wash each other out.
Even in such a situation, the correct answer cannot be an unequiv-
ocal one. On the one hand, the landlord's $5 investment in code improve-
ments will sometimes generate services which the tenant would value
more than those he could purchase with $5 in cash. Since comprehen-
sive code enforcement requires the landlord to engage in an improve-
ment program on all his substandard properties, it may enable him to
garner the economies of scale available by undertaking a larger repair
operation than he would attempt without the code. Thus, for example,
if the code requires the owner to undertake substantial electrical re-
pairs and maintain them at a high standard, a landlord could well find
it profitable to hire a full time electrician, thereby enabling him to
improve each apartment's electrical defects far more cheaply than if
each job were subcontracted out on an individual basis. This means
that while it might cost an individual tenant $20 to get his landlord or
an electrician to make a repair, it will cost the landlord only $5 to com-
plete the task once code enforcement requires the owner to organize a
more efficient and wide ranging maintenance service.10 3 On the other
103. Some of the readers of earlier drafts of this article suggested that the cconomy
of scale argument may be invoked with even more weight on behalf of the services
performed by the code inspectorate. If there were no code enforcement at all, a tenant
who wished to know the condition of the wiring or heating system in an apartment he
was considering as a residence would often be required to hire the services of experts to
give him special advice. Indeed, it could often happen that the same apartment would be
inspected by different electricians hired by several different families before the apartment
would ultimately be rented. In contrast, an effective code enforcement program could
eliminate this waste by systematically appraising the safety of each apartment on a
regular basis, providing information for all potential consumers. Moreover, even when
the possibility of pointless, multiple inspections is set aside, sstematic public inspection
will provide relevant consumer information on a substantially cheaper per unit basis
than will the alternative of private inspection. While a private inspector will only ex-
amine the apartment or apartments in which his customer is interested, the public
official can save a great deal of money by inspecting all the units in the building at the
same time, thereby obviating the need for countless limited purpose inspections under-
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hand, in those contexts in which this economy of scale factor is not
substantial, one would suspect that the $5 housing improvement will
often benefit the tenant less than a cash payment of $5. For if the ten-
ant has received $5 in cash he could presumably obtain his housing im-
provement simply by offering the $5 to the landlord, assuming that the
costs of entering into the transaction are minimal.10 4 However, there
will be many tenants who would not choose to spend all their extra $5
on the housing improvements the code requires, but instead, would
spend their extra income on other goods and services they desire more,
To them, the landlord's $5 investment is worth less than $5 in cash.
Concentrating myopically upon this possibility, it is easy for the critic
of housing code enforcement to attack the program upon efficiency
grounds. He would suggest that instead of redistributing landlord in-
come through in-kind payments, it may be more efficient to tax slum
landlords in cash and then distribute the cash to slum tenants to do with
what they wish. Thus, not the negative income tax, but the "slumlord
tax-tenant cash grant" plan appears as the ultimate antagonist of code
enforcement.
While the "slumlord tax" has a certain initial charm to it, analysis
reveals that there is more novelty than substance to this proposal. A
comparison of a "slumlord tax" with a "code enforcement" scheme may
fruitfully begin by inquiring whether the two alternative programs
really differ from one another as much as their different labels suggest.
When viewed from this perspective, analysis reveals that if the "tax"
is substantial, it leads to results no different from "code enforcement."
taken at the behest of countless tenants.
While this argument is sound as far as it goes, it does not, alas, respond to the prob.
lem posed in the text. For the state's superior efficiency in providing consumer information
does not justify code enforcement, but at most, a system of state inspections which would
eventuate in a report posted in each apartment advising consumers of the existence
of serious, non-obvious defects. Once consumers have been provided with this information,
there is nothing in the information efficiency argument which suggests that they
should be prevented from deciding for themselves whether they will endure the risks
reported by the state or pay a higher rent for a less risk-laden apartment. Yet tlils is
precisely what code enforcement, as opposed to a pure system of inspections, has the
effect of doing.
Consequently, I have included this footnote principally to warn students of code
enforcement that this argument, which seems on its face powerful indeed, justifies only
a "pure" inspection program, but does not argue for moving beyond this to a coercive
code enforcement operation.
104. This assumes further that even if there were no system of code enforcement,
the state would furnish a mechanism like that described in note 103 supra, which pro.
vides the tenant with objective information regarding the existence of non-obvious
defects latent in the apartments he is considering. As suggested in note 103's discussion
of the consumer information problem, it seems quite clear that a system of state con.
trolled inspections to unearth hidden defects can be justified on efficiency grounds
which are quite independent of those that may be invoked on behalf of an enforcement
program.
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For when a landlord is threatened with a high "slumlord tax" he can
avoid the tax simply by improving his building so that it no longer is
classified as a slum. If he takes this option, his tenants benefit in the
same way and to the same degree that they benefit from a code enforce-
ment program. Indeed, the only difference between the two programs
is that in one, the slumlord is threatened with something called a "tax";
in the other, he is threatened with a sanction labelled a "fine." Thus
the "slumlord tax" alternative only remains a distinct option if the tax
which is levied is lower than the amount required to induce universal
improvement.
If, however, the tax rate is low enough that some of the landlords
pay cash into the fund rather than improve their buildings, the taxing
authority will encounter a far different problem in redistribution pol-
icy. The principal difficulty will become manifest if we assume-for
a moment-that none of Slumville's landlords respond to the "slumlord
tax" by seeking to improve their buildings. Thus, imagine that each
landlord, who formerly charged a $100 monthly rental, is now obliged
to pay $20 per unit per month into the fund and each tenant family
receives $20 a month as a supplementary cash grant.'05 It should be
easy to see that each landlord will quite promptly act to increase his
rent to $120 and will succeed in this strategy. For if, prior to the slum-
lord tax, the marginal tenant was formerly willing to pay $100 without
engaging in demand-limiting tactics, the marginal tenant will now be
willing to "pay" $120 for this same apartment provided that he then
receives a "supplemental grant" of $20: $120 - $20 = $100. Thus, if a
"slumlord tax" is set low enough so that none of Slumville's landlords
seeks to escape it by improving the building, each will rapidly succeed
in raising his rent so that his tenant is no better off than he
was formerly.
We are now in a position to assess the intermediate case in which
some landlords respond to the tax by improving themselves out of the
"slum" category while others find it cheaper to pay the tax. Assume,
for purposes of simplicity, that of Slumville's 100,000 units, 10,000 are
improved (X) while the remainder (Y) remain slummy, thereby opening
a new set of alternatives to each ghetto family. On the one hand, they
may live in inferior buildings and receive the $20 monthly supplement;
on the other hand, they may foresake the $20 cash for the improved ac-
commodations. Needless to say, the number of tenants taking one option
105. For purposes of simplicity, I shall temporarily assume away the cost of ad.
ministering the "tax-grant" program, taking this matter up at p. 1185 mira.
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rather than another will depend upon the pricing behavior of both the
improved and inferior units. Imagine, for example, that the owners of
the slummy Y units attempt to appropriate the entire benefit of the $20
government grant by raising their rents to $120, which is equivalent to
the old $100 rent from the tenants' point of view once the $20 supple-
ment is taken into account. Substantial numbers of Y's tenants could
then be expected to move to the 10,000 X units since they have become
relatively more desirable at the old $100 price. As the expatriate Y'ers
move to X, they will of course bid up the rents beyond the old $100
level,106 inducing old-time X residents to depart from their newly im-
proved dwellings in search of the lower net rents prevailing in Y. Upon
their arrival in Y, the ex-X'ers will confront the landlords of the
slummy apartments recently vacated by the ex-Y'ers. As always, the
rents resulting from the ensuing bargains will turn upon the prefer-
ences of the 6migr~s from X: if a significant number turn lukewarm at
the pre-existing Y rent of $120 - $20, rents will decline; if not, not.
All this means that the income redistribution effect of the "tax-grant"
scheme will in a wide range of cases be singularly unimpressive: on the
one hand, rent levels in the improved units will increase; on the other
hand, the landlords will successfully obtain the benefit of the $20 cash
subsidy unless the 6migr~s from X act lukewarmly when confronted by
the old net rental prevailing in Y. Indeed, it would be necessary for
the ex-X'ers to force the rent down by $20 before the entire grant would
remain in the tenants' pockets. Thus, even in those cases in which, for
example, $20 of code investment generate only a $10 benefit to the
average tenant, it nevertheless does not follow that the average tenant
will benefit more as a result of a "slumlord tax-cash grant" scheme
which on its face promises to pay him $20 a month in cash. For in a
wide variety of situations, the lion's share of the cash grant will be
appropriated by slum landlords, with tenants remaining little better
off than formerly. 07
106. As the rental premium charged in the improved buildings increases, it will
become cheaper for some of the landlords who initially selected the strategy of paying
the "slumlord tax" to improve their buildings. This, in turn, will increase the competi-
tion in the newly improved sector, thereby depressing the rent that may successfully
be charged tenants. This point may, however, be ignored without prejudice to an un-
derstanding of the basic arguments presented in the text.
107. This discussion casts some light upon another conceivable subsidy approach not
considered in the text: what would be the result of a scheme which sought to pay cash
grants out of the general fund to tenants living in substandard houses? The discussion
here would suggest the likelihood that landlords, rather than tenants, would be the
primary beneficiaries of this form of governmental largesse, although a canvass of further
factors not considered here (notably the trickle down effect) would be necessary for a
complete analysis. I have omitted a discussion of this subsidy approach here because It
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Finally, there is a rather prosaic factor which makes the "tax-grant"
scheme even less attractive. Up to the present time, we have assumed
that the costs of administering a "slumlord tax-cash grant" plan were
no greater than the code enforcement operation. It should be dear,
however, that administering the "tax-grant" program would require
the creation of an administrative behemoth far more costly than the
bureaucracy required under code enforcement. Like the code enforce-
ment authority, the taxing agency would be obliged to check the con-
dition of the landlords' premises as well as engage in the sometimes
cumbersome task of forcing a landlord to pay the cash due under the
law. In addition to this, however, the taxing agency (unlike the code
enforcement authority), would have to enter into an even more com-
plex and costly effort when the time came to disburse the funds to
Slumville's tenantry.'10
When faced with these insurmountable obstacles, the "tax-grant"
advocate most probably will be tempted to alter his proposal one final
time, and suggest that instead of compensating Slumville's tenantry,
the revenue raised from the slumlord levy should be placed in the
general fund for worthy governmental purposes among which redis-
tribution may be numbered. By revising the proposal in this way,
however, the "tax" proponent has removed the only feature distinguish-
ing it from the code enforcement alternative. For absent any effort to
compensate the tenantry in cash, a "slumlord tax" is but a different
label for a housing code enforced by "fines": if the "taxes" are very
high, slum landlords will improve (or abandon) all their buildings to
free themselves of their potential tax liability, just as they would when
threatened by heavy "fines"; if the tax is lower, the result will be identi-
cal to partial code enforcement; if so low as to be de minimis, the result
will be equivalent to ineffective enforcement. 10 9
did not seem germane to the main line of the argument. Nevertheless, I suspect that one
of my readers might find it rewarding to pursue this particular tangent, since it might
well be that a number of contemporary efforts at subsidizing the housing of poor people
may be seen in a different light as a result of the exercise.
108. Moreover, it should be recalled that not all of the cost of administering the
code scheme is properly chargeable to the aspect of the plan which is concerned vdth
redistributing wealth to the tenantry. See pp. 1123-24 supra.
109. In addition to the factors canvassed in the text, there is a final argument
against any taxing scheme which many will find persuasive, though I am not numbered
among them. Since effective code enforcement assures that the poor will live in "decent
housing," it appeals to those paternalistic members of the middle and upper da.,es
who gain psychic satisfaction in the knowledge that the life patterns of adults living
in poverty conforms to middle-clas norms; in contrast, however, the paternalists ill
be deprived of their satisfaction if poor adults are each given a share of the proceeds
of a "slumlord tax," since the cash may be spent in ways not meeting the paternalists"
approval. Thus, code enforcement can be conceived as a program which redistributes
benefits not only to the tenantry but also to the paternalists in the upper classes. And
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This final accounting of the relative merits of code enforcement,
therefore, leaves the program relatively unscarred. Compared with the
code program, the "slumlord tax-tenant cash grant" plan will generally
have a far less significant redistributive effect and will in addition be
substantially more expensive to administer. Finally, the "slumlord




It has been my task to explicate the economic and ethical premises
behind a government effort at regulating slum rental markets on behalf
of the poor. As I cautioned in my introductory remarks, however, I
have not attempted to prove that code enforcement will successfully
redistribute income under all conditions. Indeed, under many condi-
tions, the code must be supported by a special purpose housing subsidy
if it is to be enforced at all successfully. Moreover, the redistributive
impact of code enforcement also depends heavily upon the compre-
hensiveness of the enforcement effort: a localized effort may be rela-
tively ineffective in a market structure in which comprehensive enforce-
ment would yield significant results.
Instead of advancing code enforcement as a panacea, my task has
been a more modest one. I have attempted to demonstrate that, even
when it is compared to a redistributive system which relies exclusively
upon a negative income tax, comprehensive code enforcement (backed
by an appropriate subsidy) often has certain significant advantages:
first, it may require landlords to make improvements which, except for
bargaining costs, would have been in their interest-and in the interest
of their tenants-to make anyway; second, it serves to tax away a sub-
stantial share of the rentier and monopoly profits earned by slum land-
if the satisfaction accruing to the paternalists may properly be counted, the code
enforcement program has yet another advantage over the "tax.grant" alternative. Cf.
Buchanan, What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?, 85 EcoNoMicA 185 (1968).
I am of the view, however, that the psychic benefits potentially derived by the
paternalists should not be counted. For while I have argued that it is fair to impose a
special burden upon the landlords to redistribute wealth to their poorer tenants, I canl
discern no plausible ground for imposing an obligation upon landlords to make In-
vestments which please the paternalist members of the privileged classes. Since the
landlord's obligation only properly runs to his tenants, I would select the policy alterna-
tive which maximizes the benefits made available to the proper beneficiaries and ignore
the benefits accruing to those beneficiaries whose interests the landlord has no obligation
to respect. Thus, if it could be established that the "tax-grant" plan more efficiently
provided benefits to the tenantry than the code enforcement-subsidy plan, I would
opt for the "tax-grant" alternative. It is only because the considerations advanced In
the text convince me that this will not be the case that the alternative has been rejected.
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lords; third, it fairly imposes a burden upon landlords who, like other
members of the privileged class, have an obligation to exercise self-
restraint in their ongoing dealings with the poor; fourth, it generates
the same total amount of benefit to the poor tenantry, at a much re-
duced expenditure of government funds.
In the world of pure theory, this last point could easily be ignored.
One may argue-with a surface plausibility-that we are not interested
in a program's cost to the government, but only in its overall cost to
society. This argument, however, neglects an important aspect of the
code enforcement problem. For if-as we have suggested-it is fair to
impose a special burden upon slum landlords to redistribute income
to their tenants, the "costs" landlords incur in fulfilling the code must
be viewed in a different light from the way expenditures are normally
considered in cost-benefit analysis. Normally, the analyst's calculation
of "cost" presupposes the legitimacy of the existing distribution of
income. Thus, when Jones is forced by government to spend $10 for
a public purpose in which he does not benefit, the analyst counts the
$100 as a "cost" of the program only because the government has de-
prived Jones of the opportunity to expend $100 for his own purposes.
If, however, the government believes that it would not have been fair
for Jones to have spent the $100 in the first place, the analyst should
not count Jones' lost opportunity as a "cost." (Indeed, from the govern-
ment's point of view, Jones' lost opportunity is-if anything-a benefit,
not a cost.) It follows, then, that a reader convinced of the fairness of
placing a special redistributive obligation upon slum landlords would
not necessarily consider their expenditures incurred under code enforce-
ment as a "cost" of the program, since the program has only deprived
the landlords of funds they should not fairly have spent for their own
purposes in any event. Indeed, in assessing the "cost" of the landlord's
expenditure, the reader convinced by this essay should consider only
whether in choosing code enforcement as the means of enforcing the
landlord's special obligation to his tenants, the state lost the oppor-
tunity to adopt a redistribution scheme which generated even greater
tenant benefits than code enforcement promises. As our consideration
of the viability of "slumlord taxes" and "tenant cash grants" has just
shown, however, code enforcement seems to be the most efficient form
of discharging the landlord's special obligation to his tenantry. Conse-
quently, those who are persuaded by this essay will consider the "oppor-
tunity cost" of code expenditures incurred by landlords to be zero. For
the convinced reader, the only costs which must be weighed are those
reflected in the government's budget, since in choosing to spend these
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funds on the code enforcement-housing subsidy plan, the state has
doubtless foregone opportunities either to embark upon alternative
public projects or reduce the general tax level.
Even for those less convinced of the fairness of imposing a special
redistributive obligation upon landlords, however, the significance of
the relatively low governmental budgetary cost of the code-subsidy
program should not be completely discounted. For in the world of
American institutions, the point is not unimportant. Given the con-
straints on local taxing power imposed both by state constitutions and
by competition among localities to attract new business, the relatively
low budgetary cost of the code enforcement-subsidy scheme means that
it is one of the few programs which could feasibly be instituted by city
governments wishing to sustain a significant effort at income redistri-
bution. Moreover, even if a negative income tax were adopted on the
national level, we have shown that code enforcement would-under
many circumstances-perform as an appropriate local supplement to
the broader national effort. And it would appear that the case for hous-
ing code enforcement is even more persuasive given the present con-
fusion we call our welfare system.
When all is said and done, of course, an approach to income redis.
tribution which relies in part on code enforcement and a special
housing subsidy deprives the tenantry (or at least the adult portion of
the poor tenantry) of full freedom to use all of their subsidy money
as they see fit. And this fact alone may, in the eyes of those who make
their spiritual home the University of Chicago, be enough to invalidate
the program's entire claim to legitimacy. For those less convinced of
the supreme moral significance of consumer sovereignty than Milton
Friedman, however, perhaps the most important utility of this essay
will be its reminder that a sophisticated redistribution policy need not
necessarily rest upon a single technique, however attractive its sim-
plicity.
B.
On a lower level of abstraction, the analysis presented here permits
an evaluation of existing federal policies governing code enforcement.
Since 1965, HUD has been granting substantial subsidies "for the
purpose of assisting ... localities in carrying out programs of concen-
trated code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which
such enforcement, together with those public improvements to be pro-
vided by the locality, may be expected to arrest the decline of the
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area." n Moreover, the federally subsidized concentrated code enforce-
ment program contains a number of features which should commend
themselves to the reader who has been persuaded by this article: special
financing is provided to all property owners wishing to improve their
buildings to code level, with a special preference given to owners of
moderate income;"' many tenants who are induced to leave their
homes as a result of code enforcement are provided with relocation
grants to compensate them for the expenses involved in moving and
establishing themselves in a new home;"' in addition, regulations
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (Supp. V, 1970), § 311(a), 79 Stat. 477 (1965), as amended § 6(b),
81 Stat. 21 (1967), § 515, 82 Stat. 525 (1968), § 202(c), 83 Stat. 386 (1969). The federal
share can be as much as two-thirds of the total program cost in cities with populations
greater than 50,000 and as much as three.fourths total cost in smaller cities. Id. In
addition, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 authorizes grants of sim-
flar-though more limited--subsidies to support "programs to alleviate harmful conditions
in slum and blighted areas which are planned for substantial clearance, rehabilitation,
or federally assisted code enforcement in the near future but in which some immediate
public action is needed until clearance, rehabilitation, or code enforcement activities
can be undertaken." 42 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (Supp. V, 1970), § 514, 82 Stat. 525 (1968), as
amended § 202(d), 83 Stat. 386 (1969).
111. Under § 312 of the Housing Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (Supp. V., 1970),
as amended § 207, 83 Stat. 887 (1969), HUD is authorized to grant 20 year loans at the
subsidized interest rate of 3%, with priority for owners whose income is below that
prescribed for occupants of projects funded under 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
For more details, see HuD, REHABILITATION FINANCING RAA PROGRA s IIANDBooK, RHA
7375.1, ch. III (1970). In addition, grants of up to $3,500 are available to families with
very low incomes who, nevertheless, own their own slum homes, 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (Supp.
V, 1970).
112. Under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1894 (enacted Jan. 2, 1971) [hereinafter the Uniform Reloca-
tion Act], assistance is provided to all families who are evicted as a result of code enforce-
ment activities, see implementing regulations §§ 42.55(c)(3)(a), 42.55(c)(3)(b)(2), 86 Fed. Reg.
8790 (1971), and to certain penurious families who move when confronted by substantial
rent increases of a kind described more fully at note 117 infra. Eligible families are en-
titled to compensation for moving expenses, Uniform Relocation Act, § 202(a)(1), and,
in addition, state authorities must find the emigrant a code level apartment in a neigh-
borhood comparable in other respects to the one he is leaving, § 204(1), as interpreted by
implementing regulations §§ 42.20(b), 42.20(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 8787 (1971) this right to
demand a decent home may, however, be "waived" by the emigrant if he 'refuses without
justification reasonable choices of specifically identified replacement dwellings," § 42.120(b),
36 Fed. Reg. 8795 (1971)-an exception which seems capable of substantial manipulation
by a reluctant relocation agency. In any event, if the tenant obtains a new apartment
through the assistance of the relocation agency only to find that his rent has increased as
a result of the move to a decent home, the Act undertakes to pay the difference between
his old and new rent for a period of four years, up to a limit of $4,000, Uniform Relo-
cation Act, § 204(1), and implementing regulations, § 42.95(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 8794 (1971).
No mention is made of the fate of the tenant after the four years or $4,000 are exhausted,
but it would seem probable that when the subsidy terminates, most will return to
inferior housing in the ghetto, this time with no state assistance for moving costs.
Thus, the Act's approach to relocation is a curious mixture: on the one hand, by insist-
ing that the tenant be placed in a code level house, the Act seems to require that he be
put in a better position than formerly; by terminating all assistance after four years, it
ultimately places the tenant in a worse position; moreover, there is no attempt to com-
pensate the tenant for the non-monetary costs of uprooting himself from one neighbor-
hood to another, as well as the further psychological dislocation involved in the probable
subsequent move back to inferior accommodations after the four year period expires.
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recognize the relationship between code enforcement and subsidy
policy by providing that:
No displacement [shall] occur in a locality which has less than a
three percent vacancy rate in rental housing-adequate in size
and within the financial means of those anticipated to be dis-
placed-unless the locality undertakes replacement of housing
units through rehabilitation of substandard units or new con-
struction, as a minimum, on a one-to-one basis for each such unit
removed from the housing supply.11 a
On the other hand, the program does not specifically address the
problem of external costs generated by abandoned houses; 114 even
more important, however, is the program's virtually exclusive concentra-
tion upon the importance of code enforcement in relatively small seg-
ments of the city's slums. While HUD naturally instructs each locality
"to develop.., long-range goals for community-wide code compliance,"
the agency requires the development of a "specific action program"
only "with respect to ... priority areas."" 05 Not surprisingly, I-IUD pol-
icy verges on the incoherent when it comes to articulating the appropri-
ate factors to be considered by local and federal officials in their attempt
to define appropriate "priority areas" for code enforcement.110 The
When this curious assortment of subsidies is weighed together, it seems fair to conclude
that, at the very least, the Uniform Relocation Act does not significantly improve the
position of the migr6 and may indeed fail to compensate fully for the full range of
monetary and non-monetary costs involved in the dislocation. Indeed, it would seem
probable that a straight cash grant would provide a superior mode of compensating for
dislocation than the present administrative amalgam.
113. HUD, CODE ENFORCEMENT GRANT HANDBOOK, RHA 7250.1, ch. 6, l(d) (1969).
114. While a federal subsidy is authorized under certain limited conditions to under-
write in part the cost of demolition of unsafe structures, 42 U.S.C. § 1467 (Stipp. V,
1970), there is no explicit requirement in the regulations promulgated under tile cot-
centrated code enforcement program demanding that municipalities take advantage of
this section or go further and put the vacant lot to a beneficial use. Perhaps the general
proviso that "[t]he municipality shall have a program satisfactory to HUD for pro-
viding all necessary public supporting improvements and services within the code en-
forcement project area," HUD, CODE ENFORCEMENT GRANT HANflOOX, RHA 7250.1, ch, 2,
at 1 (1968) implies that localities are responsible for resolving the abandoned building
problem satisfactorily, either by using their own resources or by applying for a grant
under another federal program.
115. HUD, 'WORKABLE PROGRAM FOR COMltMUNrY IMPROVEMENT, RHA 7100.1, ch. 4,
4 (1968).
116. When the HUD Guide gives examples of appropriate priority code enforcement
projects, the reader is treated to an endless list of unrelated criteria:
EXAMPLES OF PRIORITY AREAS. Examples of areas having high priority need
for code enforcement are: slum areas with especially urgent threats to health or
safety, basically sound neighborhoods threatened by deterioration, urban renewal
areas in which clearance is not imminent, Model City neighborhoods, older buildings
on a scheduled basis, and dwelling units brought onto the market for sale or rental.
HUD, WORKABLE PROGRAM GUIDE, RHA 7100.1, ch. 4, 5 (1968). Moreover, when the
Guide moves on to describe the fundamental factors involved, the program's failure to
deal coherently with the income redistribution problem becomes manifest:
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO CODE ENFORCEMENT. The requirement
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core of the difficulty, of course, is that the redistributive consequences
of partial code enforcement of the kind endorsed by HUD may be far
less favorable than those implied by a comprehensive program regu-
lating the private sector in all the city's slums, operating in conjunction
with an appropriate subsidy policy. I do not suggest that HUD com-
pletely ignores the unpleasant fact that its present program of partial
code enforcement can be expected to impose severe hardships on those
poor tenants who are induced to flee the "priority area" when con-
fronted by a significant increase in rents. The agency does attempt to
aid at least the most penurious among the 6migr s by both moving
them to code level houses in other neighborhoods and assisting them
in their effort to pay the higher rents generally associated with an
apartment possessing a higher level of amenity than their previous sub-
standard dwelling?' 7 Nevertheless, even on the unlikely assumption
that this program is administered with great success, it will often serve
only to conceal, rather than eliminate, the fact that partial code
enforcement may sometimes prove an ineffective redistribution device.
It is true that, thanks to HUD, some of the 6migr s from the "priority
area" will not be obliged to move immediately to one of the inferior
houses in areas where the code remains unenforced. However, by
moving the 6migr6 to a code house in another neighborhood, HUD will
in all likelihood preempt one of the limited supply of code level apart-
ments available to Slumvillites, thereby requiring the Slumville family
which otherwise would have lived in the code apartment to obtain
lodging in an inferior building."' Thus the result of the complex
that communities establish an effective program of code enforcement is based on
the fact that unchecked deterioration of individual structures is an important cause
of blight which affects the care given nearby structures and neighborhoods. At the
same time, it is recognized that communities may need to enforce housing codes in
a flexible manner to avoid unduly harsh effects on low income families and in-
dividuals.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
117. For a description of the subsidies provided and an assessment of their adequacy,
see note 112 supra. Under the regulations interpreting the Uniform Relocation Act, a
tenant who is confronted by a rent increase in excess of ten per cent is eligible for the
assistance described in note 112 supra, provided that the new rental is in excess of the
amount the local agency has determined to be the limit imposed by the tenant's "ability
to pay," § 42.55(c)(3)(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 8790 (1971). Obviously, the "ability to pay" formula
is flexible indeed, and those &nigrks found to be on the wrong side of the line are forced
to bear the full brunt of dislocation.
118. It is only a relocation effort which substantially expands the number of units
of code housing available to ghetto residents which is immune to the line of criticism
pursued in the text. Such a program would require the agency to subsidize tnigrds to
such a degree that they would be capable of outbidding middle-class renters in Middle-
burg who-as a result-would purchase or rent new housing where they would other-
wise have been content to live in an older unit, thereby increasing the rate at .%hich
Middleburg housing trickled down to Slumvillites. A consideration of the details of the
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relocation effort may well be to change the identity of the families
required to live in substandard units without changing the basic reality
that rents have risen substantially in the "priority area" while they may
have failed to decline in the areas ignored by the code inspector.
The federal government's code assistance is a relatively small-time
affair, as such things go, with the estimated cost of the federal subsidy
to localities running at $72 million in 1971 and $52 million in 1972.111
In contrast, the more ambitious neighborhood development program
(NDP), created by the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act,
promises to become of far greater importance.' 20 The NDP is designed
to short circuit the extraordinarily cumbersome planning process as-
sociated with traditional urban renewal procedures which often de-
ferred significant action for unconscionable time intervals while the
"planning process" crawled forward. Most important for our purposes,
NDP districts are capable of combining subsidy and code enforcement
strategies in much more flexible ways than seem available under the
simple code enforcement program.1 1 Nevertheless, the fact that the
NDP effort is concentrated in specially selected target areas within the
slums can be expected once again to induce the now familiar rent
present subsidy program, see note 112 supra, suggests that such liberal subsidies will not,
in general, be forthcoming.
119. THE BuDGEr OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMxENT, FiscAL YEAR 1972 (ArPPNDIX) 52
(1971).
120. 42 US.C. §§ 1469-1469(c) (Supp. V, 1970). Estimated expenditures in 1971 In.
curred for NDP and the diminishing number of traditional urban renewal projects
amounted to 939 million dollars. THE BuDGEr OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1972 (APPENDix) 532 (1971).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1457 (Supp. IV, 1969). It should be noted, however, that when
Barnet Lieberman questioned code enforcement officials in thirty-nine cities during 1905
and 1966 about their relationship with urban renewal and public housing subsidy pro.
grams, he found:
To the question, "To what extent is code enforcement tied in or coordinated
wiith the urban renewal or public housing programs?" 34 percent answered "none."
-Only 10 percent described the relationship between the urban renewal agency
and the code agency as "close." In 54 percent of the municipalities, it was stated
that the "tie-in" or "coordination" is minimal, as, for example, (1) in survey In.
spections'by the code agency for Part I urban renewal applications by the LPA;
,(2),in the use of the code agency as a last resort against recalcitrant property owners
in- conservation areas; (3) in the making of relocation inspections by the code agency;
and (4) in the renewal agency's use of housing inspectors to obtain entry for surveys
of housing conditions in rehabilitation areas.
It was interesting to observe the feeling and emphasis put into the answers to
the question about LPA interest in a code compliance program. Thirty-four percent
of the officials unhesitatingly used the word "none" and 21 percent replied "lmfited"
or "very little." In only 20 percent of the municipalities was the interest described
as "positive" or "good."
B. LIEBERMAE, supra note 2, at 10-I. This data was, of course, collected during the earliest
stages of the federally supported concentrated code enforcement program and before
the NDP program was established in 1968; it is possible that a survey taken today would
yield somewhat 'different results.
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inflation at the expense of some of the NDP's original inhabitants
who will flee the area in their search for lower rents.
22
To many, of course, all this will simply suggest that "urban renewal,"
despite latter-day modifications intended to restrain its use on behalf
of the rich and merchant classes, remains, at the very least, a device
which will serve the black lower-middle class without much concern for
the black proletariat and lumpen proletariat. But there is another, ad-
mittedly more optimistic, way of considering the matter. While our
society decades ago committed itself to the promise of a decent home
for every American,2 3 we have never been clear as to why we made
this promise precisely because we have never soberly considered the
relationship of this commitment to the larger question of income dis-
tribution; nor have we even seriously sought to establish the extent
to which regulation of the private housing sector related to the housing
subsidy policies which were being contemporaneously pursued. In-
stead, one aspect of housing policy has been isolated from its comple-
ment and the entire problem of "decent housing" isolated from the
larger issue of income distribution of which it is an important part.
Doubtless this intellectual failure does not in itself adequately explain
the inadequacies of contemporary housing policy, which in many re-
spects can be traced to a basic failure of political will. Nevertheless,
this essay is premised on the notion that our inability to relate subsidy
policy to regulation of the private sector has been abetted to a great
extent by a failure to think through the fundamental conceptual prob-
lems involved in regulating housing markets on behalf of the poor,
and that a sustained public discussion of these matters will contribute
significantly to the development of a more sophisticated and humane
housing policy.
C.
Our analysis of the conditions under which effective code enforce-
ment is desirable may also cast some light upon the propriety of the pro-
liferating number of legal remedies granted to poor tenants proposed
in the literature or enacted by legislatures and courts. While the law
122. Particularly penurious dmigrds from NDP, who qualify for subsidy under the
conditions stated in note 117 supra, are eligible for the grants available under the Uni-
form Relocation Act, which are described in note 112 supra. The significance of this
subsidy effort in ameliorating the burden upon dmigrds has, however, already been dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph in the text.
123. See United States Housing Act of 1937, § 1, 50 Stat. 888.
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here is in an especially chaotic condition,124 it may be possible to clarify
the confusion somewhat by recognizing that tenant rights may be ex.
124. In the absence of legislative action, common law notions of property rights and
the principle that the covenants in a lease are independent have traditionally re-
stricted tenant rights and remedies even where the landlord breached an express promise
to repair. In an action by the landlord to recover rent, courts did recognize the defense
of constructive eviction, however, but only where the tenant showed an actual abandon.
ment due to outrageous conditions, 1 Amrxuc LAw or PROPERTY § 3.51 (A. Casner
ed. 1952). More recently, several modern court decisions, most notably in the District
of Columbia, have broken away from these traditional doctrines. See Javins v. First
National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) holding that notwithstanding
the terms of the lease, the landlord is obligated to maintain the premises in habitable
condition and his failure to perform will entitle the tenant to withhold his rent-,
Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) declaring a lease void as an
illegal contract because knowingly executed by the landlord in violation of the local
housing code. See also Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1970);
Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. Hawaii 1969) holding that in the lease of a
dwelling there is an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for its intended use.
Movements on the judicial front, however, are dwarfed in significance by an Increasing
amount of legislative activity taking various forms. Five states have enacted repair and
deduct statutes whereby tenants are authorized to make their own repairs and deduct
the cost from the rent. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1971) (provided the cost does
not exceed one month's rent); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (1952) (provided the cost
is "just and reasonable"); MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 42-202 (1961) (provided the cost does
not exceed one month's rent); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1960) (no express limitation
on the cost of the repairs); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (1951) (no express limitation on
the cost of repairs). Ten others have gone further and enacted rent withholding or abate.
ment statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-347a-h (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23
(Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Supp. 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127C
(1967), as amended, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 127C (Supp. 1970), MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 239,
§ 8A (Supp. 1971); MiH. Comsi. LAws ANN. §§ 125.530, 534 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 441.570 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-79 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. MuLT. DwELL, LAW
§ 302-a (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. REAL PRoP. AcTIONs AND PROc. LAW § 755 (McKinney
Supp. 1970), amending N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIoNs AND PROC. LAW § 755 (McKinney 1963);
N.Y. REAL PROP. AcroNs AND PRoc. LAw §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. Soc.
WVELARE LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971): R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-24.2-11 (Supp. 1970). Many of these statutes provide that actions
may be initiated either by a public agency (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Supp. 1970)), a
welfare department (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Soc. WrLvA, LAW
§ 143-b (McKinney 1966)) or housing department (see, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN,
§§ 19-347a-h (1969)), or by the tenant himself acting alone (MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A
(Supp. 1969)), or jointly with others (N.Y. REAmL PROP. AcriONS AND PROC. LAW §§ 769-82
(McKinney Supp. 1970) requiring participation by one-third of the tenants in the build-
ing). Other statutes provide the tenant with a defense to an action for summary eviction
(N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS AND PRoc. LAw § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1970), amending N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTIONS AND PROC. LAw § 755 (McKinney 1963)). The usual prerequisites for ti
statutory remedy is a code violation certified as causing the dwelling to be "unfit for
human habitation" (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971)), or "dangerous, hazardous
or detrimental to life or health" (N.Y. Soc. WELFVARE LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966)).
Once a violation has been certified, rents typically must be deposited in some form of
escrow account and the landlord is generally given a period of time such as 90 days (ILL,
ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (Supp. 1970)) or 6 months (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp,
1971)) to make the necessary repairs. Sometimes the period of time available to the landlord
is not explicitly defined, requiring only that he have a reasonable opportunity to make
the repairs (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-79 (Supp. 1971)). If the landlord fails to make the
repairs, the rents are either returned to the tenants (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 1700-1
(Supp. 1971)), or allocated to a receiver appointed to make the repairs for him (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347c (1969)), or an administrative penalty may be assessed on the
withheld rent (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, (Supp. 1971)).
Some authors have urged courts and legislators to go beyond this and recognize
slumlordism as a tort. Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MxcHi. L. Riv. 869
(1967). But see Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 Mxcx.
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panded to protect two very different interests. On the one hand, a
tenant may be given greater legal recourse when his reasonable expec-
tations as to the condition of the premises have been disappointed.
Consider, for example, the plight of the tenant who moved into his
apartment believing (reasonably) that it was adequately heated, only
to find it freezing during the winter. Under the old regime, the tenant
was of course obliged to continue paying rent in the absence of an ex-
press landlord covenant to provide adequate heat upon whose fulfill-
ment the tenant's obligation to pay rent had been explicitly made
dependent; under the new, he might be entitled (a) to quit the
premises and remain free of his obligations to continue rental payments
required by his lease under an expanded doctrine of "constructive
eviction" or (b) to put his rent into escrow until heat is restored or
(c) to obtain a court appointed receiver charged with rehabilitating the
heating system or (d) to demand even more drastic remedies. While
much can be said concerning the propriety of the frozen tenant's de-
mands, the fact remains that at least certain forms of relief may be
justified on the ground that the tenant's reasonable expectations as to
the quality of his apartment are entitled to legal protection.
In contrast to the "expectation interest," however, the expansion of
tenant rights may be understood to protect an interest in a "decent
home." Consider, for example, a tenant who moves into a freezing
apartment in mid-winter and thus is perfectly well aware of the defect
in the heating system. If this tenant is to be given any form of legal
protection when he later attempts to induce the landlord to provide
heat, it must be on the ground that the landlord has an affirmative ob-
ligation to redistribute some of his income to his tenantry for tie sake
of providing him with a "decent home." It should be apparent to the
reader that the ethical and economic analysis which we have attempted
in the body of this essay is relevant to a consideration of this claim.
Most important, our discussion suggests that localized rent-withhold-
ing actions cannot be expected to be terribly successful in vindicating
L R v. 451 (1968); Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MAicu. L. REv. 465
(1968). Where a claim is based on the proposed tort theory, the tenant would not be
required to show physical injury or severe emotional distress; instead, the court would
examine the conduct of the landlord and the availability of housing alternatives to the
tenant to determine whether there had been an "imposition of outrageous conditions."
Sax & Hiestand, supra, at 889-906.
These trends, together with recommended extensions, have been examined in numerous
law review commentaries. See, e.g., Schoshinski, Remndies of the Indigent Tenant:
Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966); Comment, Rent Withholding and the
Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CAIF. L. REv. 304 (1965); Note, Rent With.
holding for Minnesota: A Proposal, 55 MINN. L. REv. 82 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions:
Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YA.m UJ. 1868 (1968).
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the "decent home" interest if they simply induce the isolated target
landlord to improve his building. For in the medium run-if not the
short run-the landlord will succeed in increasing his rent substan-
tially as the residents of the surrounding slum find the improved apart-
ments more desirable. Consequently, whatever virtue rent strikes may
have in giving the poor a sense of self respect, they will frequently be
rather ineffective income redistribution devices. The same may be said
for even more drastic remedies, like receiverships and the suggestion
that slumlordism be made a tort. If, however, rent withholding and
similar actions are more than sporadic and isolated affairs, their value
as a redistributive device holds greater promise. Traditional code en.
forcement methods are not only quite costly, but are often ineffective;
if tenant organizations can achieve broad effectiveness throughout a
particular Slumville, a properly drawn rent withholding statute may
provide a mechanism by which tenant organizations may themselves take
on the task of enforcing the code on a wide ranging basis. And, as we
have shown, comprehensive code enforcement permits a significant pos-
sibility of substantial income redistribution in a wide range of situa.
tions. Of course, if there is a broadly based tenant organization in
Slumville, it might not be necessary for the group to institute a large
number of rent withholding actions in order to induce the landlords
to obey the housing code. So long as a rent strike action is a credible
threat, its deterrent value alone may lead most landlords to believe
that code conformity is the best policy. Indeed, even if tenant organi-
zations will never be so well developed as to bear the full weight of
enforcing the code comprehensively, they may develop sufficiently to
serve as a supplement to the city's enforcement efforts.
D.
Perhaps the most notable quality of property law in the United States
is the extent to which its characteristic doctrines and institutions re-
main insulated from the broader currents of legal thinking. I refer not
only to hoary problems such as whether specific performance should
be granted in land transactions although the remedy is not generally
available in other areas. Even analyses of the more "modem" legal in-
stitutions which structure contemporary land development seem highly
idiosyncratic when viewed from a broader perspective. Thus, discus-
sions of zoning rarely consider whether anything can be learned from
other governmental efforts at industrial regulation.1 25 Nor have I ever
125. For exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of
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seen a sophisticated and sustained legally oriented comparison between
the regulatory pattern imposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
and that mandated by the Federal Reserve Board.
In suggesting that these comparisons-and hundreds of others-be
considered seriously, I do not mean to argue that there are no good
reasons for the distinctive characteristics of the legal institutions which
surround land development. Indeed, this essay has attempted to trace
a systematic relationship between property law problems-revolving
around tenants' organizations, tenants' private remedies, code enforce-
ment and housing subsidies-with more general considerations of in-
come redistribution policy. Nevertheless, in testing property doctrine
against a larger framework, I have little doubt that much deadwood
will be revealed. Freed from provincialism by comparative analysis, prop-
erty lawyers will be in a much better position to design institutions
which will more effectively deal with the distinctive character of land
development. While some work along these lines has been attempted
in the past, much more needs to be done with dispatch if lawyers are
to deal coherently with the pressing problems of both the center city
and the suburban fringe.
the Content of the Master Plan, I J. Lmw & EcoN. 170 (1958); Comment, The General
Welfare, Welfare Economics, and Zoning Variances, 38 S. C. L. Rmv. 548 (1965).
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